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Abstract
These essays examine how economic agents strategically choose to produce, manipulate,
or disclose information, when that information can influence the behaviour of others. By
theoretically modelling these choices, it seeks to contribute to debates about the optimal
design of policies such as transparency rules, the regulation of lobbying, or the concen-
tration of ownership among information providers such as media groups. The models
developed in these essays also provide a framework to interpret and evaluate empirical
assessments of how information influences behaviour.
The first chapter looks at how interest groups choose to generate information to in-
fluence policies. It innovates on the literature by explicitly modelling the choice of policy
makers to obtain their own confidential internal information ahead of interactions with
these groups. This approach reveals unintended consequences of transparency policies and
the subtle role that institutions such as congressional research agencies can have on the
quality of policy making.
The second chapter studies how agents choose to produce new information, for instance
by running experiments, in the presence of competing information providers. In particular,
it examines whether these agents produce more information when they compete than
when they collude. The existing literature has established that when these agents possess
no existing information, competition always increases the amount of new information
produced. I show that when agents do possess prior information, this conclusion does not
necessarily hold.
The third chapter analyses how policy choices are affected when voters have a limited
capacity to correctly interpret information about policy performance. In a situation where
policy performance provides information about the competence of policy makers, and
where voters decide whether to re-elect incumbents based on that information, voters may
benefit from these cognitive limitations as they can induce policy makers to choose better
policies.
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Chapter 1
The value of confidential policy
information: persuasion,
transparency, and influence
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1.1 Introduction
Transparent policy making is often considered a defining feature of democracy.1 When
the information available to policy makers is easily accessible, the public can scrutinise
policy decisions and hold elected representatives accountable.
While governments have started disclosing the identity of external sources of informa-
tion and the interests they represent, through bills such as the Lobbying Disclosure Act
in 1995 in the US or the Transparency of Lobbying Act in the UK in 2014, they continue
to defend forcefully the confidentiality of internal sources. For example, the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) in the US has strictly restricted access to its research for the last
30 years.2 One of the arguments advanced by the CRS to defend the confidentiality of its
reports is the risk of influence by outsiders: “Widespread public dissemination will almost
certainly increase partisan and special interest pressure [...]. Such pressure from the public
[...] could subtly affect the way CRS authors write their reports. Congress may ultimately
benefit less from the information in CRS Reports.”3
This argument suggests that there can be a cost associated with the transparency of
internal information. This cost is closely tied to the co-existence of internal and external
sources of information, and to the influence that special interest groups can exert on
the policy process. While internal information is obtained through formal institutions
such as parliamentary research services, government agencies, or committees (Howlett
2015), external information is generally provided by lobbyists on behalf of special interest
groups (Esterling 2004). In 2016, lobbying expenditures in the US amounted to $3.15
billion. These resources, used to transmit information to policy makers, are much larger
than campaign contributions – which amounted to less than $500 million for the whole
2015/2016 electoral cycle – and therefore represent an important channel of influence.4
In this paper, I evaluate the effect of keeping internal information confidential on
the provision of external information. I extend theories of informational lobbying – the
influence of interest groups through the provision of information, rather than through
monetary contributions – by explicitly considering policy makers’ control over their inter-
1As an example, Angel Gurr´ıa, OECD Secretary–General stated in a recent speech that “The OECD
has been at the forefront of efforts to promote and protect the free flow of information. We believe this to
be a fundamental human right.” (Source OECD.org).
2This was formally expressed in 1980 when, in response to a subpoena by the Federal Trade Commission
on behalf of oil companies to access all CRS research related to the oil industry, the Senate issued a
resolution stating that “The communications of the Congressional Research Service to the members and
committees of the Congress are under the custody and control of the Congress.” (S. Res. 396, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1980, cited in https://fas.org/sgp/crs/crs041807.pdf).
3See https://fas.org/sgp/crs/considerations.pdf.
4Campaign contributions from PACs only, excluding individual donations. Source: Center for Respon-
sive Politics.
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nal information. This approach reveals a novel channel by which confidentiality can be
beneficial: by keeping their own information confidential, policy makers can induce special
interest groups to provide more evidence. The value of confidentiality to policy makers
is not driven by reputational concerns or bargaining considerations, and can therefore be
socially beneficial. Characterising policy makers’ strategic choices of internal information
allows me to derive testable predictions on the value of confidentiality, and to show that
empirical assessments of influence should account for the role of government expertise.
The provision of information by special interest groups depends on policy makers’
choices of internal information and on whether that information is confidential. When
interest groups can observe the information already available to policy makers, they can
produce evidence that is just sufficiently accurate to tilt the policy decision in their favour.
When the information available to the government is not publicly available, interest groups
form beliefs about the information policy makers are most likely to have. These beliefs
determine whether interest groups want to offer more or less information: if they believe
that policy makers are likely to be sceptical about their preferred policy, then they need
to offer more evidence. Therefore, policy makers should shape their preliminary investi-
gations to let lobbyists believe that they are sufficiently sceptical and that more evidence
is needed.
I formalise this intuition to address the following questions. First, when is confiden-
tiality valuable to policy makers, and therefore most likely to be used by governments?
Second, how does the government’s control over internal investigations affect the influence
that special interest groups exert on policy making?
To answer these questions, I consider a model with a single policy maker and a lobbyist.
The policy maker has to decide whether to enact a new policy that is supported by the
lobbyist, but faces uncertainty. In the first stage, the policy maker chooses the precision
of a signal about an unknown state of nature that she receives confidentially. She would
like to choose the welfare-maximising policy given the state, but her limited expertise
constrains the precision of her signal. The lobbyist also acquires some independent signals
and commits to revealing them to the policy maker. This allows him to engage in Bayesian
persuasion: his expertise is not limited and he can perfectly adjust the precision of his
information to persuade the policy maker to choose his preferred policy.
I show that confidentiality is valuable as it forces the lobbyist to choose an investigation
that reveals more evidence than necessary to persuade the policy maker. By keeping her
own signal realisations confidential, the policy maker strategically creates a situation of
11
asymmetric information which allows her to extract informational rent. This occurs even
when her preliminary information would have no effect on her policy choice, in the absence
of lobbying.
This result can explain why governments sometimes insist on the confidentiality of
their information, while lobbyists criticise the lack of access to that information. For
instance, when the UK government refused to publish studies evaluating the impact of
Brexit between 2016 and 2017, one of the groups it received evidence from, the Food and
Drink Association, stated that “[The] Government has a duty to share this analysis with
the sector so businesses can prepare”.5
A puzzling aspect of this confidentiality is that this information does not always re-
veal some government wrongdoing, or weakens the government’s negotiating position. For
instance, the research produced by the CRS is available to the whole congress, and there-
fore cannot affect the bargaining power of a legislator against other members of congress.
Similarly, while some members of the UK government worried that revealing information
on the impact of Brexit might have weakened the government’s bargaining position with
the European Union, it also seems unlikely that EU negotiators did not already possess
similar information.6 Strengthening the government’s negotiating position therefore does
not seem to be the only reason for the confidentiality of these studies. This model suggests
an explanation for this puzzle by showing that confidentiality can be valuable even in the
absence of reputational concerns.
The value of confidentiality has limits, however. I show that the policy maker may
need to distort her own information, in order to induce the lobbyist to provide more
evidence than he would like to. These distortions involve reducing the precision of certain
conclusions of the investigation, and hence reduce its overall informativeness. There is
thus a trade-off between obtaining information internally and extracting it from external
sources.
A second result of this analysis is therefore that the value of confidentiality is non-
monotonic in the policy maker’s expertise and her ideological alignment with lobbyists.
When government expertise is low, the value of confidentiality increases in expertise,
5In a study of interest groups access to legislators in Estonia conducted by the Praxis Center for Policy
Studies, over 50% of them emphasised that information from the government was not easily accessible
(Jemmer 2014). There is also evidence that lobbyists adapt their strategies to the transparency of the
policy process. Matthews Luxon (2012) shows that lobby groups react to lower government transparency
by making their lobbying tactics more specialised. As a result, some groups specialise in offering evidence
to support policy proposals when transparency is lower, while this specialisation does not occur when
transparency is high.
6Indeed, this point was raised by a member of the opposition requesting the studies to be published
when he asked in a Commons debate: “Do they [the government] honestly believe that the EU has not
carried out its own assessments of what Brexit will mean for those 58 areas?” (HC Deb (01 Nov 2017)).
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as more expertise allows the policy maker to extract more evidence from the lobbyist.
However, when expertise is high, that value eventually declines as the additional gains
from inducing the lobbyist to provide more information are relatively less important,
compared to the costs of distorting internal information. The policy maker’s predisposition
to accept the lobbyist’s preferred policy, measured by their ideological alignment, also
affects the amount of evidence produced and therefore the value of confidentiality. I show
that confidentiality is most valuable when the ideological alignment between the policy
maker and the lobbyist is neither too low nor too high.
Finally, modeling the policy maker’s choice of internal investigation reveals that the
influence of the lobbyist on policy can sometimes increase in the government’s expertise.
This arises because more expertise can make the policy maker more likely to choose the
lobbyist’s least-preferred policy and therefore makes the lobbyist’s presence even more
important to overturn that choice. This occurs despite the fact that expertise improves
policy choice and makes the policy maker better-off. Similarly, an increase in alignment
can correspond to a decrease in influence – even though more alignment makes persuasion
easier for the lobbyist – because it can make the policy maker more likely to choose the
lobbyist’s preferred policy in the absence of lobbying.
These results have both positive implications for evaluating the influence of interest
groups, and normative consequences for the optimal design of institutions.
Consider the fact that the resources spent on lobbying in the US have significantly
increased in real terms over the last 15 years, while the budget of the Congressional
Research Service has remained relatively constant or even declined, as shown in figure
1.1. This observation could suggest that information generation is increasingly being
outsourced to external groups whose influence has therefore increased over time. This
paper proposes an alternative explanation: even when their capacity to gather information
internally is reduced, policy makers can force lobbyists to provide additional information,
and therefore expend more resources, so these changes in fact reflect a loss of influence.
Which of these two explanations is correct depends on how these sources of information
interact. More generally, the model reveals that careful consideration of the counterfactual
policy choice in the absence of lobbying is required to correctly interpret empirical evidence
on influence. Since the choice of internal investigation differs in the absence of lobbying,
the default policy choice can also differ, and influence should not be simply measured as
the probability of a policy change following lobbying efforts. The results also show that
research designs that fail to control for government expertise may produce biased estimates
13
of the returns to lobbying, as expertise can be correlated with both lobbying resources and
the probability of a policy change.
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Figure 1.1: Lobbying resources (LHS) and Congressional Research Service budget (RHS),
inflation-adjusted. Sources: CRS annual report and Center for Responsive Politics.
Secondly, the results explain why policy makers may prefer their information to be
confidential in certain policy areas but publicly available in others, and how the choice of
confidentiality can vary over time as the policy agenda evolves or new, more technocratic,
policy makers get elected. These strategic preferences for confidentiality can be positively
correlated with the quality of policy making even in the absence of a causal relationship
between the two variables. Islam (2006) reports that higher levels of transparency are as-
sociated with better governance and concludes that “there is a strong positive relationship
between transparency and governance, with the likely effect running from the former to
the latter”. Focusing on the effect of government transparency on informational lobbying
suggests that there can be other factors, such as government expertise, moving both of
these variables without the existence of a causal link between them. In fact, the model
shows that shining too much light on the policy process can reduce the quality of policy
making, and therefore have adverse consequences beyond those already identified in the
literature (see e.g. Prat 2005).
Related literature
This paper relates to two strands of literature: models of informational lobbying and
studies of transparency in political institutions. It shows that these two questions are
linked: transparency determines how information should be allowed to flow between policy
makers and lobbyists which, in turn, affects the type of information lobbyists choose to
14
provide.
A large literature has looked at how information is transmitted to legislators by lobby-
ists (e.g. Potters & van Winden (1992), Austen-Smith & Wright (1992), Rasmusen (1993),
Austen-Smith (1993), Lagerlof (1997)). The most closely related papers within that liter-
ature study how informational lobbying is affected by information already held by policy
makers. Felgenhauer (2013) shows that expert politicians are not always better at making
decisions than non-experts in the presence of lobbyists. In his model, the expertise of the
politician cannot affect the information provided by a single lobby and only has an effect
when two lobbies compete. By allowing the information to be concealed, I show that even
a single lobby can be induced to provide more information as the politician’s expertise
increases. Cotton & Dellis (2016) show that informational lobbying can be detrimental
if more information provided by lobbyists shifts the focus of a policy maker towards less
important issues and thus reduces the information she collects. This substitution across
the two sources of information relies on the existence of multiple policies and the limited
capacity of the policy maker to act on these different policies. Substitution arises in my
model even with one policy dimension because information can be confidential, so that
the policy maker’s choice of information affects the beliefs of lobbyists and the amount
of evidence they want to provide. Finally, in Ellis & Groll (2017), the trade-off between
acquiring costly information in-house or relying on that provided by lobbyists comes from
the difference in resource constraints of these two sources. Information is costless in my
model and the interaction between the two types of information relies on whether that
information is made public or not.7Another closely related paper, Cotton & Li (2018),
studies the effect of internal information on monetary lobbying. They show that because
a better informed politician might be harder to sway through contributions, politicians
might prefer to remain uninformed or to reduce the informativeness of the signals they
obtain. While they share some of the implications of this paper, they focus on the effect
of internal information on monetary contributions rather than on information provision.
Since influence can take both forms, this paper is complementary to theirs. With in-
formational lobbying, additional information from the politician can be detrimental even
when the politician wants to choose the socially optimal policy rather than to maximise
contributions.
7Other papers also study how political institutions affect the influence of informational lobbying.
Bennedsen & Feldmann (2002a) look at the effect of the vote of confidence procedure, Bennedsen &
Feldmann (2002b) at party cohesion, Dellis & Oak (2018) at the legislature’s subpoena power, while Dahm
& Porteiro (2008a) and Wolton (2018) look at the interaction between informational lobbying and other
forms of pressure. Finally, Schnakenberg (2017) shows how the presence of multiple legislators who can
communicate affects informational lobbying.
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In the transparency literature, Felgenhauer (2010) and Gailmard & Patty (2018) study
the effect of making policy makers’ information public.8 Felgenhauer (2010) finds that
confidentiality can be beneficial to the public as it can induce lobbyists to refrain from
providing monetary contributions and therefore result in better policy decisions. In his
paper, more internal information results in both a better decision and less influence from
lobbyists and is therefore unambiguously valuable. By looking at informational instead
of monetary lobbying, I show that more precise information can be detrimental and can
make confidentiality less valuable.9 Gailmard & Patty (2018) find that transparency of
the policy maker’s information can reduce the amount of information transmitted from a
bureaucrat and show that the policy maker prefers opacity over transparency if preferences
are sufficiently different. By focusing on delegation in bureaucracies, rather than interest
group influence, they introduce a trade-off between authority and information aggregation
which leads to a focus on the choice of delegation rule rather than distortions in the policy
maker’s information.
From a technical perspective, this paper is related to the literature on Bayesian persua-
sion. Kamenica & Gentzkow (2011) identify the optimal signal that a sender can design
to persuade a single receiver, assuming that both sender and receiver are symmetrically
informed about the state of the world. The results developed in their paper are used
throughout this paper. A number of recent papers look at how these results change when
the receiver is privately informed.10 The most closely related studies in this literature are
Guo & Shmaya (2018) and Kolotilin (2018). In both papers, a sender chooses an optimal
information structure to persuade a privately informed receiver. Guo & Shmaya (2018)
provide a general solution for the sender’s persuasion strategy when the receiver’s infor-
mation is correlated with the state. Kolotilin (2018) restricts attention to the case where
payoffs are linear in types and the receiver’s type is uncorrelated with the state and shows
that, under certain conditions, the receiver’s payoff can be decreasing in the precision of
her private information. My results show that, if the receiver were to choose her private
information, she would indeed prefer to keep it private as long as its precision is limited.
8A large literature has shown how transparency of an agent’s actions can be damaging in a number of
institutions, including decision making in committees of experts (Levy (2007), Meade & Stasavage (2008),
Seidmann (2011), Swank & Visser (2013), Hansen et al. (2017), Fehrler & Hughes (2018), Gradwohl &
Feddersen (2018)) or by a single expert (Fox & Van Weelden (2012)), political accountability (Fox (2007),
Stasavage (2007), Malesky et al. (2012), Carey (2013) Benesch et al. (2018)), international negotiations
(Stasavage (2004), Naurin (2007)), or more general principal-agent relationships (Prat (2005)).
9Another key difference is that monetary contributions have no social value so the trade-off faced by the
politician in Felgenhauer (2010) is between accepting the lobbyist’s contribution and choosing the socially
valuable policy.
10See for instance, Li & Shi (2017) in a bilateral trade setup, Basu (2017) in a dynamic setting, and Au
(2015) and Kolotilin et al. (2017) for the case where the receiver’s private information is about her payoffs
rather than about the state of the world.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model. Section
1.3 provides the main results: it shows how the policy maker gains from confidentiality
and characterises both the lobbyist’s choice of persuasion strategy and the policy maker’s
choice of preliminary investigation. Section 1.4 shows that confidentiality is only valuable
when expertise or ideological alignment are not too high, and that interest group influence
varies non-monotonically in these two variables. Section 1.5 discusses the implications of
these results and section 1.6 concludes. All proofs are presented in appendix.
1.2 Model
The model has two players: a policy maker and a lobbyist, and three stages. In the first
stage, the policy maker can acquire some information about a binary state of the world
ω ∈ {0, 1}. In the second stage, the lobbyist acquires some additional information about ω
to present to the policy maker. All players share a prior µ0 ··= P(ω = 1). Throughout the
paper a belief refers to the probability that the state is ω = 1, unless otherwise specified.
In the final stage, the policy maker chooses a policy x ∈ {0, 1} whose consequences
are uncertain. The policy maker wants the policy to match the state. Her preferences are
represented by the payoff function
u(x, ω) =

1 if x = ω,
0 if x 6= ω
By contrast, the lobbyist cares about the final action of the policy maker independently
of the state, and wants her to choose policy x = 1. His preferences are represented by the
payoff function
v(x) =

1 if x = 1,
0 if x = 0
Because of the uncertainty, the policy maker would like to obtain more information
about the state. This information can come from two sources. In the first stage, she
can launch a preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation consists of a pair of
conditional probability distributions over binary signal realisations r ∈ {r0, r1}, for each
17
value of the state:11
p = {p(r|ω = 1), p(r|ω = 0)}
The policy maker updates her beliefs according to Bayes rule upon observing r ∈ {r0, r1},
to
µr = P(ω = 1|r) = p(r|ω = 1)µ0
p(r|ω = 1)µ0 + p(r|ω = 0)(1− µ0)
The information provided by a preliminary investigation is therefore captured by the
posterior beliefs it can induce: µr0 or µr1 .
In the second stage, the policy maker obtains additional information from the lobbyist.
The lobbyist produces evidence in the same way as the policy maker does, by choosing
an investigation which produces one of two signals s0 and s1. Since the lobbyist uses this
investigation to attempt to persuade the policy maker, I refer to this choice of investigation
as the lobbyist’s persuasion strategy and denote it pi. A persuasion strategy consists of a
pair of probability distributions over realisations s ∈ {s0, s1} conditional on ω:
pi = {pi(s|ω = 1), pi(s|ω = 0)}
Before s is realised, the lobbyist can credibly commit to revealing it to the policy maker.
The lobbyist therefore cannot conceal his evidence or lie about it. This commitment
assumption is a standard feature of the Bayesian persuasion literature (see e.g. Kamenica
& Gentzkow 2011) and has been used to model informational lobbying (e.g. Austen-Smith
1998, Cotton & Dellis 2016). Given the focus of this paper on the policy maker’s ability
to mitigate influence, allowing the lobbyist to have full commitment provides the most
demanding benchmark: it captures a situation in which the lobbyist has a significant
advantage and where influence is hardest to mitigate.12
The lobbyist’s strategic choice is therefore over which of many possible signal structures
to choose to affect the policy maker’s posterior beliefs. I denote the posterior belief of the
11In the appendix, I discuss the possibility that the policy maker has access to a more complex investi-
gation generating more than two signals and show that the main insights continue to hold.
12There are a number of situations in which this assumption is satisfied. For instance, special interest
groups may fund and help design scientific studies. Once the results of these studies are released in peer-
reviewed publications, special interest groups can no longer control their disclosure (for examples, see
White & Bero 2010, Kearns et al. 2016, Nestle 2016). Pharmaceutical companies have also funded patient
advocacy groups to send patients to testify in Congress (Kopp et al. 2018). The companies can influence
what patients are likely to reveal, but do not have control over the final testimony, so this type of influence
strategy is akin to running an uncertain experiment and committing to disclosing the results.
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policy maker following realisations r and s by µrs ··= P(ω = 1|s, r).
Acquiring information is costless for both players. However, a key feature of the model
is that the policy maker’s expertise, i.e. her capacity to produce information, is limited.
Formally, expertise is captured by a bound B ∈ [1,+∞) on the likelihood ratios of the
signals r. So that, for every p,
1
B
≤ p(r|ω)
p(r|ω′) ≤ B
This bound implies that the policy maker cannot learn the state of the world perfectly:
the posterior beliefs µr must belong to an interval
[
µ, µ¯
] ⊂ [0, 1]. The lowest and highest
posterior beliefs that she can induce are: µ = µ0µ0+(1−µ0)B and µ¯ =
Bµ0
Bµ0+(1−µ0) . The pa-
rameter B captures the difference in expertise between the policy maker and the lobbyist.
The lobbyist’s advantage stems from facing no expertise bound as, in effect, B = +∞ for
him.
I refer to the preliminary investigation p such that p(r0|ω=0)p(r0|ω=1) =
p(r1|ω=1)
p(r1|ω=0) = B as the the
most informative preliminary investigation available and denote it p¯. This investigation
induces interim beliefs µr0 = µ and µr1 = µ¯. When the policy maker chooses that
preliminary investigation, I say that she makes full use of her expertise.
Under confidentiality, the policy maker’s choice of preliminary investigation p is pub-
licly observed by the lobbyist, but not its outcome r.13 The choice of persuasion strategy
pi can therefore be conditioned on p but not on r.
The timing is as follows:
1. The policy maker publicly chooses a preliminary investigation p.
2. r ∈ {r0, r1} is realised but only observed by the policy maker.
3. The lobbyist chooses a persuasion strategy pi after observing p.
4. s ∈ {s0, s1} is publicly realised.
5. The policy maker updates her beliefs and chooses x ∈ {0, 1}.
Under transparency, the timing is the same, but the lobbyist can observe the realised
r and therefore condition pi on both p and r.
13This corresponds to examples mentioned in the introduction in which the type of information obtained
by the government was known, but the results were kept confidential. More generally, policy makers can
run pilot projects, or commission reports from the civil service in visible ways without publicising the
results of these investigations. In the appendix, I show that the policy maker does not need to commit to
keeping that information confidential: if she had the possibility to disclose it, she would never choose to
do so in equilibrium.
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The equilibrium concept is weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium: the players’ strategies
are sequentially rational given their beliefs, and beliefs are updated according to Bayes
rule whenever possible.14 I focus on pure strategy equilibria within this class.15
Policy choice
I begin by solving for the policy maker’s choice of policy x in the final stage of the game,
given some generic belief µ. The policy maker chooses policy x = 0 (respectively, x = 1)
if she is sufficiently confident that the state is ω = 0 (respectively, ω = 1). I assume that
the policy maker selects x = 1 when indifferent. The policy choice can be expressed as a
function of some generic posterior belief µ:
x(µ) =

0 if µ < 12 ,
1 if µ ≥ 12
Given this strategy x(µ), we can express the policy maker and lobbyist’s expected utilities
as functions of µ. Let U(µ) = µu(x(µ), 1) + (1 − µ)u(x(µ), 0) and V (µ) = v(x(µ)). For
the policy maker,
U(µ) =

1− µ if µ < 12 ,
µ if µ ≥ 12
While for the lobbyist,
V (µ) =

0 if µ < 12 ,
1 if µ ≥ 12
These expected utilities are illustrated in figure 1.2.
I focus on the more interesting case where the policy maker needs to be persuaded
to take action x = 1, that is, I assume that µ0 <
1
2 . The closer the prior belief µ0 is to
1
2 , the more sympathetic the policy maker is to the lobbyist’s proposal (while remaining
unfavourable to that proposal). I therefore refer to an increase in µ0 towards
1
2 as an
14Since players can never signal any private information through their choice of action before the other
player’s move, there is no need to refine beliefs following off-equilibrium actions.
15There cannot exist a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the policy maker mixes across policy choices
in the final stage. If there was, then the lobbyist could always deviate to break the policy maker’s
indifference and increase the probability that she chooses his preferred policy. In addition, mixing across
investigations or persuasion strategies simply leads to another distribution over posterior beliefs, which
could be replicated with a different investigation or persuasion strategy.
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Figure 1.2: Policy maker and lobbyist’s expected utilities
increase in the ideological alignment between the policy maker and the lobbyist.16
For a given p and a given pi, the policy maker’s ex-ante expected utility is
E [U(µ)|(p, pi)] =
∑
r∈{r0,r1}
Pp(r)
∑
s∈{s0,s1}
Ppi(s|r)U (µrs)
Pp(r) is the probability of observing realisation r from the policy maker’s investigation
p: Pp(r) = µ0p(r|1) + (1 − µ0)p(r|0). Similarly, Ppi(s|r) is the probability of observing
realisation s from the lobbyist’s persuasion strategy pi, conditional on having observed
signal r that is: Ppi(s|r) = µrpi(s|1) + (1− µr)pi(s|0).
1.3 The role of confidential policy information
In this section, I explain the core mechanism that allows the policy maker to extract
information from the lobbyist by using her preliminary investigation. I first describe the
players’ strategies when the policy maker’s information is not confidential. I then show
how the lobbyist adapts his strategy to confidentiality and how the policy maker maximises
the benefits from her preliminary investigation.
1.3.1 Transparency
Suppose first that the policy maker’s information is not confidential, so her belief following
a realisation r from her preliminary investigation is the same as that of the lobbyist: µr.
16A policy maker who is more ideologically aligned with a lobbyist is not necessarily a supporter of the
lobbyist’s preferred policy. This definition of ideological alignment corresponds to the idea of proximity
between legislators and lobbyists and is in line with definitions used in the empirical literature. For example
Igan & Mishra (2014) control for legislator–congress fixed effects to account for “potential changes in a
legislator’s general propensity to switch stances across time”.
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Lobbyist’s persuasion strategy
The lobbyist’s strategy, pi, induces a lottery over the policy maker’s posterior beliefs:
with probability Ppi(s0|r), the policy maker will observe signal realisation s0 and update
her belief to µrs0 , while with probability Ppi(s1|r) she will update her belief to µrs1 . The
posterior beliefs satisfy: µrs0 ≤ µr ≤ µrs1 .
The lobbyist only gains when the policy maker chooses x = 1, which requires her
belief to be above 12 . If the belief of the policy maker is such that she already chooses the
lobbyist’s preferred policy (µr ≥ 12), the lobbyist does not need to provide any evidence.
If µr < 12 , a posterior belief above
1
2 can only occur following realisation s1. The
lobbyist’s problem is therefore to maximise the probability that s1 occurs, while ensuring
that the policy maker chooses policy x = 1 after observing that realisation. As shown
in Kamenica & Gentzkow (2011), this is achieved by choosing a persuasion strategy pi
such that the policy maker is just sufficiently persuaded following favourable evidence
(µrs1 =
1
2), and such that unfavourable evidence is as precise as possible (µ
r
s0 = 0). Any
additional favourable evidence (i.e. inducing µrs1 >
1
2) would be wasted, as the policy
maker already chooses the lobbyist’s preferred policy. In addition, any other level of
unfavourable evidence (i.e. µrs0 > 0) would not change the policy maker’s decision and the
lobbyist’s payoff, but would make s0 more likely, which reduces the lobbyist’s expected
utility.
Lemma 1. Under transparency, if the policy maker is not already persuaded (µr < 12),
the lobbyist’s equilibrium persuasion strategy, denoted pir, induces the beliefs µ
r
s1 =
1
2 and
µrs0 = 0, and therefore satisfies
(pir(s1|ω = 1), pir(s1|ω = 0)) =
(
1,
µr
1− µr
)
Note that as µr increases, persuasion becomes easier (Ppir(s1|r) = µrpir(s1|1) + (1 −
µr)pir(s1|0) = 2µr increases), and the lobbyist needs to provide less information (the ‘noise’
from his persuasion strategy, pir(s1|ω = 0) = µr1−µr , increases). This relationship between
the policy maker’s belief and the lobbyist’s strategy will also determine the equilibrium
strategy when the policy maker has confidential information.
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Policy maker’s preliminary investigation
Given this persuasion strategy, the policy maker’s expected utility as a function of her
interim beliefs is
UP (µr0 , µr1) =

∑
r∈{r0,r1} P(r)
[
P pir(s0|r) · 1 + P pir(s1|r) ·
(
1
2
)]
if µr1 < 12 ,
P(r0)
[
P pir0 (s0|r0) · 1 + P pir0 (s1|r0) ·
(
1
2
)]
+ P(r1)µr1 if µr1 ≥ 12
(1.1)
Where the probability of a realisation r, is determined by the pair of interim beliefs
(µr0 , µr1) and the Bayes plausibility constraint that they need to satisfy: P(r0)µr0 +
P(r1)µr1 = µ0.
The policy maker chooses her preliminary investigation to maximise the total informa-
tion that she receives. If her expertise is limited and the interim beliefs µr she can generate
are always below 12 , the policy maker cannot gain from her preliminary information be-
cause the lobbyist will optimally adjust his persuasion strategy to the policy maker’s belief.
The policy maker is therefore indifferent between any preliminary investigation.
If her expertise is sufficiently high and her own investigation can persuade her (µ¯ >
1
2), the lobbyist provides no valuable information following r1 if µ
r1 > 12 . The policy
maker faces a sharp trade-off: if she chooses the most informative investigation herself,
and obtains some belief µ¯ > 12 , the lobbyist stops providing information. This trade-off
is resolved in favour of obtaining more preliminary information: by choosing the most
informative investigation (and inducing µ¯ > 12), she can become more confident in her
policy decision (x = 1) than she would ever be if she were to restrict her information
(µr1 < 12) and rely on the lobbyist’s information.
In both cases, the policy maker does not gain from the lobbyist’s information, and it
is therefore optimal for her to obtain as much preliminary information as possible.17
Proposition 1. Under transparency, the most informative investigation (p¯) is an equilib-
rium strategy for the policy maker.
1.3.2 Confidentiality
Suppose now that the policy maker’s information is confidential. The lobbyist is aware of
the investigation commissioned by the policy maker (p), but does not know the conclusions
of this investigation (r).
17The policy maker does not gain from the lobbyist’s information because it never makes her change her
policy choice. She either continues to prefer policy x = 0 or is indifferent between the two policies.
23
Lobbyist’s persuasion strategy
Under confidentiality, the lobbyist’s persuasion strategy is based on his beliefs about the
realisation of the policy maker’s investigation. Each of these realisations defines a type of
the policy maker which I denote by the realisation of the signal r.
When the policy maker’s interim beliefs (µr) are always below 12 , one realisation of the
lobbyist’s strategy (s0) will not persuade any type. The lobbyist needs to choose between
generating favourable evidence (s1) that persuades both the sceptical type r0 and the
sympathetic type r1 and favourable evidence that only persuades the sympathetic type r1.
When the policy maker’s own preliminary information is sometimes persuasive (µr1 ≥
1
2), the favourable realisation (s1) should always persuade both types but the lobbyist
chooses whether the unfavourable realisation (s0) should fully reveal the state to be ω = 0
as before, or if it should be sufficiently imprecise that the sympathetic type (r1) still prefers
policy x = 1, i.e. µr1s0 ≥ 12 .
In equilibrium, the lobbyist will choose one of two persuasion strategies. In particular,
restricting the lobbyist’s persuasion strategy to binary signals is without loss of generality.
This is illustrated in figure 1.3 for the case where the policy maker is never persuaded by
her own information (µ¯ < 12). If the lobbyist’s favourable evidence is not very informative,
and only induces a belief at point A, it only persuades the sympathetic type (µr1), and
generates a payoff less than 1. If it is more informative, and induces a belief at B, it can
persuade both types and generates a payoff of 1. The optimal persuasion strategy can be
determined by the concavification of this step function.18
I refer to the optimal persuasion strategy which targets the sympathetic type r1 as
the targeted persuasion strategy and denote it piT . If the sympathetic type is not already
persuaded (µr1 < 12), this persuasion strategy should be designed as if the lobbyist knew
that the policy maker had observed r1, that is piT = pir1 , as defined in Lemma 1. When
the sympathetic type is already persuaded (µr1 > 12), favourable evidence (s1) should
persuade the sceptical type (µr0s1 =
1
2) and unfavourable evidence (s0) should leave the
sympathetic type just persuaded to choose policy x = 1 (µr1s0 =
1
2).
18Kolotilin (2018) shows that the problem faced by the lobbyist allocating probabilities across different
possible realisations is a linear programming problem. The relative marginal gains and marginal costs
associated with each realisation can be ranked and one of of the two possible persuasive realisation will
dominate the other. The lobbyist therefore always prefers either the persuasion strategy that exactly
persuades the favourable type r1 or the one that persuades both, but never a combination of these strategies.
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Figure 1.3: In equilibrium, the lobbyist only chooses one of two strategies with binary
signals
Definition 1. Targeted persuasion strategy. piT is the persuasion strategy defined by:
piT s.t.

piT (s1|1) = 1 and piT (s1|0) = µr1(1−µr1 ) if µr1 < 12
piT (s1|0)
piT (s1|1) =
µr0
(1−µr0 ) and
piT (s0|0)
piT (s0|1) =
µr1
(1−µr1 ) if µ
r1 ≥ 12
I call the optimal persuasion strategy which persuades both types a general persuasion
strategy and denote it piG. This strategy should target the sceptical type r0 and be designed
as if the lobbyist knew that the policy maker had observed r0: piG = pir0 , as defined in
Lemma 1.
Definition 2. General persuasion strategy. piG is the persuasion strategy defined by:
piG(s1|1) = 1 and piG(s1|0) = µ
r0
(1− µr0)
Which of these two strategies is optimal depends on the relative likelihood of the two
types (captured by the height of the first step in figure 1.3) and the relative distance
between the beliefs (captured by the distance between points A and B). Specifically, a
general strategy piG requires more favourable evidence, and makes the favourable results
(s1) less likely to arise. On the other hand, persuading only the more sympathetic type
with a targeted strategy piT is easier (requires less evidence and makes s1 more likely), but
the lobbyist no longer guarantees that favourable evidence (s1) always persuades the policy
maker. A similar intuition applies when the policy maker’s own preliminary information
25
(a) Incentive constraint (b) Expertise constraint
Figure 1.4: Set of interim beliefs and incentive and expertise constraints
is sometimes persuasive (µr1 ≥ 12). Formally, the lobbyist chooses piG over piT if:
P piG(s1) > P p(r1)P piT (s1|r1) if µr1 <
1
2
and P piG(s1) > P piT (s1) + P p(r1)P piT (s0|r1) if µr1 ≥
1
2
These conditions can be expressed entirely in terms of the interim beliefs of the policy
maker, µr0 and µr1 . As the sceptical type’s belief becomes more sceptical (µr0 decreases),
the policy maker becomes more likely to be sympathetic (r = r1), and a targeted strategy
piT becomes more attractive. As a result, the lobbyist chooses the targeted strategy piT if
the sceptical type is sufficiently sceptical and the general strategy otherwise. This leads
to the following characterisation of the lobbyist’s equilibrium persuasion strategy.
Lemma 2. Under confidentiality, there is a threshold m∗(µr1) ∈ (0, µ0) such that, for any
µr1 ∈ (µ0, 1), the lobbyist chooses a general persuasion strategy piG if the belief µr0 is above
m∗(µr1), and chooses a targeted strategy piT otherwise.
I refer to the condition µr0 ≥ m∗(µr1) as the incentive constraint. By contrast, I call
expertise constraint the bounds imposed on µr0 and µr1 by the policy maker’s expertise:
µr0 ≥ µ and µr1 ≤ µ¯, and say that beliefs are feasible if they satisfy the expertise constraint.
These constraints are illustrated in figure 1.4.
Intuitively, there are two reasons why the lobbyist prefers a targeted persuasion strat-
egy piT if the interim belief of the sceptical type r0 is too low. First, the more sceptical the
policy maker is, the more evidence the lobbyist has to provide with a general persuasion
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strategy. Second, the more sceptical the policy maker is, conditional on observing r0, the
more likely it is ex-ante that the policy maker is sympathetic (r = r1). Conversely, as the
belief of the sympathetic policy maker µr1 increases, the probability of r1 decreases, which
leads the lobbyist to prefer the general persuasion strategy piG. The threshold m
∗(µr1)
therefore decreases as the sympathetic type becomes more sympathetic (µr1 increases).19
Policy maker’s preliminary investigation
I now turn to the policy maker’s choice of preliminary investigation. I first show under
what conditions the policy maker strictly benefits from confidential information. I then
show that these benefits are limited by the lobbyist’s incentive constraint and characterise
the policy maker’s optimal choice of preliminary investigation.
Gains from confidentiality When information is confidential, the policy maker’s ex-
pected utility as a function of her interim beliefs is
UC(µr0 , µr1) =

∑
r∈{r0,r1} P(r)
∑
s∈{s0,s1} PpiG(s|r)U (µrs) if µr0 ≥ m∗(µr1)∑
r∈{r0,r1} P(r)
∑
s∈{s0,s1} PpiT (s|r)U (µrs) if µr0 < m∗(µr1)
(1.2)
Where, as before, P(r), is determined by the pair of interim beliefs (µr0 , µr1) and the Bayes
plausibility constraint: P(r0)µr0 + P(r1)µr1 = µ0.
The policy maker’s gain from confidential information arises when the lobbyist chooses
a general persuasion strategy: piG is designed to persuade the sceptical type r0 who requires
more evidence to be persuaded. This additional evidence is valuable to the sympathetic
type r1 who gains some informational rent. In other words, had the lobbyist known that
the policy maker was sympathetic, he would have provided less evidence.
The rent obtained from confidential information is captured by the distance between
the belief that the lobbyist would like to induce following favourable evidence (12), and the
belief the sympathetic type actually has (µr1s1). When the latter is strictly above
1
2 , the
policy maker is more confident that choosing policy x = 1 is the correct thing to do: she
is better off because her uncertainty is reduced. This intuition is illustrated in figure 1.5.
When the lobbyist chooses a targeted strategy piT , the policy maker gains no informa-
tional rent since the beliefs induced by the lobbyist never make her strictly prefer policy
19In fact, an opposite effect also takes place: as µr1 increases, the type r1 becomes easier to persuade
which makes the lobbyist less likely to choose piG. The first effect dominates since the decrease in the
probability of the type being r1 is convex, while the gain in the probability of realisation s1 given r1 is
linear.
27
0 = µrs0
µ0 1
2 = µ
r
s1
1
1
2
0.7
1
µ
U
(µ
)
0 = µrs0
µ0 1
2 = µ
r0
s1
µr1s1 1
1
2
0.7
1
Value of
confidential
information
µ
U
(µ
)
Figure 1.5: Distribution of posterior beliefs when the policy maker’s information is public
(left) and when it is confidential and the lobbyist chooses piG (right).
x = 1. A targeted persuasion strategy piT therefore yields the same payoff as public
information.20
These results are formalised in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. For any pair of interim beliefs (µr0 , µr1) the policy maker strictly gains
from confidentiality, UC(µr0 , µr1) > UP (µr0 , µr1), if and only if (µr0 , µr1) satisfies the
incentive constraint: µr0 ≥ m∗(µr1).
For low levels of expertise, the incentive constraint is satisfied even when the policy
maker uses the most informative investigation p¯, and the policy maker strictly gains from
confidentiality relative to the optimal investigation under transparency. Interestingly, if
expertise is so low that µ¯ < 12 , the policy maker would not change her decision based on her
own information and her information would have no value in the absence of lobbying. The
policy maker therefore does not gain from her own information because that information
helps her decision directly, or because she uses this information to audit the information
provided by the lobbyist.21 Instead, the policy maker can gain from her information
indirectly, by inducing the lobbyist to provide additional evidence. While it is natural
to expect the policy maker to gain from having a second source of information, this
mechanism allows her to gain even if that second source of information is redundant from
a policy choice perspective.22
20When information is public, the policy maker allows the lobbyist to perfectly target each of her types.
Since the targeted strategy is designed to just persuade the sympathetic policy maker, a sceptical policy
maker obtains little information. By revealing herself to be sceptical, the policy maker would force the
lobbyist to provide additional evidence to persuade her. However, that additional information would never
be sufficient to make her change her policy choice, so she does not strictly gain from it.
21As for instance in Dellis & Oak (2018).
22The information is redundant in the sense that the lobbyist’s strategy will reveal at least as much
information as the policy maker’s investigation. Alonso & Caˆmara (2018) also show that strategic uses of
redundant information can arise when the sender (rather than the receiver) is privately informed.
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Figure 1.6: Reducing µr0 to µr
′
0 forces the lobbyist to provide more evidence to induce
µr0s1 =
1
2 . This increases µ
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s1 and the policy maker’s expected utility.
Limits of confidentiality and optimal investigation Given a general persuasion
strategy, the policy maker prefers to be as sceptical as possible as this forces the lobbyist
to provide more evidence. This is illustrated in figure 1.6: the lower the sceptical belief
µr0 , the more evidence the lobbyist needs to produce under a general strategy piG to ensure
that the sceptical policy maker chooses policy x = 1 following a good signal (µr0s1 =
1
2),
and the higher the posterior belief of the sympathetic policy maker following a good signal
s1. The policy maker’s expected utility given piG is therefore decreasing in µ
r0 .23
However, to induce the lobbyist to choose that strategy, the policy maker may need to
distort her information. When expertise B is high, making full use of expertise (choosing
p = p¯) induces beliefs (µ, µ¯) that violate the incentive constraint (µ < m∗(µ¯)). The
lobbyist therefore chooses a targeted strategy piT (Lemma 2) which provides less evidence
than a general strategy piG.
The policy maker therefore faces a trade-off: to extract more information from the
lobbyist, she needs to distort the preliminary information she obtains. The distortion
needs to ensure that the sceptical type is sufficiently likely and not too hard to persuade,
so the policy maker chooses a preliminary investigation that makes her sceptical type not
too sceptical (µr0 ≥ m∗(µr1)). This limits the value of confidential information.
These observations lead to the following characterisation of the policy maker’s optimal
preliminary investigation.
Proposition 3. Under confidentiality, there exist thresholds B and B on the policy
maker’s expertise such that:
23Note that the policy maker’s expected utility is independent of µr1 because the increase in utility due
to a higher posterior belief is exactly offset by the lower probability of that belief occurring. However,
when the incentive constraint binds µr0 = m∗(µr1), it is still preferable to choose the highest sympathetic
belief µr1 = µ¯ since this loosens the constraint: m∗(µ¯) < m∗(µr1), for any µr1 < µ¯.
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• The policy maker chooses the most informative preliminary investigation p¯ if either
B < B or B > B
• She imposes distortions on her preliminary investigation if B < B < B and sets
p(r0|0)
p(r0|1) =
1−m∗(µ¯)
m∗(µ¯)
· µ0
1− µ0 and
p(r1|1)
p(r1|0) = B
The precision of the policy maker’s preliminary investigation relative to her expertise
B is therefore non-linear in expertise: for low levels of expertise, the policy maker chooses
the most informative preliminary investigation, for intermediate levels of expertise she
chooses to restrict her information in order to induce the lobbyist to choose a general
persuasion strategy, and for higher levels of expertise, she chooses the most informative
investigation available again. This is illustrated in figure 1.7. The solid line represents the
sceptical type’s belief µr0 induced by the policy maker’s equilibrium investigation. The
dashed line represents the lowest possible belief µ and the dash–dot line the incentive
constraint m∗(µ¯), both as functions of B.
Figure 1.7: Sceptical belief µr0 induced in equilibrium as a function of expertise B
When expertise (B) is low, the expertise constraint (µr0 ≥ µ) binds before the incentive
constraint (µr0 ≥ m∗(µ¯)). The policy maker does not need to distort her information to
induce the lobbyist to choose piG and therefore chooses the lowest sceptical belief possible:
µr0 = µ.24 The solid line (equilibrium µr0) therefore coincides with the dashed line (the
24Since her payoff is independent of µr1 , she can choose any µr1 such that (µr0 , µr1) is in the set of
beliefs that induces piG. In particular, choosing the most informative investigation is an equilibrium.
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lowest possible belief µ).
When expertise (B) is intermediate, the incentive constraint binds and the policy maker
faces a trade-off between obtaining more precise preliminary information (setting µr0 = µ)
and inducing the lobbyist to provide more evidence (choosing piG). The loss in expected
utility from distorting her information (setting µr0 = m∗(µ¯) > µ) is relatively small
compared to the gain from extracting information from the lobbyist (inducing piG instead
of piT ). Conditional on inducing the lobbyist to play a general persuasion strategy piG,
she chooses her investigation to induce the lowest possible sceptical belief: µr0 = m∗(µr1).
Since the constraint m∗(µr1) is decreasing in the sympathetic type’s belief µr1 , it is optimal
to induce µr1 = µ¯. The solid line therefore coincides with the dash–dot line (the incentive
constraint m∗(µ¯)).
Eventually, as expertise (B) becomes sufficiently large, the policy maker may be willing
to give up the gains from a general persuasion strategy piG if the gains from making full use
of her expertise (µr0 = µ and µr1 = µ¯) instead of distorting her investigation (µr0 = m∗(µ¯)
and µr1 = µ¯) are sufficiently large. The solid line (equilibrium µr0) thus coincides again
with the dashed line (lowest possible belief µ). Intuitively, in the limit (as B becomes very
large), the policy maker can learn the state almost perfectly and the role of the lobbyist’s
signal becomes negligible. The policy maker is then willing to give up the gains from
inducing the general persuasion strategy piG in order to use a more precise preliminary
investigation.
1.4 The value of confidentiality and its effect on influence
Confidentiality is valuable to the policy maker, but using it to extract information from the
lobbyist may require distorting her preliminary investigation. In this section, I show that
these distortions can sometimes make confidentiality relatively less attractive. As these
distortions depend on government expertise and ideological alignment, I show that the
equilibrium value of confidentiality is highest when expertise or alignment is intermediate.
Confidentiality also affects how often the lobbyist’s preferred policy is passed. I show that
the lobbyist’s influence also depends non-monotonically on expertise and alignment.
1.4.1 Value of confidentiality to policy maker
The equilibrium value of confidentiality, W (B,µ0), is the difference in the policy maker’s
equilibrium expected utility when information is confidential (UC), given by expression
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(1.2) and when information is public (UP ), given by expression (1.1)
W (B,µ0) = U
C(m0,m1)− UP (n0, n1) (1.3)
where m0 and n0 are the beliefs of the sceptical type in the confidentiality and transparency
equilibria, respectively, and m1 and n1 are the beliefs of the sympathetic type in these
equilibria.
Value of confidentiality, government expertise, and ideological alignment
The next result reveals that the value of confidentiality varies non-monotonically in both
expertise (B) and ideological alignment (µ0). It is highest when both of these parameters
take intermediate values. This is illustrated in figure 1.8 and formalised in Proposition 4
below.
Proposition 4. The value of confidentiality is
• increasing in expertise (B) and in ideological alignment (µ0) at low levels,
• decreasing in both variables at higher levels.
For sufficiently high expertise or alignment, the policy maker is indifferent between trans-
parency and confidentiality.
As the expertise of the policy maker changes, two opposite effects arise. On the one
hand, the value of confidentiality increases because the policy maker can extract more
information from the lobbyist when keeping her information confidential: she can make her
sceptical belief (µr0) more sceptical and force the lobbyist to produce more evidence when
choosing a general persuasion strategy piG. On the other hand, expertise can also increase
the value of information when it is public, which decreases the value of confidentiality.
Indeed, when expertise is sufficiently high (so that µ¯ > 12), preliminary information is
valuable even when public, as the policy maker can base her policy decision on information
that the lobbyist would not have provided. That value increases in expertise.
Since the second effect does not arise when expertise is low, the first effect initially
dominates and the value of confidentiality increases in expertise. When expertise is high,
expertise starts to increase utility under transparency. In addition, the first effect (exper-
tise increasing utility under confidentiality) dampens as the policy maker needs to distort
her information (set µr0 = m∗(µ¯)) to induce the lobbyist to choose a general persuasion
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(a) Value of confidentiality as a function of
expertise
(b) Value of confidentiality as a function of
alignment
Figure 1.8: Value of confidentiality with respect to expertise B and ideological alignment
µ0
strategy piG. As a result, the effect of expertise on utility is higher under transparency
than confidentiality and the value of confidentiality decreases in expertise.
A similar intuition explains the non-monotonicity in ideological alignment. As ideolog-
ical alignment increases, the policy maker’s expected payoff decreases under both trans-
parency and confidentiality. The closer the policy maker’s belief is to 12 , the easier it is for
the lobbyist to persuade her and the less evidence needs to be produced. However, under
confidentiality, this effect is mitigated by the policy maker’s ability to extract more in-
formation from the lobbyist. The policy maker’s expected utility therefore decreases with
alignment at a slower rate under confidentiality than under transparency, and the value
of confidentiality increases in alignment (µ0) when alignment is sufficiently low (µ¯ <
1
2).
When alignment is higher, it is possible for the policy maker to benefit from her pre-
liminary investigation when information is public (as µ¯ > 12 is now possible for a given
B). The more closely aligned she is to the lobbyist, the more valuable that preliminary
information becomes under transparency.25 Under confidentiality, the policy maker’s ex-
pected utility continues to decrease in alignment. The value of confidentiality therefore
unambiguously decreases when alignment is sufficiently high.
Finally, when expertise or alignment are very large, the policy maker becomes indif-
ferent between confidentiality and transparency. Recall that the policy maker may find
distorting her information so demanding that she prefers to let the lobbyist target her
25The higher the alignment, the more likely the policy maker is to observe some information (r1) which
makes her more confident about choosing x = 1 than she would be with the lobbyist’s information (as
µr1 > 1
2
).
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sympathetic type (choose piT ) to be able to make full use of her expertise (Proposition
3). In addition, recall that a targeted strategy yields the same utility as transparency
(Proposition 2). The policy maker is therefore happy to make her information public
whenever her expertise or alignment is sufficiently high that she would prefer to let the
lobbyist choose a targeted persuasion strategy.26 In fact, in this case, the policy maker
would receive strictly less information under confidentiality than under transparency.27
Proposition 4 reveals that the choice to make internal information transparent depends
on both the policy environment and the political environment.
Given some exogenous value of transparency, transparent institutions should be more
prevalent in areas where the government is either not very competent, or on the contrary,
very good at obtaining precise policy-relevant information. This depends for instance on
the policy’s complexity, on whether the government is composed of technocrats, or on
whether the civil service is relatively less attractive than the private sector to competent
researchers.
Similarly, we should expect more transparency when the policy maker is so opposed to
the lobbyist that she does not expect to gain much from the lobbyist’s information, or on
the contrary, when the policy maker and the lobbyist are so aligned that the policy maker
cannot extract much information from the lobbyist.
Value of transparency with weak institutions
How valuable is confidentiality when the policy maker cannot credibly control internal
investigations? It may not always be possible for the policy maker to keep the realisa-
tions r from her preliminary investigation confidential, yet make the choice of preliminary
investigation p public. This possibility affects whether the policy maker can induce the
lobbyist to choose a general persuasion strategy piG and thus benefit from confidential in-
formation. If the policy maker’s preliminary investigation p is not observable, the lobbyist
best responds to the preliminary investigation that she expects the policy maker to choose
in equilibrium.
The policy maker would like to commit to choose a preliminary investigation p that
induces piG. However, given that the lobbyist chooses a persuasion strategy piG, the policy
maker would want to deviate to the most informative preliminary investigation, as it would
provide her additional information.
26This can only occur when the incentive constraint is binding, so high alignment alone is not sufficient.
27The policy maker is therefore only indifferent between confidentiality and transparency because the
additional information available under transparency has no effect on her policy choice. If she also cared
about the total amount of information received, she would strictly prefer transparency over confidentiality.
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If expertise is sufficiently low that the lobbyist would still choose a general persuasion
strategy (piG), then the policy maker faces no commitment problem. Otherwise, there
can be no equilibrium in which the lobbyist plays a general persuasion strategy piG. As a
result, any equilibrium must involve a targeted persuasion strategy piT when expertise is
large. As shown in Proposition 4, the policy maker is indifferent between transparency and
confidentiality when the lobbyist chooses a targeted persuasion strategy piT . We therefore
get the following result.
Proposition 5. If expertise is sufficiently large, B > B, and the investigation p is not
observed by the lobbyist, the policy maker is indifferent between transparency and confi-
dentiality.
This result qualifies the finding of the previous section: confidentiality only increases
total information available when expertise B is not too large or when the policy maker can
credibly commit to distorting her information. This commitment is more credible when
institutions are strong: policy makers interact repeatedly with special interest groups,
have strong incentives to choose the right policy or can delegate information gathering
to independent agencies in the civil service. As a corollary, transparency is beneficial
when institutions are weak, and the policy maker cannot commit to distorting preliminary
investigations, but only if expertise is large.
1.4.2 Effect of confidential information on influence
In this section, I analyse how the policy maker’s control over her investigation affects the
lobbyist’s influence. I show that an increase in government expertise can sometimes result
in both higher welfare for the policy maker and higher influence by the lobbyist, while
a decrease in ideological alignment can increase both the policy maker’s expected payoff
and the lobbyist’s influence. This result cautions against the popular view that external
influence always has a negative impact on policy making.
Evaluating influence
I define influence as the effect that the presence of a lobbyist has on policy choice. In
particular, since the lobbyist’s objective is to persuade the policy maker to enact policy
x = 1, influence is measured as the difference in the ex-ante probability that the policy will
be x = 1 with and without the lobbyist. This measure is therefore related to the lobbyist’s
expected utility, which is equal to the probability that the policy chosen is x = 1. It differs
because it accounts for the policy that the policy maker would choose in the absence of
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lobbying. Explicitly modeling the policy maker’s choice of information therefore highlights
that her equilibrium strategy in the counterfactual (the policy choice in the absence of
lobbyist) may be different.28
In the absence of lobbying, the policy maker weakly prefers the most informative
preliminary investigation. The probability of choosing policy x = 1 is therefore 0 if the
policy maker’s expertise is too low to ever change her choice (µ¯ < 12) and it is equal to the
probability of observing signal r1 otherwise.
In the presence of lobbying, the lobbyist chooses a general persuasion strategy piG in
equilibrium, when the policy maker prefers information to be confidential (B < B). The
probability of inducing policy x = 1 is therefore the probability of producing a signal
s = s1. When the policy maker prefers information to be public (B > B), the probability
that the policy is x = 1 is also the probability that s = s1, unless the policy maker is
already persuaded (r = r1 and µ¯ >
1
2).
Thus, influence is measured as
F (B,µ0) =

PpiG(s1) if µ¯ < 12
PpiG(s1)− Pp(r1) if µ¯ ≥ 12 and info confidential[
Pp(r0)Ppir0 (s1|r0) + Pp(r1)
]− Pp(r1) if µ¯ ≥ 12 and info public.
(1.4)
Influence, government expertise, and ideological alignment
I now show how this measure of influence varies with expertise and alignment. Different
values of expertise and alignment lead to different combinations of equilibrium strate-
gies with and without the lobbyist. Under some combinations, influence can increase in
expertise and alignment, while under others it can decrease in both parameters.
Proposition 6. The lobbyist’s influence on policy making is non-monotonic in the policy
maker’s expertise (B) and in ideological alignment (µ0).
As expertise increases, the policy maker is better equipped to defend herself. She
can make the lobbyist believe that she is very sceptical and force him to produce a large
amount of evidence. Therefore, as expertise B increases, influence initially decreases.
When expertise becomes too large and the policy maker needs to distort her preliminary
investigation, this effect is dampened and influence decreases slower.
28For a similar argument based on the role of outside lobbying, see Wolton (2018).
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(a) Influence as a function of expertise B (b) Welfare as a function of expertise B
Figure 1.9: Influence, welfare and expertise B
However, influence can also increase in expertise. Since ω = 0 is more likely than
ω = 1 (µ0 <
1
2), an increase in expertise makes the policy maker’s signal more precise,
and her preliminary investigation is more likely to indicate that the state is ω = 0. In
the absence of lobbying, the policy maker therefore becomes more likely to choose policy
x = 0. By contrast, the presence of a lobbyist leads to a relatively high probability that
the policy chosen is x = 1, especially as the policy maker’s ability to extract information
becomes more limited. As a result, influence increases in the policy maker’s expertise
B. Eventually, the policy maker’s expertise is so high that she weakly prefers to make
her information public. The lobbyist’s capacity to influence policy decreases again as
the policy maker relies less on the lobbyist’s information and more on her own. This
non-monotonicity is illustrated in the left-panel of figure 1.9.
Increases in ideological alignment between the policy maker and the lobbyist (µ0)
generally increase influence, but influence drops discontinuously when alignment is large
enough that µ¯ > 12 becomes possible.
More ideological alignment leads to more influence for two reasons. First, the most
sceptical belief of the policy maker (µr0) becomes less sceptical, so it becomes easier for
the lobbyist to persuade her to choose policy x = 1. Second, it is less likely that the
policy maker actually observes a signal from her preliminary investigation that makes her
sceptical, so she needs to distort her investigation even more to force the lobbyist to choose
a general persuasion strategy piG.
However, for a given level of expertise, an increase in alignment also means that the
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(a) Influence as a function of alignment µ0 (b) Welfare as a function of alignment µ0
Figure 1.10: Influence, welfare and alignment µ0
policy maker’s own information becomes relevant: she may decide to enact policy x = 1
following a signal r1 from her own investigation if µ
r1 > 12 . At this point, influence
drops: the lobbyist still makes the choice of policy x = 1 more likely than if there was
no lobbying, but the effect of his presence is smaller because the policy maker would have
made that choice with some probability based on her own information. As a consequence,
it is possible for influence to decrease when alignment increases. These variations are
illustrated in the left-panel of figure 1.10.
It is interesting to note that influence can therefore move in the same direction as the
policy maker’s utility on some ranges. As discussed in section 1.3.2, the policy maker’s
expected utility is everywhere increasing in her expertise B. If the policy maker is benevo-
lent, i.e. matching the state of the world is the socially beneficial action, then her expected
utility identifies social welfare (excluding the lobbyist). Therefore, social welfare increases
everywhere in B. This leads to the following result, illustrated in figure 1.9.
Corollary 1. There exists a range
[
BH , B
]
such that both influence and welfare increase
in B when B ∈ [BH , B].
Since the lobbyist always provides information that would not be otherwise available
to the policy maker, lobbying is valuable in this setup. In that sense, it is to be expected
that the policy maker’s interests and those of the lobbyist may be aligned. However, the
presence of lobbying implies that policy x = 1 is chosen more often than it would in
its absence. Corollary 1 shows that this is not always against the interest of the policy
maker, or detrimental to social welfare. In some environments, more influence can be
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associated with better policy making. As a result, while increasing expertise can also
increase influence, this effect should not stop the acquisition of expertise as more expertise
always makes the policy maker better-off.
Similarly, influence and welfare can co-move as alignment increases. The policy maker’s
expected utility is decreasing in alignment, as an increase in alignment corresponds to
higher uncertainty and less information provided by the lobbyist. Since influence can also
decrease with alignment, we obtain the following result illustrated in figure 1.10.
Corollary 2. There is a threshold mH such that influence drops when µ0 = mH , and
welfare decreases on an interval around mH .
The relationship between influence and ideological alignment also highlights a coun-
terintuitive effect of lobbying: while we would expect influence to be highest when the
lobbyist and the policy maker are ideologically aligned, Corollary 2 shows that influence
might decrease with alignment, because a more aligned policy maker would have obtained
favourable information on her own in the absence of lobbying.
Finally, it is interesting to note that influence may be negative as shown in figure 1.9.
In other words, the probability of enacting the lobbyist’s preferred policy can be higher
without the lobbyist than with him. This occurs because without a lobbyist, the policy
maker would choose the most informative preliminary investigation whereas when facing a
lobbyist, she chooses to distort her information. This distortion increases the probability of
the policy maker being sceptical and therefore decreases the probability that she chooses
the lobbyist’s preferred policy x = 1, even following the lobbyist’s persuasion attempt.
This negative value of influence implies that the lobbyist would like to commit not to
intervene in the policy process for some levels of expertise and alignment. By distorting
her information, the policy maker therefore forces the lobbyist to intervene and provide
information.
Corollary 3. Confidentiality can force the lobbyist to provide information when he would
prefer not to intervene ex-ante.
1.5 Discussion
I first discuss the implications of these results for the measurement of interest group
influence, and then for the relationship between transparency of the policy process and
the quality of policy making.
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Empirical assessment of interest group influence
The results presented in the previous sections have two implications for the interpretation
of studies of interest group influence. First, since government expertise affects both the
amount of evidence provided by special interest groups and the choice of policy, failing
to include expertise can lead to omitted variable bias. Second, interpreting the effect
of lobbying on policy change as influence relies on the wrong counterfactual. Instead,
influence should be assessed relative to the policy that would have been chosen in the
absence of lobbying.
Influence is usually measured as the effect of lobbying expenditures on policy changes
benefiting special interest groups. For instance, de Figueiredo & Silverman (2006) esti-
mate the return from money spent on lobbying by universities onto the earmarks received
by these universities, Richter et al. (2009) analyse the effect of lobbying expenditures by
firms on their effective tax rate, Igan & Mishra (2014) look at the return on lobbying
expenditures in the financial industry, Kang (2016) focuses on the effect of lobbying re-
sources on the probability of a specific policy being passed within the energy industry,
and Payson (2017) looks at the changes in revenues from states to cities induced by these
cities’ lobbying effort. All these studies find significant effects of lobbying expenditures on
policy change, and estimate large returns to these expenditures.
The model presented here abstracted from information costs to emphasise that trade-
offs between internal and external information can arise for strategic reasons rather than
purely monetary considerations. Assuming instead that costs of producing information are
proportional to the precision of information produced (see Gentzkow & Kamenica (2014)
for a discussion) would not affect the conclusions of the model, as long as the gains of
each player from obtaining their preferred policy are large enough relative to the costs of
producing information.
In that case, resources spent on lobbying – which correspond to an increase in the
informativeness of the information provided – would be positively related to the policy
maker’s level of expertise B, since the higher expertise, the more sceptical the policy
maker’s belief (µr0) could be, and the more evidence the lobbyist would have to provide in
equilibrium. Similarly, an increase in ideological alignment should be related to a decrease
in resources as persuasion becomes easier. Most studies account for ideological alignment,
but few control for government expertise.29 To show how this affects the estimates of
29An exception is Igan & Mishra (2014) who interact legislator and Congress fixed effects to account for
changes in expertise. This would still fail to capture shorter term changes, however.
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influence, consider the following regression equation:
xi = f(α+ βRi + δMi) + εi (1.5)
Where xi ∈ {0, 1} is the policy chosen on bill i, Ri are resources spent by lobbyists, and
Mi is the alignment between policy makers and lobbyists.
Figure 1.11: Lobbying expenditures (solid line) vs. probability of policy x = 1 (dashed
line)
If the data includes lobbyists who spend close to no resources and have no influence,
we should expect β > 0.30 The model shows that a relevant variable is bill-specific
government expertise Bi, that this variable is positively correlated with resources, and
negatively correlated with the probability of choosing policy x = 1 when it is not chosen
ex-ante (µ0 <
1
2), as illustrated in figure 1.11.
31 This means that the error term in
equation (1.5) is εi = γBi + νi, where γ < 0 and cov(Bi, Ri) > 0. As a result, estimating
equation (1.5) would produce a downwardly biased estimate of β. This can be dealt with
by controlling for government expertise, which could be proxied by the budget of agencies
dedicated to the relevant policy domain, the number of reports produced internally on a
specific policy, or controlled for by policy-level fixed effects if the identification variation
allows for it.
The second implication is that measuring influence through xi, the probability of a
30While not explicitly covered by this model, this positive relationship could come from the presence of
some lobbies spending resources even when their resources are too constrained to affect the policy choice,
i.e. when µs1 <
1
2
for any pi. Lobbyists could do this to ensure future access, or to influence other policies
as in Ellis & Groll (2017). Lower resources would then be associated to no policy change, while higher
resources would correspond to policy change.
31For simplicity, resources are assumed to be equal to the precision of signal s1 chosen in equilibrium by
the lobbyist, which is the only precision that varies on this range.
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policy change, is based on the wrong counterfactual. As the model shows, the equilibrium
investigation of the policy maker is affected by the presence of lobbying. This is important
for the interpretation of coefficients. Consider for example the policy implications from a
positive estimate of the parameter δ in equation (1.5), the effect of ideological alignment
on policy change. If xi measured influence, this would imply that influence decreases
when ideological alignment decreases. However, Proposition 6 shows that when ideological
alignment decreases, the policy maker may no longer choose policy x = 1 in the absence of
lobbying. As a result, the role of the lobbyist becomes more important in changing policy
and actual influence may increase.
Evolution of institutions
The results from Section 1.4 provide a rationale for the development of some institutions
used for information gathering in legislatures and contributes to a more general literature
on the role and development of legislative institutions (see Krehbiel (1991), Bimber (1991),
Krehbiel (2004) or Stephenson (2011)).32 In particular, the observed diversity of systems
used to obtain information within governments (agencies, legislative research services,
public consultations, legislative hearings, etc.) raises a number of questions: why might
legislators obtain redundant information from both internal and external sources? Are
internal and external sources substitutes or complements? What explains the transitions
from confidentiality to transparency, such as congressional hearings in the U.S. in the
1970s and congressional research memos more recently?33 The model’s predictions can be
related to these observations.
First, the model shows that internal information is valuable to the policy maker even
when that information would not impact policy in the absence of lobbying (Proposition
2). This can account for the puzzling observation that the government may choose to
obtain information even if that information is redundant. For example, one Appropriations
committee aide stated that “Congress relies on CRS as an extension of staff, for quick and
32Existing studies of information generation in legislatures have focused on the incentives of agents to
acquire costly information, and how institutional features, such as voting or agenda setting can affect these
incentives. A large literature has developed around the seminal work of Giligan and Krehbiel (Gilligan &
Krehbiel (1987), Gilligan & Krehbiel (1989), and Gilligan & Krehbiel (1990)) which shows how decision-
making procedures (in particular closed vs. open rule) affect the incentives of legislative committees to
acquire and transmit information in the legislature.
33In 2018, the US Congress eventually required the congressional research discussed in the introduction
to be made publicly available (DeBonis 2017). This change only concerns general reports produced by the
CRS and not specific reports requested by legislators with confidentiality requirements. In practice, many
of these general reports had become available through connections to individuals with insider access, but
the CRS’s original publication policy created barriers that limited the ease of access of these reports, which
the more recent changes overturned. This policy change echoes the Legislative Reorganization Act 1970,
which required open congressional hearings to be televised.
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dirty analysis that is sometimes not perfect” (Clark 2016), which suggests that the evidence
obtained internally may not be precise enough to determine policy choices. The model
suggests that ‘quick and dirty analysis’ can result in significant policy improvements in the
presence of lobbyists. In addition, higher expertise allows policy maker to produce more
internal information, and at the same time to induce lobbyists to produce more evidence,
so the two sources can be complements.
Second, Proposition 4 shows that for a large enough level of expertise or ideological
alignment, confidentiality is no longer valuable, and Proposition 5 shows that this effect
is even stronger when the policy maker cannot credibly convey the type of preliminary
investigation that she carries out. As a result, increases in expertise within the govern-
ment or changes in ideological alignment with lobbyists can lead to more transparency of
government information. This can arise independently of the role of transparency for ac-
countability (as in Argenziano & Weeds (2017) for example). In addition, since expertise
varies across policy areas (Howlett 2015), it is possible for transparent institutions (such
as hearings) to be used in certain domains, and confidential ones (such as agency memos)
in others even when the ideological alignment between policy makers and special interest
groups remains the same.
Finally, since the value of confidentiality decreases with expertise when expertise is
high (Proposition 4), we should observe empirically that increases in expertise are associ-
ated with increases in transparency. This is consistent with the findings of Islam (2006)
that transparency (measured by the timeliness of governments in releasing economic infor-
mation and the presence of freedom of information laws) is correlated with the quality of
governance. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that transparency causes improve-
ments in governance. In particular, Proposition 4 indicates that at low levels of expertise,
the value of confidentiality is strictly positive. In other words, transparency would lead to
worse policy making in that case.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper examined the effect of a policy maker’s internal information on the provision
of information by special interest groups. When policy makers can control their prelimi-
nary investigations, they can extract additional evidence from special interest groups by
distorting these investigations. This gives value to internal information, even when that
information is limited. However, this possibility only arises when internal information is
kept confidential. This makes confidentiality valuable to policy makers even in the ab-
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sence of reputational concerns and explains why internal research is kept secret in many
governments.
When the government obtains confidential information, special interest groups have
to adapt the strategy they use to influence policy. Their ability to affect policy decisions
is limited by the uncertainty they face, and they would prefer information to be publicly
available. However, the paper also highlights that influence cannot be simply measured
based on whether policy changed or not. As the policy maker’s own investigation changes
in the absence of lobbying, the definition of influence should consider what policy would
have been chosen in the absence of lobbying. Given this definition, it is possible that
influence and welfare increase at the same time, when government expertise or ideological
alignment change. When the Congressional Research Service opens its research to the
public, as is currently planned, it will increase the influence that interest groups exert on
policy making. But if this move towards transparency is driven by an increase in expertise,
then this increase in influence could be accompanied by an increase in welfare.
More generally, the results showed that the value of confidentiality varies with gov-
ernment expertise and with the ideological alignment between policy makers and interest
groups. When other factors make transparency more desirable, the model suggests that
the tension between transparency and confidentiality will be lowest when government ex-
pertise is either high or low. Transparency is therefore more likely to be observed when
expertise, and therefore the quality of policy making, is high. Yet, we should not conclude
that transparency leads to better policy making. This paper shows that at intermediate
levels of expertise and intermediate ideological alignment, imposing transparency would
lead to worse policy making.
Understanding the control of governments over the production of internal informa-
tion is therefore critical not only to the study of special interest groups but also to the
relationship between transparency and the quality of government.
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Chapter 2
Competition in persuasion
between privately informed
senders
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2.1 Introduction
In many situations, competing agents can influence the behaviour of a decision-maker by
providing information. For instance, a pharmaceutical company might carry out tests on
one of its drugs to persuade doctors or patients that its product is more effective than
those of competitors. Two lobbyists with opposite preferences can produce evidence about
the benefits of a policy to influence a policy maker. Two competing media outlets can
choose the editorial standards that their investigative journalists should adhere to with
the objective to influence the views of their readers.
In all these situations, competing forces can induce these agents to reveal more infor-
mation. By strategically producing evidence about its products, a firm can indicate to
consumers that these products are better than those of its competitor. The competitor
cannot take away that information from the consumer, so the only alternative is to gen-
erate more evidence about its own product, in the hope that this evidence will persuade
the consumer to buy it.
The existing literature (e.g. Gentzkow & Kamenica 2017b,a) has shown that, as long
as senders have access to sufficiently sophisticated technologies to generate information,
competition will lead to more information.
This paper shows that this conclusion does not necessarily hold when these senders
have private information prior to generating evidence. In that case, more information can
be revealed when the senders are merged into one than when they compete.
More specifically, I consider a situation in which two senders compete to persuade a
receiver by designing an experiment. The transmission of information operates through
Bayesian persuasion: senders choose probability distributions over signal realisations, con-
ditional on an unknown state of the nature, and can commit to revealing these realisations
to the receiver. The two senders may also have some private information about the state
prior to designing their experiment. Their choice of experiment can therefore signal their
private information to the receiver in equilibrium.
When the two senders are merged, two features of their environment change. First,
the joint preferences of the senders over the receiver’s actions are different than their
individual preferences. Second, the senders share their private information. As a result,
the merged senders may have different incentives to signal their joint private information
than each individual sender. I refer to the situation where the two senders are merged
as ‘collusion’, even though the senders may not be choosing this situation deliberately to
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increase their payoff.1
There are three effects that can result in more information being produced under
collusion than competition. The first effect is the signalling role of choosing a given
experiment. The same experiment can induce different posterior beliefs, depending on the
type of sender who chooses it in equilibrium. When senders are merged, the incentives
of different types of the coalition to choose a particular experiment may differ from the
incentives of competing individual senders. As a result, the interim beliefs of the receiver
given a choice of experiment may be different in collusion than in competition, and the
posterior beliefs induced by that experiment will also differ.
The second effect arises through the interaction between the information produced
by the experiment chosen by one sender and the private information revealed by the
strategy choice of the other sender. Senders cannot ‘take away’ information that has been
revealed by another sender and this restricts the set of distributions over posterior beliefs
that senders can induce in competition. In particular, this will occur when a choice of
experiment reveals the private information of a sender. Some distributions are therefore
impossible to generate in competition but possible in collusion.
Finally, differences between the competition and collusion equilibria can arise because
senders are asymmetrically informed. If a sender learns the other sender’s private infor-
mation when the two senders are merged, then the optimal strategy might differ between
competition and collusion. If the less informed sender benefits from signalling this private
information to the receiver, but the informed sender does not, then the equilibrium in
collusion will differ from the equilibrium in competition.
I first identify a set of sufficient conditions on the preferences and information of the
senders, under which the least informative collusive equilibrium is more informative than
the least informative competitive equilibrium. I focus on the least informative equilibrium
since there are typically many equilibria in competition. In particular, full revelation is
always an equilibrium: if both senders choose a fully revealing experiment, an individual
sender cannot unilaterally undo that revelation.
I then restrict attention to specific utility functions of the senders and show that there
exist parameter values such that these sufficient conditions are satisfied. As a result, there
exist payoff functions and a private information structure, such that the least informative
collusive equilibrium is more informative than the least informative competitive equilib-
rium. To show this, I focus on a symmetric pooling weak perfect Bayesian equilibria of
1I borrow this terminology from Gentzkow & Kamenica (2017b).
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the two games, and use the intuitive criterion refinement.
In that example, I show that collusion cannot reveal more information than competition
if either both senders have perfect knowledge of the state (i.e. observe perfectly revealing
signals before designing their experiments), or if they have no information. This indicates
that the informativenes ordering of collusion and competition can be non-monotonic in
the precision of the senders’ private information.
These results have two key implications. First, they reveal that the private informa-
tion of senders matter to assess whether competition increases the provision of information
compared to collusion. While the existing literature has focused on the set of experiment-
ing technologies available to the senders to determine this ordering, I show that another
dimension to take into account is the pre-existing information structure.
Second, these results have implications for evaluating the effect of mergers or the
design of organisations. The impact of mergers on consumer welfare has traditionally
been evaluated by looking at their effect on prices or product quality. However, the effect
of mergers on information can also be a relevant concern. For example, the monopoly
status of technology conglomerates such as Google or Facebook, whose main service is the
provision of information to users, has been criticised.2 The results in this paper indicate
that knowing the information environment of these companies is important to assess the
effect of monopoly power on the information they provide to users. In particular, it seems
unlikely that these companies can signal any private information about the products they
advertise to consumers through their choice of algorithms. As a result, competition would
lead to more information generated. By contrast, pharmaceutical companies are more
likely to have some information about the effectiveness of their drugs before designing
clinical tests. As a result, competition can lead to less information being generated about
these products. In addition, the paper also suggests that a manager of a research and
development division could decide to force two competing research teams to collaborate,
if she is interested in obtaining more evidence about the quality of a project. This would
be the case when these teams have done some prior research on the quality of the product.
Finally, a legislator could become more informed by commissioning a joint report from
opposed interest groups if those have private information regarding the optimality of a
policy, but would learn more by hearing their recommendations separately otherwise.
This paper is related to the large literature on information transmission and persuasion,
2It has been observed for instance that “Many information monopolies today are more interested in col-
lecting our data than taking our money. The stronger argument is that information monopolies discourage
competition, and that ultimately will limit choice and innovation.” (see https://techcrunch.com/2010/
11/13/information-monopolies-internet/?guccounter=1).
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and in particular, to models of competition in information transmission. Early works on
this question include Milgrom & Roberts (1986) who show that when parties have verifiable
information, then competition will induce full revelation of that information as long as one
sender prefers the full information outcome. Shin (1998) shows that this result continues
to hold even if parties are imperfectly informed, and in particular, even if the receiver
is ex-ante as well informed as each sender is. Krishna & Morgan (2001) also show that
competition generates more information when informed senders are allowed to publicly
send messages sequentially.
The model in this paper uses the Bayesian persuasion approach developed by Ka-
menica & Gentzkow (2011), and in particular considers the case of Bayesian persuasion by
privately informed senders. The case of one individual privately informed sender has been
studied by Alonso & Caˆmara (2018), Hedlund (2017) and Perez-Richet (2014). In all these
papers, the choice of an information revelation mechanism can signal the information of
the sender. Alonso & Caˆmara (2018) highlight that a privately informed sender cannot
gain and can sometime be made worse-off by their private information. Hedlund (2017)
characterises the conditions for pooling or separating equilibria to arise, and Perez-Richet
(2014) shows that, in a restricted setting where the sender is perfectly informed, all the
sender’s types always pool on the same signal. This literature does not consider the case
of multiple senders competing against one another.
By contrast, Gentzkow & Kamenica (2017b) evaluate the effect of competition on in-
formation transmission in the context of Bayesian persuasion but assume that all senders
and receivers share a common prior and have no private information. They show that a
property of the information environment, that they call Blackwell connectedness, which
requires that each sender can unilaterally deviate to a more informative outcome, is nec-
essary and sufficient for competition to be weakly more informative than collusion. They
show that when senders compete, they can always deviate to an information revelation
strategy that reveals more information, holding the strategy of the other sender constant,
but not to one that reveals less information. Gentzkow & Kamenica (2017a) focus on the
special case where senders have access to any type of signals and show that the result
continues to hold. This paper extends these two models by allowing for senders to be
privately informed. Boleslavsky & Cotton (2018) also obtain that competition increases
information provided when competition is induced by the receiver’s limited capacity to
implement the recommendation of both senders, so that the receiver can be better off with
limited capacity to select projects. In contrast with these papers, Li & Norman (2018)
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show that additional senders may not increase information when senders cannot arbitrarily
correlate their signals to other senders, if senders move sequentially, or if mixed strategies
are allowed. In this paper, I show that additional senders may not increase information
even when these conditions are not satisfied, provided that senders are privately informed.3
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: I present the model and the notation
in section 2.2. Section 2.3 provides some generic conditions for the least informative
equilibrium in collusion to be more informative than in competition. In section 2.4, I
introduce a parameterised problem and derive sufficient conditions in this problem for
more information to arise in collusion. Section 2.5 discusses how these results change
when the private information of the senders changes and how the welfare of all players is
affected. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model
Environment. There are two senders, I and N, who try to influence a receiver. The
receiver’s payoff depends on an unknown binary state of the world denoted ω ∈ Ω = {L,R}.
Players have a common prior over the state µ0(ω) = P(ω).
Sender I (I for informed) may also receive private signals regarding the state of the
world, unobservable by the receiver and the other sender. This private signal is denoted
θ ∈ {θL, θR}, and is generated from a distribution p(.|ω) conditional on the state of the
world. The distribution is common knowledge to all players, but not the realisation. I refer
to θ as the ‘type’ of this sender. Following the realisation of this signal, the sender updates
his beliefs using Bayes’ rule to µθ(ω|θ) = p(θ|ω)µ0(ω)p(θ|ω)µ0(ω)+p(θ|¬ω)µ0(¬ω) . I refer to µθ ··= µθ(R|θ)
as the interim belief of a type θ sender.
Preferences. The preferences of the receiver depend on her action a and the state ω
and are represented by the utility function u(a, ω). The preferences of sender i ∈ {I,N}
only depend on the receiver’s action and are represented by a utility function vi(a). The
3This paper is also related to papers studying competition in information transmission using other
approaches than Bayesian persuasion. Martimort & Semenov (2008) use a mechanism design approach to
study the incentives of interest groups to collude or to compete and the effect this has on public welfare.
Bhattacharya & Mukherjee (2013) study competition between privately-informed senders (‘experts’) and
show that experts with more extreme preferences induce more information to be revealed, but that the
effect of private information is ambiguous. In contrast to this paper, their receiver is uncertain about
the quality of the sender’s information, and the persuasion operates through the disclosure of verifiable
information. Finally, Kartik et al. (2017) find that a receiver can be better informed with fewer senders.
This arises because the senders’ information acquisition choices are substitutes. Their model relies on
costly information acquisition rather than the costless information generation of Bayesian persuasion, and
their focus is on adding senders rather than comparing collusion and competition.
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utility of the senders when they collude is a weighted sum of their individual utilities:
vm(a) = αvI(a) + (1− α)vN (a). All payoffs are common knowledge.
Actions. Following Gentzkow & Kamenica (2017a), I assume that each sender’s strategy,
pii, consists of a finite partition of {L,R}×[0, 1], such that pii ⊂ S where S is the set of non-
empty Lebesgue measurable subsets of {L,R} × [0, 1]. The setup developed by Gentzkow
& Kamenica (2017a) is then completed by considering a random variable X independent
of ω and uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and an S-valued random variable equal to s
when (ω, x) ∈ s, for ω ∈ {L,R} and x, a realisation of X. As a result, given some pii,
the probability of a signal realisation s is: P(s|ω) = λ({x|(ω, x) ∈ s}), where λ(.) is the
Lebesgue measure. Throughout the paper, I refer to these strategies as ‘experiments’.
In competition, experiments pii are chosen simultaneously by both senders and observed
by the receiver, and the senders commit to revealing the realisation of this experiment (s)
to the receiver. Under collusion, the coalition chooses a unique experiment pi, observed by
the receiver and also commits to revealing its realisation to the receiver.
Modelling experiments in this way explicitly specifies the joint distribution of the two
signal realisations and allow senders to arbitrarily correlate their signal realisations to that
of the other senders, thus allowing any Bayes-plausible distribution of posterior beliefs to
be induced. Note that, contrary to the case where the two senders generate independent
signal realisations, additional signal realisations do not necessarily generate more informa-
tion in this setup, as one sender’s signal realisations can be perfectly correlated with those
of the other sender. More details on these rich signal spaces and useful graphical repre-
sentations of how multiple signals are combined are presented in Gentzkow & Kamenica
(2017a).
In the competitive game, I denote by pi the strategy profile of the two senders: pi =
(piI , piN ). The information revealed to the receiver is the join of the two experiments:
piI ∨piN , defined on the lattice induced by the refinement order among experiments (which
are partitions of {L,R}× [0, 1]). In other words, the receiver’s information is given by the
finer partition of the signal space that arises as each sender’s experiment creates additional
partition of {L,R}× [0, 1]. This is illustrated in figure 2.1. In that example, piI = {sIL, sIR}
and piN = {sNL , sNR }, where
sIL = (L, [0, 0.8]) ∪ (R, [0, 0.3]) and sIR = (L, [0.8, 1]) ∪ (R, [0.3, 1])
sNL = (L, [0, 0.6]) ∪ (R, [0, 0.4]) and sNR = (L, [0.6, 1]) ∪ (R, [0.4, 1])
51
ω = L ω = R
X
0 1
piI s
I
L s
I
R
piN s
N
L s
N
R
piI ∨ piN s1 s2 s4
0 0.6 0.8 1
X
0 1
piI s
I
L s
I
R
piN s
N
L s
N
R
piI ∨ piN s1 s3 s4
0 0.3 0.4 1
Figure 2.1: Join of two experiments piI and piN
As a result, the information gained by the receiver from the two experiments is determined
by the realisations: s1 = s
I
L ∩ sNL , s2 = sIL ∩ sNR , s3 = sIR ∩ sNL , and s4 = sIR ∩ sNR .
The receiver chooses an action a ∈ A, where A is a compact set, after observing
the experiments (piI , piN ) chosen by each sender and a signal realisation s from these
experiments. In equilibrium, the receiver updates her beliefs using Bayes’ rule. She first
forms interim beliefs upon observing the choice of experiments pi, given the equilibrium
strategy of a type θ sender P(pi|θ):
µ(ω|pi) =
∑
θ P(pi|θ)P(θ|ω)µ0(ω)∑
ω′∈Ω
∑
θ P(pi|θ)P(θ|ω′)µ0(ω′)
Given these interim beliefs, she then updates her posterior beliefs upon observing some
signal realisation s:
µs(ω|pi) = P(s|ω)µ(ω|pi)∑
ω′∈Ω P(s|ω′)µ(ω′|pi)
In the rest of the paper, I use µ to denote the probability of state R (µ = µ(R)), for
prior, interim and posterior beliefs. Since I focus on pure strategies, the possible interim
beliefs of the receiver (in equilibrium) are in the set {µθR , µθL , µ0}.
Timing. The timing is as follows.
1. Nature determines a state of the world, privately from all players
2. Senders receive private signals
(a) In the competitive game, Sender I receives a private signal θ ∈ {θL, θR}, gener-
ated from the distribution p(.|ω)
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(b) In the collusive game, the two senders receive that private signal
3. Senders choose their experiments
(a) In the competitive game, each sender simultaneously chooses an experiment pii
(b) In the collusive game, the two senders jointly choose an experiment pi
4. The receiver observes the strategies of the senders and the signal realisations, updates
her prior and chooses an action
5. Payoffs are realised.
Additional definitions and assumptions
Given a profile of experiments pi, I denote by 〈pi〉 the distribution over signal realisations
s ∈ pi induced by pi, and therefore over posteriors µs.
I assume that for a given belief µ of the receiver, there is a unique action that maximises
her expected utility. Let aˆ(µ) = argmaxa∈A Eµ [u(a, ω)], that action.
Given that this action is unique, and that the senders’ utilities are independent of the
state, we can easily map a distribution over posterior beliefs into the expected utility of a
sender of type θ. I thus define
Vi((µs)s∈S ;µr) ··= E pi [vi(aˆ(µ))] =
∑
ω∈Ω
µθ(ω)
(∑
s∈S
pi(s|ω)vi(aˆ(µs))
)
(2.1)
where (µs)s∈S ∈ [0, 1]|S| is the support of posterior beliefs of the receiver induced in
equilibrium and µr is the receiver’s interim belief upon observing the senders’ choices of
experiments pi. Finally, pi(s|ω) is the conditional probability that induces posterior beliefs
(µs)s∈S given interim belief µr.
Note that if |S| = 2, the distribution over posteriors is uniquely pinned down by
the Bayes plausibility constraint:
∑
s∈S P(s)µs = µr, given some interim belief µr of the
receiver. Therefore, knowing the support (µs)s∈S and the receiver’s interim belief µr is
enough to compute the sender’s expected utility. When |S| > 2, there can be multiple
distributions satisfying the constraint, but the notation Vi((µs)s∈S ;µr) will only be used
when it is not ambiguous.
Finally, let % denote the ordering over distributions over posteriors according to Black-
well informativeness.
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Equilibrium concept
I characterise weak perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of the two games. Following an off-
equilibrium action pi′, the receiver forms out-of-equilibrium interim beliefs regarding the
type of the deviating sender P(θ|pi′). Given these interim beliefs she then updates her
beliefs in the same way as she does when facing an on-equilibrium action, based on the
signal structure pi′.
I abuse notation and refer to these interim beliefs, denoted µθ as the ‘out-of-equilibrium
beliefs’ of the receiver. This is used as a shorthand for ‘the interim belief that the sender
forms about the state of the world following a deviation, given some out-of-equilibrium
beliefs about the sender’s type following this deviation’.
I use the intuitive criterion (Cho & Kreps 1987) as a refinement on these out-of-
equilibrium beliefs with the following modification: if a deviation is either equilibrium
dominated for both types, or not equilibrium dominated for either type, then the only
possible out-of-equilibrium belief of the receiver is the prior µ0. In the original version
of the intuitive criterion, the receiver is allowed to have any out-of-equilibrium beliefs in
these situations. This modification rules out equilibria that could be sustained by believing
that only one type deviated in these situations, and therefore simplifies the proof. It is
also reasonably intuitive insofar as there are no strong argument for assigning weight on
one type rather than the other in these cases. The existence result does not rely on this
modification.
Preliminary results
Given the receiver’s interim beliefs, the posterior beliefs of the receiver and of the sender
following a signal realisation s form a bijection that is independent of the signal realisa-
tion s and of the signalling strategy pi (aside from the effect of the equilibrium choice of
signalling strategy on the receiver’s interim belief). This is shown in Alonso & Caˆmara
(2016), in the context of heterogeneous priors, and naturally extends to the case of het-
erogeneous interim beliefs.
In particular, given interim beliefs µi of the sender and µr of the receiver, any posterior
belief µ of the receiver corresponds to a posterior belief of the sender ms(µ, µr, µi) defined
as:
ms(µ, µr, µi) =
µµr(1− µi)
µµr(1− µi) + (1− µ)(1− µr)µi
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2.3 Conditions for collusion to reveal more information than
competition
The first result provides some sufficient conditions on the payoffs of the senders and on
the private information structure of sender I, such that the least informative equilibrium
in competition is less informative than the least informative equilibrium in collusion. In
particular, I focus on one particular type of equilibrium structure such that this situation
can arise. I first define formally the equilibrium and then summarise the conditions that
payoffs and beliefs need to satisfy for this equilibrium to exist.
The equilibrium considered takes the following form. In competition, both types of
Sender I (the informed sender) pool on an experiment, denoted pic (‘c’ for ‘competition’),
that induces a distribution over posteriors τ c given interim beliefs µ0. Sender N also selects
the experiment pic. Under collusion, both types of the coalition pool on an experiment
that induces a distribution over posteriors τm (‘m’ for ‘merged’).
I am interested in a situation in which (1) τm is Blackwell more informative than τ c
(τm % τ c), and (2) τm is the least informative equilibrium of the collusive game. As
a result, the least informative equilibrium in collusion is more informative than the least
informative equilibrium in competition. I define this situation as a collusion-preferred pair
of equilibria.
Definition 3. A pair of equilibrium strategies of the senders together with a belief function
of the receiver ((pic, µc(pi)), (pim, µm(pi))) is a collusion-preferred pair of equilibria if:
1. (pic, µc(pi)) is a symmetric pooling weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the compet-
itive game that survives the intuitive criterion.
2. (pim, µm(pi)) is a pooling weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the collusive game that
survives the intuitive criterion.
3. If (pim
′
, µm
′
(pi)) is another weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the collusive game
that survives the intuitive criterion, then 〈pim′〉 % 〈pim〉
4. 〈pim〉 = τm % τ c = 〈pic〉.
Proposition 7 summarises some sufficient conditions that the senders’ payoffs should
satisfy, given some private information structure for the existence of a collusion-preferred
pair of equilibria. If a payoff structure satisfying these conditions exists, competition
actually reduces rather than increases the amount of information produced.
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Proposition 7. Consider a pair of senders’ payoff functions (vI(a), vN (a)), and a pair
of experiments (pic, pim) such that 〈pim〉 % 〈pic〉. There exists a collusion-preferred pair of
equilibria if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. (pic, µc(pi)) is a symmetric pooling weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the compet-
itive game:
(a) For any pi′,
E µ0
[
VN ((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
> E µ0
[
VN ((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic);µ0)
]
(2.2)
(b) For any µθ ∈ {µθL , µθR} and for all pi′
E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
> E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic); µ˜(pi′))
]
for some µ˜(pi′) satisfying condition 1(c) (2.3)
(c) µ˜(pi′) should satisfy
Either µ˜(pi′) = µθ ∈ {µθL , µθR} and, both
∃ µ s.t. E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic);µ)
]
> E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
and ∀ µ, E µθ′
[
VI((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic);µ)
]
< E µθ′
[
VI((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
Or, µ˜(pi′) = µ0 and either (2.4)
∀ µθ, ∀ µ, E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic);µ)
]
< E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
Or, ∃ µ(θ), s.t. ∀µθ,
E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic);µ(θ))
]
> E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
2. (pim, µm(pi)) is a pooling weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the collusive game
(a) For any µθ ∈ {µθL , µθR} and for all pi′
E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pim);µ0)
]
> E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′); µ˜(pi′))
]
for some µ˜(pi′) satisfying condition 2(b) (2.5)
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(b) µ˜(pi′) should satisfy
Either µ˜(pi′) = µθ ∈ {µθL , µθR} and, both
∃ µ s.t. E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′);µ)
]
> E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pim);µ0)
]
and ∀ µ, E µθ′
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′);µ)
]
< E µθ′
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pim);µ0)
]
Or, µ˜(pi′) = µ0 and either (2.6)
∀ µθ, ∀ µ, E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′);µ)
]
< E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pim);µ0)
]
Or, ∃ µ(θ), s.t. ∀µθ,
E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′);µ(θ))
]
> E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pim);µ0)
]
3. (pim, µm(pi)) is the least informative weak perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium of the
collusive game: for any pi′ such that 〈pim〉 % 〈pi′〉,
(a) ∃ µθ and ∃ pi′′ such that
E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′′); µ˜(pi′′))
]
> E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′);µ0)
]
(2.7)
(b) Condition 3(a) holds for any µ˜(pi′′) such that
Either µ˜(pi′′) = µθ ∈ {µθL , µθR} and, both
∃ µ s.t. E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′′);µ)
]
> E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′);µ0)
]
and ∀ µ, E µθ′
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′′);µ)
]
< E µθ′
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′);µ0)
]
Or, µ˜(pi′′) = µ0 and either (2.8)
∀ µθ, ∀ µ, E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′′);µ)
]
< E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′);µ0)
]
Or, ∃ µ(θ), s.t. ∀µθ,
E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′′);µ(θ))
]
> E µθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pi′);µ0)
]
4. Any separating equilibrium in collusion, if it exists, reveals more information than
pim.
The first set of conditions (1(a), 1(b) and 1(c)) ensures the existence of a pooling
equilibrium in competition in which the strategy profile pic is played. The second set of
conditions (2(a) and 2(b)) ensures that there is a pooling equilibrium in the collusive game
in which the experiment pim is played. The third set of conditions rules out the existence
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of a pooling equilibrium in collusion that is less informative than the experiments played
in competition. Finally, the last condition allows us to focus on pooling equilibria as any
separating equilibrium is more informative than pim.
In particular, condition 1(a) (inequality 2.2) guarantees that Sender N does not deviate
to any other experiments given that Sender I plays pic. Since Sender N has no information
in competition, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the receiver are always equal to the prior
µ0 following any deviation by Sender N.
Condition 1(b) (inequality 2.3) ensures that no type of Sender I wants to deviate
from the equilibrium experiment, if that deviation were to induce out-of-equilibrium belief
µ˜(pi′). In addition, this out-of-equilibrium belief needs to satisfy the intuitive criterion.
This is guaranteed by condition 1(c) (inequalities 2.4). In particular, the receiver should
put weight only on type µθ, following a deviation to pi
′, if there is a belief such that this
deviation gives a higher payoff than the equilibrium payoff for type µθ, but there is no
such belief for type µθ′ . Otherwise, if either both types could potentially benefit from the
deviation, or if no type would, then the receiver’s belief should equal the prior.
Similarly, condition 2(a) (inequality 2.5) ensures that the coalition does not have in-
centives to deviate to an alternative experiment pi′ if that deviation were to induce out-
of-equilibrium belief µ˜(pi′). Condition 2(b) (inequalities 2.6) defines the set of out-of-
equilibrium beliefs µ˜(pi′) that satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Condition 3(a) (inequality 2.7) guarantees that pim is the least informative pooling
equilibrium in collusion. For any other experiment pi′, one type would find it profitable to
deviate to another experiment pi′′ for any out-of-equilibrium belief µ˜(pi′′) that satisfies the
intuitive criterion.
Finally, condition 4 can be satisfied whenever the informed sender’s private information
is sufficiently precise that the signalling effect in itself would reveal more information than
the equilibrium choice of experiment.
As a result, when all these conditions are satisfied, the least informative equilibrium
of the competitive game is less informative than any equilibrium of the collusive game.
2.3.1 Alternative combinations of equilibria
Proposition 7 offers some sufficient conditions for the existence of some combination of
equilibria in which the least informative equilibrium under collusion is more informative
than the least informative equilibrium in competition. This is not the only possible combi-
nation of equilibria that would lead to this situation, however. In particular, it is possible
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that the conditions guaranteeing this pair of equilibria are not satisfied, but there exist
other equilibria that lead to more information under collusion than competition, even
when restricting attention to the least informative equilibria.
I focus on this situation because it captures the most interesting aspect of persuasion
with private information. In particular, it isolates two effects: one due to the uninformed
sender learning private information in collusion, and one due to the receiver having differ-
ent off-equilibrium beliefs under collusion than under competition. In addition, it excludes
a third possible effect: increasing informativeness through the revelation of the sender’s
type. Indeed, because Proposition 7 focuses on pooling equilibria, such learning does
not occur in equilibrium and the increase in informativeness comes exclusively from the
equilibrium choice of experiments.
Since I focus on least informative equilibria, separating equilibria can be easily ruled out
from the comparison provided that the informed sender’s information is sufficiently precise.
In particular, if that information in itself is more informative than the experiment on which
the senders pool (both in collusion and competition), then a separating equilibrium can
never be the least informative equilibrium.
Finally, in competition, the same outcome distribution of posterior beliefs can be gen-
erated from different individual choice of experiments. To keep the problem simple, I focus
on a symmetric equilibrium in competition: both senders choose the same experiment.
2.4 Sufficient conditions for selected payoff functions
To understand the dynamics involved in a collusion-preferred pair of equilibria and to
show that such a situation can exist, I restrict attention to payoffs functions of a particular
form. This simpler problem highlights the key differences that arise between competition
and collusion when senders are privately informed while limiting the set of actions of the
senders and the set of possible equilibria.
I consider senders with discontinuous payoff functions who have opposite preferences
on some range of receiver’s actions: when a sender prefers the receiver to have posterior
beliefs closer to 1, the other sender prefers the receiver to have posterior beliefs closer to
0 (but only up to a certain limit).
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Assumption 1. The preferences of the senders satisfy the following assumption:
vI(µ) =

wI1
µ1
µ on [0, µ1]
wI2 on (µ1, µ2]
wI3 on (µ2, 1]
vN (µ) =

wN1 on [0, µ1)
wN2 on [µ1, µ2)
wN3 on [µ2, 1]
(2.9)
Where 0 < µ1 < µ0 < µ2 < 1, and w
i
1 < w
i
2 < w
i
3 and w
j
3 < w
j
2 < w
j
1 for i, j ∈ {I,N}.
Notice that these assumptions imply that the two senders are competing, in the sense
that one sender prefers the receiver to have posterior beliefs closer to 1 whereas the other
sender prefers the receiver to have posterior beliefs closer to 0. However, the senders have
partially aligned interests at the points µ1 and µ2 since they both get relatively high utility
at these boundaries.
Under collusion, the coalition’s utility is a convex combination of the individual senders’
utilities with a weight α on the preferences of Sender I. That is,
vc(µ) =

wc1 = α ·
(
wI1
µ1
µ
)
+ (1− α) · wN1 on [0, µ1)
wc(µ1) = α · wI1 + (1− α) · wN2 at µ1
wc2 = α · wI2 + (1− α) · wN2 on (µ1, µ2)
wc(µ2) = α · wI2 + (1− α) · wN3 at µ2
wc3 = α · wI3 + (1− α) · wN3 on [µ2, 1]
(2.10)
These utility functions are illustrated in figure 2.2. Note that the points of discontinuity
at µ1 and µ2 in the coalition’s utility functions are due to the partial overlap of preferences
by the senders at these points. This feature of the payoff functions are needed to ensure
existence of a non-fully revealing equilibrium in competition, but it does not drive the
desire for a more informative distribution in collusion. Intuitively, these points correspond
to regions where the senders are in relative agreement: they would prefer to push the
posterior beliefs further in one direction or the other, but they agree that this compromise
is better than the next worse option. The results would also work with a larger overlap
around these beliefs.
I also impose restrictions on the private information of the informed sender. As de-
scribed in section 2.3.1, separating equilibria can be excluded from the analysis of the
least informative equilibria if the signalling itself always reveal more information than the
experiments chosen in pooling equilibria.
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(a) Sender I (b) Sender N (c) Coalition (α = 0.4)
Figure 2.2: Payoff functions
I assume that the private information of the informed sender is sufficiently informative
that the interim belief of this sender is either below µ1 or above µ2. In particular, the
signal realisation θR fully reveals the state, whereas realisation θL induces an interim belief
between 0 and µ1:
Assumption 2. p(θ|ω) is such that:
p(θR|L) = 0 (2.11)
p(θL|R) < 1− µ0
µ0
µ1
1− µ1
Assumption 2 implies that µθL ∈ (0, µ1) and µθR = 1.
2.4.1 Conditions on payoffs for the existence of a collusion-preferred
pair of equilibria
Given these restrictions, the next step is to find conditions on the senders payoffs and
private information such that all conditions in Proposition 7 are satisfied. In particular,
one way to achieve this is to look for value of these parameters such that the equilibrium
experiments induce distributions 〈pim〉 = τm and 〈pic〉 = τ c that satisfy
τ c = [µ1 w.p. τ
c
1 ; µ2 w.p. τ
c
2 ]
τm = [0 w.p. τm1 ; µ2 w.p. τ
m
2 ]
Under these conditions, τm % τ c, since one signal realisation induces the same belief
(µ2) under both distributions, while the other realisation fully reveals the state in collusion
(induces belief 0), but not in competition (induces belief µ1 > 0).
The equilibria inducing these distributions take the following form. In collusion, both
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types of the coalition choose an experiment pim such that
P pim(s1|R) = 0 and P pim(s1|L) = µ2 − µ0
µ2(1− µ0)
In competition, there exists a pair of symmetric experiments (pic, pic) that results in
two possible signal realisations s1 and s2 such that:
P (pic∨pic)(s1|R) =
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1) and P (pic∨pic)(s1|L) =
(1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
It is possible for two symmetric experiments to have only two signal realisations because
the rich signal space considered here allows senders to perfectly correlate their signal reali-
sations to the other sender’s realisation. The distribution above can therefore be achieved
if the two senders’ expriments are perfectly correlated and issue a signal realisation s1 with
probability µ1(µ2−µ0)µ0(µ2−µ1) when the state is R and probability
(1−µ1)(µ2−µ0)
(1−µ0)(µ2−µ1) when the state is
L. Because the two signal realisations are perfectly correlated, the receiver does not gain
additional information from observing the two realisations and a realisation s therefore
induces the same belief whether it comes from a single experiment pic or from a pair of such
experiments. In addition, if the two signal realisations are perfectly correlated, there is a
zero probability that the receiver observes realisation s1 from one sender’s experiment and
s2 from another, so the support of the combined signals is also binary. The construction
of these signals is provided in appendix.
In both games, the receiver’s interim beliefs are equal to the prior after observing an
equilibrium experiment, and are equal to any beliefs in the set of beliefs consistent with
the intuitive criterion following a deviation.
Necessary condition on senders’ payoffs
For pic and pim to be equilibria, each individual sender must prefer the less informative
distribution (τ c) in competition but the coalition of the two senders must prefer the more
informative distribution (τm), at least for some type of the informed sender.
In particular, since the signal θR is fully revealing, the informed sender cannot get a
higher payoff when the receiver knows that the state is R (i.e. µ = 1). Otherwise, type
θR would always deviate to a fully revealing experiment (or any experiment that signals
his type), and induce µ = 1 (given µθR = 1).
It should also be the case that the coalition does not get a higher payoff when the
receiver is certain that the state is R. Otherwise type θR of the coalition would deviate to
62
a fully revealing experiment.
Lemma 3. If pic is an equilibrium of the competitive game, and pim an equilibrium of the
collusive game, then
1. wI1 > w
I
2 > w
I
3 for any i, j such that i > j.
2. max{wc2, wc1, wc(µ1), wc(µ2)} > wc3
A direct corollary of Lemma 3 and assumption 1 is that Sender N has increasing
preferences: wN1 < w
N
2 < w
N
3 .
Sufficient conditions on senders’ payoffs
I now derive some sufficient conditions for the existence of a collusion-preferred equilib-
rium.
Proposition 8. Suppose that preferences of the senders satisfy the conditions in Lemma
3, and normalise the senders’ payoffs so that wN1 = w
I
3 = 0, then a collusion-preferred
equilibrium exists if wc1 < w
c
2 < w
c
3 and,
µ1
µ2
≤ w
N
2
wN3
(2.12)
(1− µ2)(µ0(1− µ1)− µθL(µ0 − µ1))
(1− µ1)(µ0(1− µ2) + µθL(µ2 − µ0))
≤ w
I
2
wI1
(2.13)
µθLµ2(1− µ0)
µ1(µθLµ2(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µθL)(1− µ2))
≤ w
c(µ2)
wc(µ1)
(2.14)
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1) >
wc(µ2)− wc3
wc(µ2)− wc(µ1) (2.15)
Competition. Condition 2.12 ensures no deviation by Sender N from pic in competition.
By Lemma 3, we know that Sender N’s preferences must be increasing. Therefore, Sender
N would only want to deviate to a strategy that increases the weight on µ2. This can only
be achieved by ‘splitting’ belief µ1 and condition 2.12 ensures that this is not profitable. In
particular, condition 2.12 implies that µ1 and µ2 are on the concave closure of Sender N’s
utility so any other distribution of posterior beliefs would yield a lower expected utility.
Condition 2.13 ensures that type θL of Sender I does not deviate to induce beliefs
(µ1, 1) with an experiment that induces out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ0. The concavification
approach cannot be used directly when the sender is privately informed since the sender’s
expected utility is evaluated based on his belief µθ rather than the prior µ0 (as was the
case for Sender N). However, the same intuition can be used to rule out any distributions
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that puts weight on any belief other than µ1, µ2 or 1. Condition 2.13 then ensures that
type θL prefers to induce (µ1, µ2) than (µ1, 1), and is sufficient for type θL not to deviate
to any other experiment.
A similar condition ensures that type θR of Sender I does not deviate to induce beliefs
(µ1, 1) with an experiment that induces out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ0. Since type θL is more
confident that the state is favourable than type θR, the requirement is less demanding for
type θR. Therefore, condition 2.13 is also sufficient to ensure that type θR does not deviate.
If some deviation induces out-of-equilibrium belief µθR , then the receiver’s posterior
belief is µ = 1 for any experiment. Therefore, Sender I’s expected utility is wI3 and since
wI3 < w
I
2 < w
I
1, Sender I does not want to deviate to such an experiment.
If some deviation induces out-of-equilibrium belief µθL , condition 2.13 ensures that
type θL does not want to deviate to that experiment. In particular, in that case, the
set of possible deviations for type θL is restricted by (1) the information revealed by
Sender N playing pic, and (2) the revelation that the informed sender has observed θL.
This implies that any deviation must induce some beliefs in the set [0,m(µ1, µ0, µθL)] ∪
[m(µ2, µ0, µθL), 1]. The conditions for no deviation to be profitable can be reduced to
two conditions by noting that any deviations inducing a distribution over more than two
posterior beliefs is dominated by either inducing (m(µ1, µ0, µθL), µ2) or (m(µ1, µ0, µθL), 1).
Finally, these two conditions can be reduced to a unique one (condition 2.13) as one implies
the other.
Note that there is no need to check whether type θR wants to deviate to an experiment,
if that deviation induces out-of-equilibrium belief µθL , since if he does, then the receiver’s
set of beliefs satisfying the intuitive criterion following that deviation includes µθR and
the deviation can be ruled out by associating belief µθR with that deviation.
Therefore, taken together, conditions 2.12 and 2.13 guarantee that the strategy profile
(pic, pic) is an equilibrium of the competitive game.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the concave closure of the senders’ expected utility functions and
their expected payoffs in the competitive equilibrium. Sender N has no information, so
his expected utility in this pooling equilibrium (denoted E(V ∗) in the graph) is evaluated
with the same beliefs as those of the receivers (µ0). Sender I has different beliefs than
the receiver in equilibrium. However, the beliefs induced are on the concave closure of the
sender’s expected utility given the receiver’s interim belief µ0. The only type of the sender
who might want to deviate is type θL, but as illustrated, his equilibrium utility (denoted
EL(V
∗)) is greater than the best deviation that reveals his type (and which must therefore
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(a) Sender I (b) Sender N
Figure 2.3: Competitive equilibrium
induce some belief to the left of µθL).
Collusion. In collusion, the two types of the coalition pool on an experiment inducing
posterior beliefs (0, µ2). First note that in this case, we can focus exclusively on deviations
from type θL which induce out-of-equilibrium beliefs µθL . Indeed, under the equilibrium
strategy, type θR receives the highest payoff, w
c(µ2), with probability 1. Therefore, no
deviation can be profitable for type θR, and the set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs that
survive the intuitive criterion only includes µθL .
Condition 2.14 ensures that type θL of the coalition does not want to deviate from
pim in collusion. In particular, since any such deviations induces out-of-equilibrium belief
µθL , the set of feasible beliefs that can be induced by these deviations is [0, µθL ]∪ [µθL , 1].
Following a standard concavification argument, the best possible deviations given this set
induce either (m1, µ1) or (m1, µ2) for some m1 ∈ [0, µθL ]. Condition 2.14 is sufficient for
both of these deviations to be dominated by the equilibrium payoff.
Finally, pooling on an experiment that induces a less informative distribution of pos-
terior beliefs than 〈pic〉 is not an equilibrium in collusion when condition 2.15 is satisfied.
In particular, if the inequality holds, type θR would always prefer to deviate from an equi-
librium inducing beliefs (µ1, µ2) to a fully revealing experiment and receive payoff w
c
3 with
certainty. Any other experiment inducing a less informative distribution of beliefs is not
an equilibrium as some type of the coalition would deviate to induce beliefs (0, µ1) for any
out-of-equilibrium beliefs that satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the concave closure of the coalition’s expected utility functions
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(a) Expected payoff of type θR (b) Expected payoff of type θL
Figure 2.4: Collusive equilibrium
and its expected payoff in the collusive equilibrium. Type θR gets the highest possible
payoffs since he expects belief µ2 to be induced with probability 1 and to receive w
c
3
(denoted ER(V ∗) in the graph). Type θL receives expected utility EµθL [VC(0, µ2;µ0)]
(denoted EL(V
∗) in the graph), which is higher than the utility from the best deviation
which reveals his type (denoted EL(V
′
)).
2.4.2 Existence of more informative collusive equilibrium
The next proposition shows that when the information structure satisfies assumption 2
then the set of payoffs that satisfy all the conditions in Proposition 7 is non-empty.
Proposition 9. There exists a private information structure that satisfies assumption 2
and preferences of the senders satisfying assumption 1 such that a collusion-preferred pair
of equilibria exists.
This statement is proved using a numerical example. Consider two senders with the
following preferences:
vI(µ) =

µ if µ ∈ [0, 0.3]
0.25 if µ ∈ (0.3, 0.7]
0 if µ ∈ (0.7, 1]
vN (µ) =

0 if µ ∈ [0, 0.3)
1 if µ ∈ [0.3, 0.7)
2 if µ ∈ [0.7, 1]
(2.16)
So that µ1 = 0.3 and µ2 = 0.7. In addition, suppose that the preferences of both senders
are weighted equally in the coalition: α = 12 , so the coalition’s utility function is vm(µ) =
vI(µ)+vN (µ)
2 . These payoffs are those depicted in figure 2.2 and satisfy assumption 1.
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Sender I receives some information privately before designing the experiment: a binary
signal θ ∈ {θL, θR} distributed according to some conditional distribution p(θ|ω) and
satisfying assumption 2. In particular, suppose that
p(θL|R) = 1
9
and p(θL|L) = 1, (2.17)
so that µθL =
1
10 and µθR = 1.
These parameter values satisfy the conditions in Proposition 8, so the least informative
collusive equilibrium is more informative than the least informative competitive equilib-
rium.
In particular, neither type of Sender I want to deviate to an experiment inducing a
more informative distributions in competition. Sender N also does not want to deviate to
an experiment inducing a more informative distribution in the absence of information.
In collusion, Sender N learns about the private information of Sender I and the coalition
now prefers the more informative distribution of posterior beliefs when they observe private
signal θR. Type θL would prefer to deviate to an experiment inducing (µ1, µ2) given interim
µ0, but since type θR does not, the intuitive criterion only allows the receiver to put weight
on type θL following that deviation. Type θL could deviate by inducing a less informative
distribution of posterior beliefs given interim µθL but this deviation is unprofitable for the
coalition. As a result, pooling on an experiment inducing the more informative distribution
is an equilibrium.
Finally, if the coalition were to pool on an experiment inducing the less informative
distribution over posterior beliefs τ c, then type θR would find it profitable to deviate to a
fully-revealing experiment, as this type expects a fully-revealing experiment to guarantee
a payoff of wc3 = 1, independently of the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the receiver (these
beliefs no longer matter with a fully revealing experiment). Type θR therefore deviates and
pooling on an experiment inducing the less informative distribution of posterior beliefs is
not an equilibrium. This arises in collusion but not in competition because the coalition’s
preferences put more weight on the preferences of the uninformed sender, who would not
deviate in this way in competition because he does not have private information.
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2.5 Comparative statics
2.5.1 Role of private information
Since both senders have access to the private information of the informed sender when
they collude, the perception of the outcome for the uninformed sender changes, but also
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the receiver following a deviation. The latter effect occurs
as the equilibrium expected utility and the expected utility from deviating are different
in the coalition than for the informed sender alone. However, only certain combinations
of payoffs and private information structure allow all the conditions in Proposition 7 to
be satisfied at the same time. In particular, the senders’ private information needs to be
sufficiently informative, but not too informative for these conditions to be satisfied.
Proposition 10. If neither sender has any private information, i.e. if p(θR|R)p(θR|L) = 1, then
a collusion-preferred pair of equilibria does not exist.
This result follows directly from Gentzkow & Kamenica (2017b): when the information
environment is Blackwell connected (as is the case here), the least informative equilibrium
in competition is always more informative than the least informative equilibrium in collu-
sion. It is also easy to verify directly that the collusion-preferred pair of equilibria cannot
exist in this case, because there is a contradiction between conditions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.5.
Conditions 2.2 and 2.3 require both senders to prefer the equilibrium distribution τ c to
the more informative distribution τm. But if this holds, the coalition would also prefer
the equilibrium distribution τ c thus contradicting condition 2.5.
More generally, it needs to be the case that at least one of the senders, when provided
with some private information, can gain from generating a more informative distribu-
tion than the competitive equilibrium distribution. In addition, it should also be true
that unilaterally deviating to that more informative distribution is not profitable to the
uninformed sender. Otherwise, he could deviate to an experiment inducing it, without
changing the off-equilibrium beliefs of the receiver, since he has no private information to
reveal through his action.
In addition, the amount of information that sustains a collusion-preferred pair of equi-
libria is bounded: if both senders observed a fully revealing private signal, and if prefer-
ences satisfy assumption 1, a collusion-preferred pair of equilibria cannot exist.
Proposition 11. If both senders privately observe fully revealing signals, then there does
not exist a set of payoffs satisfying assumption 1 such that a collusion-preferred pair of
equilibria exists.
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With fully revealing private signals, the interim beliefs of the senders are either 0 or
1. Given lemma 3, we know that preferences need to be increasing for one sender and
decreasing for the other if a collusion-preferred equilibrium is to exist.
Suppose that Sender I’s preferences are decreasing while Sender N’s preferences are
increasing, and that both senders are perfectly informed. Consider a competitive pooling
equilibrium experiment that induces posterior beliefs (m1,m2) with m2 < 1, m1 < µ1.
Then type θL of Sender I would deviate to an experiment inducing (m1, 1) as this guaran-
tees that m1 will be induced with probability 1 and yields the highest payoff. Similarly,
if the competitive equilibrium experiment induces posterior beliefs (m1,m2) with m1 > 0,
m2 > µ2, type θR of Sender N would deviate to an experiment inducing (0,m2) to guaran-
tee m2 and yield the highest payoff. So pooling on an equilibrium revealing less information
than the collusive equilibrium is not possible with full information.
In addition, any separating equilibrium in competition would fully reveal the senders’
types, so the collusive equilibrium cannot be strictly more informative than the competitive
equilibrium.
Private information to both senders. The assumption that only one sender observes
private signals before designing an experiment can be relaxed. In the example above, the
coalition always wants to reveal more information than in competition, because the pref-
erences of the uninformed sender are such that one type of the coalition gains sufficiently
from revealing that information that it wants to deviate. However, if that information was
not sufficiently precise, it is still possible that this sender would prefer the less informative
experiment. Therefore, the situation described in the example above could arise if the
uninformed sender had access to some sufficiently imperfect signal when competing, but
gained access to more precise information when colluding.4
2.5.2 Welfare effects
I now turn to evaluating the welfare of all players, and how the presence of private in-
formation affects it. Throughout this section, I evaluate welfare at the least informative
equilibrium under both collusion and competition.
4In addition, it is not necessary that the senders have private information in both the competitive
and the collusive situation. For instance, with one sender having private information in competition,
but the coalition having no private information, it is still possible that the collusive outcome is more
informative than the competitive outcome. Similarly, the more informative outcome in collusion can arise
when both senders are symmetrically informed in both the competitive and collusive situations, and when
the senders gain information only in collusion (for instance, if they can pool some financial resources to
acquire information in collusion but not individually in competition).
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If more information benefits the receiver5, then the receiver is better-off when senders
collude if the conditions such that a collusion-preferred equilibrium are satisfied.
Proposition 12. Suppose the conditions in Proposition 8 are satisfied, then the receiver
is always better-off under collusion than under competition.
Next, I show that collusion makes the senders worse-off if it leads them to reveal more
information.
Proposition 13. Suppose the conditions in Proposition 8 are satisfied, then both senders
are worse-off under collusion than under competition.
The uninformed sender must be worse-off with the more informative distribution of
posterior beliefs. If this was not the case, he could have deviated to an experiment gen-
erating that more informative distribution under competition, since his deviation has no
impact on the receiver’s interim beliefs.
The informed sender is also worse-off under collusion if collusion reveals more informa-
tion. Suppose that, under competition, deviating to an experiment generating the more
informative distribution (τm) induces out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ0. If that distribution of
beliefs yielded a higher payoff than the less informative distribution (τ c), the sender would
deviate to generating that distribution in competition.
If such a deviation instead induced interim µθL , and the informed sender preferred to
induce that distribution, the deviation would be even more profitable, since the informed
sender prefers the receiver to have lower posterior beliefs.
If type θL finds that deviation profitable, then putting weight on type θR only follow-
ing some deviation is not consistent with the refinement used in this model. Therefore
this type of the uninformed sender would always deviate to induce the more informative
distribution of posteriors in competition if that distribution was more valuable to him,
which contradicts the fact that the less informative distribution is an equilibrium of the
competitive game.
This only leaves the possibility that type θR finds the more informative distribution
profitable. However, type θR expects to get the second-highest payoff with probability 1
in collusion and a mixture of the highest and second-highest payoff in competition, so is
clearly better-off in competition.
5For example, suppose that the receiver wants her action to match the state and has a quadratic
loss utility function. This implies that the receiver’s action is equal to her posterior belief. Specifically,
let f a random variable measurable with respect to {L,R}, and defined by f(R) = 1 and f(L) = 0.
Let U(a, ω) = −E [(a− f(ω))2], the receiver’s expected utility. This expected utility is maximised at
a = E [f(ω)] = µ. These preferences imply that the receiver always prefers more information.
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When the conditions in Proposition 8 are satisfied but neither sender observes private
signals, both senders pool on the less informative experiment both in competition and in
collusion (Proposition 10). Since the senders prefer the less informative distribution (τ c),
the senders would be better-off without private information. This result is in line with
existing result in the case of one informed sender (e.g. Alonso & Caˆmara (2018)): private
information cannot make the sender better-off but can make him worse-off.
Corollary 4. Suppose the conditions in proposition 8 are satisfied, then the senders are
worse-off with private information.
Here, both senders are worse-off with private information because the uninformed
sender gains access to the information of the informed sender in collusion. In other words,
the senders would gain from limiting communication in the merged organisation.
Incentives to collude and share information. Given that the senders are both worse-
off, they would not agree to collude if they were given the choice. However, since the
receiver is better-off under collusion, the receiver could offer transfers to the senders to
induce them to collude. This would be less costly for the receiver than to offer transfers to
induce competing senders to reveal more information, since it allows her to take advantage
of the changes in incentives arising from senders learning each others’ private information.
The receiver might also have some institutional power over the organisation of the two
senders. Finally, the senders might have some alternative (unmodelled) concerns that
leads them to merge (such as increasing their market power).
2.6 Conclusion
This paper offers a first look at the impact of private information on the strategic choice
of persuasion strategies by competing senders. In particular, it shows that access to
private information by the senders may overturn a standard result about competition in
persuasion: that competition tends to increase the amount of information available to the
receiver.
When competing senders collaborate or collude, not only are their preferences differ-
ent, but their private information also changes. This private information can induce the
merged senders to deviate from any low-information equilibrium that could be sustained
in competition, in order to signal that private information. As a result, the least infor-
mative equilibrium in collusion can reveal more information than the least informative
equilibrium when senders compete.
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There can be other forces driving a more informative equilibrium in collusion than in
competition than the ones presented in this paper. For instance, collusion might force
senders to separate and reveal their type, while they would prefer to pool on a common
experiment and restrict the information disclosed in competition.
This paper focused on identifying sufficient conditions in one particular case, in order
to analyse explicitly the mechanisms at play in this situation. This example was chosen
because of its tractability, but also because it does not rely on trivial dynamics for more
information to be revealed in collusion. In particular more information can be revealed
with privately informed senders even when all relevant equilibria are pooling.
A full characterisation of preferences and information structures under which more
information is released under collusion than competition would be an interesting avenue
left for future research.
72
Chapter 3
Overconfidence, political
accountability and politician
selection
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3.1 Introduction
One of the most striking contributions to the political science of half a
century of survey research has been to document how poorly ordinary citizens
approximate a classical ideal of informed democratic citizenship.
This observation from Bartels (1996) summarises a large literature in political science
that has shown that voters lack the ability to be well informed. Lack of political awareness
can take many forms. Voters have been shown to be unaware of basic political informa-
tion (Campbell et al. 1960, Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996), to vote consistently differently
than fully informed agents would (Bartels 1996), to follow heuristics instead of informa-
tion (Lau & Redlawsk 2001) and to react disproportionately to irrelevant information
(Achen & Bartels 2004, Wolfers 2007, Leigh 2009, Healy et al. 2010) or information that
is more recent (Huber et al. 2012). Several experimental studies also suggest that voters
systematically misinterpret the information they receive. This includes mis-allocation of
responsibilities (Hobolt et al. 2013), or systematically biased assessments of political influ-
ence (Bausch & Zeitzoff 2014, Caplan et al. 2013). A poorly informed electorate can affect
policy through different channels. Voters can lack the capacity to choose politicians that
will act in the public’s interest, because they do not know what policies are in their own
interest. They can be poorly equipped to elect competent candidates because they are
unable to disentangle competence from luck when observing political outcomes. They can
also be ineffective at holding policy makers accountable for choosing detrimental policies,
for breaking their electoral campaign promises, or for pursuing damaging behaviour such
as accepting bribery.
In this paper, I evaluate the effect of one common behavioural trait, the belief that
one’s information is more precise than it really is, on the welfare of voters. I show that this
bias always makes voters worse at selecting good politicians under uncertainty, but can
improve the incentives of politicians to take welfare improving actions. This improvement
can be sufficiently large that the voter is better-off when she mis-evaluates the quality of
her information.
Informed voting is important because the well functioning of democracy depends cru-
cially on the ability of voters to scrutinise the actions or the performance of politicians.
A vast empirical literature analyses the effects of voter information on political account-
ability including Besley & Case (1995a), Besley & Case (1995b), Besley & Burgess (2002),
Besley & Case (2003), Besley (2004), Snyder & Stromberg (2010), Alt et al. (2011), and
Ferraz & Finan (2011). This ability depends on the voter’s access to information, which
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has been widely studied, but also the voter’s capacity to process this information cor-
rectly. Based on these results, it would be reasonable to expect a lack of information to
make voters worse-off. It makes them less able to scrutinise the actions of politicians, and
less able to evaluate the impact of these actions on their welfare. However, additional
information is not always beneficial if it affects the strategic behaviour of policy makers.
Overconfidence is a special type of bias. Voters are not poorly informed per se, but think
that their information is of better quality than it really is. This implies that overconfi-
dent voters are not uninformed, but lack the capacity to draw correct inferences from the
information they have. This misperception was originally documented by Alpert & Raiffa
(1982) who show that subjects consistently overestimates the accuracy of their predictions.
Moore & Healy (2008) identify three different types of overconfidence: over-estimation,
over-placement, and over-precision, and show that the last type – the one studied in this
paper – is more persistent. Block & Harper (1991) suggest that overconfidence could be
driven by an anchoring-and-adjustment process, while Ortoleva & Snowberg (2015) show
how neglecting the correlation between different information sources leads to overconfi-
dence. Given the prevalence of this trait, this paper addresses the question: how does the
misperception of their information – rather than the lack of information – affect voters’
ability to incentivise and select politicians?
I build a model in which an incumbent politicians is office motivated, can exercise
costly effort that benefits the voter, and whose competence is unknown to both herself
and the voter. There are two periods: in each period, the politician in office chooses how
much policy effort to exert. This effort and her competence determine her performance
which affects the voter’s utility with some noise. Voters can therefore use their first
period utility as a signal of the politician’s competence. At the end of the first period,
the voter decides whether to re-elect the politician based on this noisy signal. If the
incumbent is not re-elected, a challenger takes office in the second period. The less noisy
the information received at the end of the first period, the easier it is for the voter to draw
inferences about the incumbent’s competence. I am interested in the effect of the voter’s
overconfidence about this information. That is, the voter believes that his signal of the
policy outcome at the end of the first period is less noisy (has lower variance) than it really
is. Overconfidence affects equilibrium strategies through two separate channels: thinking
that signals are more informative than they really are and thinking that the other player
interprets the information the same way as you do. Misunderstanding the precision of
the information received therefore leads the voter to mis-evaluate the equilibrium action
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of the politician. Politicians are typically more strategic than voters. They have more
experience of the political process and dedicate more time and resources to understand
the information that voters have, for example by using opinion polls. The model captures
this by assuming that the politician is aware of the voter’s bias. As a result, unlike other
behavioural models of accountability, the politician can manipulate the voter’s beliefs,
even in equilibrium.
Despite the possibility of manipulating beliefs, I show that it is possible for the in-
cumbent to exert more effort when the voter is overconfident than when she is not, and
as a result to make the voter better-off. This arises because an overconfident voter will
judge a politician who fails to achieve a sufficiently high performance harshly. Because
the voter thinks her information is precise, she does not attribute the correct portion of
a politician’s unsuccessful performance to luck. The politician, aware of the voter’s mis-
perception, reacts by exerting more effort to be re-elected. Selection is always worse when
the voter is overconfident because the voter mistakes a high performance for a signal of
competence and is therefore more likely to re-elect incompetent types. The expected type
of the second period incumbent is therefore always lower when the voter is overconfident.
The first effect can sometimes dominate the second, and the voter can be overall better-off
when overconfident. I characterise a condition on the level of overconfidence of the voter
for the politician to exert higher effort when voters are overconfident. In particular, I
show that, when the marginal benefit of effort is decreasing in effort and the difference
in competence of different types of politicians is not too large, the politician exerts more
effort if and only if the voter is not too overconfident.
Given that selection is always worse under overconfidence, that condition is necessary
for welfare to improve. Finally, I provide parameter values that satisfy this condition
and under which the overconfident voter’s welfare is higher. This does not arise without
overconfidence, or when the voter is aware of his overconfidence, as he would then correctly
anticipates the action of the incumbent.
This therefore differs from both models with rational voters and from models with
voters suffering from behavioural biases in which beliefs about the equilibrium being played
do not differ.
This paper contributes to the literature on accountability by explicitly considering a
natural situation in which players may not only have different information but also different
second-order beliefs (their beliefs about the equilibrium strategies each player follows). It
has implications for assessing the success of elections as accountability mechanisms, and
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for evaluating the effect of voter incompetence. First, trying to correct the bias may
have unintended consequences. For instance if the bias is due to the correlation of news,
which is due to concentration of ownership in the media (see Levy et al. 2018), then that
concentration could actually be beneficial. Second, if voters suffer from overconfidence,
increasing information (to reduce the variance of the noise) can have consequences that
are hard to predict because of their effect on the voter’s second-order beliefs.
Related literature
This paper extends the recent literature in behavioural political economy, by looking at
the effect of a common psychological bias on a standard model of political accountability.
It contributes to the large existing literature on political accountability, started by
Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), Austen-Smith & Banks (1989), Harrington (1993) and
Persson et al. (1997). This early literature focused on the moral hazard problem that
arises when politicians are able to extract socially wasteful rents from office holding and
on how political institutions can mitigate these issues. It did not explicitly consider the
learning process of voters who try to evaluate the quality of politicians. Fearon (1999)
further developed the idea that elections can serve as both a means to align politician’s
incentives with voters’ objectives and to select better politicians. The development and
limitations of this literature is summarised in Besley (2007) and Ashworth (2012).1
Recent pieces of work in political economy have investigated the effect of behavioural
biases on political attitudes and political behaviour. In particular, a certain stream of this
literature has focused on the role of correlation neglect in politics. Ortoleva & Snowberg
(2015) show that correlation neglect leads to overconfidence and that overconfidence is
related to more extremism, stronger partisan identification and higher turnout. Levy &
Razin (2015) show that, under certain conditions, voters with correlation neglect can ag-
gregate information better than voters who are perfectly aware of the correlation between
their information sources. Finally, Levy & Razin (2014) show that, by a similar mecha-
nism, correlation neglect can lead to more or less platform polarisation, depending on the
1Other recent theoretical models of political accountability include Ashworth (2005), who develops
a multi-period model of political accountability and selection where politicians choose an allocation of
effort across different tasks. Meirowtiz (2007) develops an infinite horizon model of policy choice, where
politicians can exploit information asymmetries to implement policies closer to their ideal points, subject to
the constraint of re-election. Snyder & Ting (2008) add interest groups to models of electoral accountability.
Padro i Miquel & Snowberg (2012) develop a model with both elections and primaries, and look at the
politician’s decision to implement or not the party’s agenda. Bonfiglioli & Gancia (2013) show how political
myopia can arise in a model of accountability when politicians need to choose between short-run and long-
run policies. Finally, Bidner & Francois (2013) introduce norms in society that govern how to reward or
punish politicians, and evaluate the behaviour of politicians who face a choice to transgress or not these
norms.
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competitiveness of the electoral system.
The first two of these three papers focus exclusively on voters’ attitudes and behaviour.
The third one introduces some strategic response from politicians to voters’ biased beliefs
through their choice of electoral platform. However, elections do not only offer a way to
choose policies, but also to choose politicians. This paper aims to build on the literature on
correlation neglect and overconfidence by applying it to models of political accountability
and selection.
This paper is most closely related to a literature that evaluates the effect of behavioural
biases on political accountability.2 Some papers study the role of voters biases without
taking into account strategic behaviour. For instance, Bendor et al. (2010) evaluate dif-
ferent retrospective voting rules that voters may follow, and examine the effect of voters’
mis-perceptions of the political outcome. Kappe (2013) extends this model to asses the
impact of loss-averse voters on political accountability. In both of these models however,
voters follow a simple, non-strategic, adaptively rational behaviour, and politicians do not
respond strategically to voters’ actions. Lockwood (2017) evaluates the effect of confirma-
tion bias on pandering. The model is based on the pandering model of Maskin & Tirole
(2004), and treats confirmation bias as voters misinterpreting a binary signal. The author
shows that under some conditions, confirmation bias can increase welfare by reducing the
incentives to pander. However, in the version that is comparable to the present model, the
author shows that confirmation bias always reduces voter’s welfare. Ashworth & Bueno
De Mesquita (2014) investigate whether political competence (defined as either more infor-
mation or lack of behavioural bias) always leads to a higher welfare for voters, when taking
into account the strategic reaction of politicians to voters’ information. In particular, they
show that in some cases, voter welfare can be higher when voters are behavioural, if the
behavioural bias from which voters suffer leads them to change their optimal reelection
threshold. The authors look in particular at the case of voters who fail to filter (i.e. who
attribute responsibilities to politicians for events that are out of the politicians’ control).
They show that in this case, failure to filter can lead to higher welfare. Their main model
is a two-period policy choice model, but the appendix includes a two-period effort choice
2The idea that behavioural biases may distort the incentives that political institutions are expected
to provide has been mentioned in previous works. For instance, with reference to models of political
accountability, Besley (2007) suggested that “Going forward it would be interesting to understand better
what the differences are between behavioral models of politics and the postulates of the strict rationality
supposed here. It would be useful to understand when simple and sensible behavioral rules lead to large
policy distortions.” (Besley 2007, p. 132). More recently, Ashworth (2012) noted that “Recent work in
psychology and economics provides resources for modeling information processing in ways that deviate
from the Bayesian rational expectations standard; incorporating these factors into political agency models,
with and without third-party monitoring, will be an important challenge in the future.”
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model, which is the basis of the model used in this paper. Overconfidence differs from
failure to filter in two ways. First, overconfidence involves a mistaken reduction in the
variance of the noise in the incumbent’s performance, while failure to filter increases this
variance. Second, overconfidence is a genuine mistake, in the sense that the voter’s utility
will not have the distribution that the voter thinks it has. With failure to filter, by con-
trast, the voter will be affected by the additional shock to utility. The mistake there is to
fail to adjust for observable noise. If this extra noise was not observable, the voter would
not be making any mistake, the whole accountability problem would simply be noisier.
Because the beliefs of the voter and the incumbent over the utility of the voter do not
diverge, assuming that each player has correct higher order beliefs is reasonable. This
generates important differences between the model presented here and that of Ashworth
& Bueno De Mesquita (2014). In contrast to other types of biases that have been recently
studied in this context (Ashworth & Bueno De Mesquita (2014), Lockwood (2017)), the
combination of mistaken beliefs about the distribution of payoffs and of infinite action
and payoff spaces can result in systematic mistakes by the voter about the equilibrium
actions of the politician. The differences between the results presented here and those
of Ashworth & Bueno De Mesquita (2014) and Lockwood (2017) are evaluated in more
details in section 3.4.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the setup of the
model. Section 3.3 characterises the choice problem faced by the two players in a generic
setup, defines appropriate restrictions on higher order beliefs and solves for the equilib-
rium beliefs and actions of the two players. Section 3.4 evaluates the differences between
overconfident voters and voters with correct beliefs in a special case of the model. Section
3.5 concludes by discussing the implications of these results and comparing them with
those of other recent studies. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3.2 Model
Environment
The model has one incumbent politician, a pool of potential challengers and a repre-
sentative voter. The politician’s competence can take two values θ ∈ {θL, θH} with
0 < θL < θH . The politician’s type is unknown to both the voter and the politician
herself, but both share the same interior prior belief that the politician’s competence is
high P(θ = θH) = p, p ∈ (0, 1). I denote by θI the competence of the incumbent and θC
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the competence of the challenger.
There are two periods. In the first period, the incumbent politician chooses a level of
effort a1 ∈ R. At the end of the first period, the voter receives utility u1(a1, θ), update
her beliefs about the type of the incumbent politician and decides whether to re-elect
the incumbent. Let r ∈ {0, 1} the re-election rule of the voter, where r = 0 means ‘not
re-elect’ and r = 1 means ‘re-elect’. In the second period, the politician (the incumbent,
if re-elected, or the challenger, drawn randomly from the pool of available politicians)
chooses again an effort level a2 ∈ R, and the voter receives utility u2(a2, θ).
The outcome in each period is a function of the politician’s type and effort and is
denoted f(at, θ). I make the following assumptions on this function:
Assumption 3. The outcome function satisfies: (1)
∣∣ lima→0 f(a, θ)∣∣ < +∞, (2) ∂f(a,θ)∂a ≥
0 and ∂f(a,θ)∂θ ≥ 0, and (3) lima→0 ∂f(a,θ)∂a > 0 and lima→+∞ ∂f(a,θ)∂a < +∞.
That is, the outcome increases in effort a and is bounded when effort tends to 0. The
marginal return to effort is strictly positive at low levels of effort and is bounded above as
effort tends to infinity. The outcome is also increasing in the politician’s competence θ.
The voter’s per period utility depends on the political outcome f(at, θ) in that period
and on some random utility shock εt:
ut(at, θ) = f(at, θ) + εt (3.1)
The random variable εt follows an ‘objective’ distribution with CDF G, density g,
support R, mean 0 and variance σ2. In particular, I assume that the utility shock follows
a normal distribution:
Assumption 4. The shock εt is distributed as εt ∼ N(0, σ2).
The issue of overconfidence arises because the voter believes that the variance of the
random shock εt is lower than its actual variance. Let σ
2
V < σ
2 the variance believed
by the voter. This form of overconfidence corresponds to the ‘over-precision’ described in
Moore & Healy (2008) or as defined in Koehler & Harvey (2008). The distribution G is
therefore objective in the sense that, should the voter not suffer from overconfidence, he
would agree that this is indeed the distribution of εt. The voter’s prior over ε1 is therefore
ε1 ∼ N(0, σ2V ). I denote the voter’s belief about the distribution of the shock by GV with
density gV .
The voter cannot observe the effort choice or the competence of the politician. How-
ever, his utility at the end of period 1 constitutes a noisy signal of the political outcome,
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from which he can draw inferences about the politician’s competence.
Utilities
Given his per-period payoff and information, the voter’s payoff is captured by the following
two-period discounted expected utility function:
Uv = E[u1(a1, θI)] + δ
[
r(u1)E[u2(a2, θI)|u1] + (1− r(u1))E[u2(a2, θC)]
]
(3.2)
Where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, and expectations are taken over the politicians’
competences and the utility shock.
The politician derives utility from holding office, which is normalised to 1, and disutility
from exerting effort captured by the function c(a). The incumbent’s utility function is
therefore:
UI = [1− c(a1)] + δE[r(u1)][1− c(a2)] (3.3)
And the challenger’s utility is:
UC = δ(1− r(u1))[1− c(a2)] (3.4)
I make the following assumption on the cost of effort:
Assumption 5. The cost of effort c(a) is increasing and strictly convex in a, c(0) = 0
and c′(0) = 0.
Equilibrium concept
Different choices of equilibrium concept can lead to different predictions on the action
choices of the two players and the ultimate outcomes. In particular, requiring players to
have correct beliefs about the equilibrium strategies of other players yields the prediction
that overconfident voters correctly anticipate the effort of the incumbent politician, set
their re-election threshold accordingly, and that the incumbent exerts the same level of
effort independently of the degree of overconfidence of the voter (including when voters
suffer from no overconfidence at all).
This approach imposes a somewhat unintuitive restriction on higher-order beliefs.
Namely, it requires the voter to either believe that the politician’s behaviour is opti-
mising with respect to incorrect beliefs regarding the distribution of the random shock ε
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(incorrect from the point of view of the voter, though correct compared to the objective
distribution), or to believe that the politician is not rational. In addition, it requires the
voter to conjecture that the politician is choosing this equilibrium strategy, despite being
unable to observe either the true distribution of the random shock or the action of the
politician. This means that the voter should have correct beliefs over the equilibrium
action choice of the politician a1 ∈ R, despite having incorrect beliefs about the objective
distribution of the utility shock. In other words, the voter would have correct second-order
beliefs about the first-order beliefs of the politician3, but incorrect (marginal) first-order
beliefs (over the payoff structure).
A more intuitive approach would be to only restrict the players to have common
knowledge of the rationality of other players, given their beliefs, and to have beliefs that
are consistent, given an exogenously determined feedback partition (i.e. that their beliefs
are consistent with what they are able to observe, given the equilibrium strategies of all
players). Esponda (2013) developed an equilibrium concept, Rationalisable Conjectural
Equilibria (RCE), which imposes exactly these restrictions. I use the framework developed
in that paper to derive the equilibrium strategies of the players.
3.3 Equilibrium strategies
In this section, I first derive some results that are independent of the voter’s higher-order
beliefs and his misperceptions about fundamentals of the game. I then discuss the issues
that can arise from the voter’s misperceptions and characterise the equilibrium strategies
given these misperceptions.
3.3.1 Second period effort and voter’s problem
The politician’s strategy in the second period is independent of the voter’s beliefs. Given
this strategy, I can then describe the problem faced by the voter at the end of the first
period, and that faced by the incumbent in the first period.
From the utility functions above, and given that second-period effort is not contractible,
it is easy to see that any type of politicians will exert no effort in the second period: a∗2 = 0.
Given that ∂f(a2,θ)∂θ > 0, the voter will re-elect the incumbent if her expected type is higher
than the challenger’s expected type given the information the voter obtained in the first
period. In addition, since the voter cannot commit to a re-election rule ex ante, the voter
cannot directly influence the politician’s first period effort through the choice of re-election
3More precisely, over the marginal first-order beliefs of the politician over the payoff structure.
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rule. These two observations imply that the voter’s re-election strategy follows a threshold
rule, in which the voter re-elects the politician if and only if her utility is above a certain
level. Let u¯ the threshold on the voter’s first period utility above which the incumbent is
re-elected. These observations are summarised in the following proposition.
Proposition 14. Second period effort and re-election rule.
1. In the second period, the politician in office exerts zero effort a2 = 0.
2. The voter correctly believes the politician will choose this action independently of his
beliefs on the politician’s competence.
3. The voter re-elects the incumbent if and only if his first-period payoff is greater than
a threshold u¯, and elects the challenger otherwise.
The voter follows a threshold strategy as long as the distribution of the shock satisfies
the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) which the normal distribution does. All
these results hold as long as there is common knowledge that the game terminates after
the second period, common knowledge of rationality, and common knowledge that the
politician’s competence is unknown to all players. Proposition 14 is therefore satisfied for
any belief hierarchies of the voter and the politician that satisfies these assumptions.
Given these results, the game can be reduced to a one-period game. The incumbent
chooses a level of effort, the voter observes her payoff at the end of period 1 and re-elects
the incumbent if that payoff is above the threshold. The threshold is determined by three
factors: the voter’s beliefs over the types of incumbent and challenger politicians, the
performance function f(a, θ), and the voter’s conjecture of the incumbent’s equilibrium
choice of effort in period 1. The first two factors are common knowledge and the voter
has no mis-perceptions over those, but the third factor will be affected by the voter’s mis-
perceptions. However, given some arbitrary re-election threshold u¯, the incumbent’s choice
of effort is independent of the voter’s mis-perception. In other words, the actual first period
effort is only affected by the voter’s mis-perception through the threshold. This effort
choice maximises the probability of being re-elected subject to the cost of effort. Given
that the voter re-elects the incumbent if u1(a1, θ) > u¯, and that u1(a1, θ) = f(a1, θ) + ε1,
the probability of re-electing the incumbent is:
P(r = 1) = P (ε1 > u¯− f(a1, θ)) = 1−G (u¯− f(a1, θ)) (3.5)
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The incumbent therefore solves:
max
a1
δ
[
1− pG
(
u¯− f(a1, θH)
)
− (1− p)G
(
u¯− (f(a1, θL)
)]
− c(a1)
Let V (a1, u¯) = δ [1− pG (u¯− f(a1, θH))− (1− p)G (u¯− (f(a1, θL))]. The first-order con-
dition of this maximisation problem is then,
c′(a∗1) =
∂V (a1, u¯)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=a∗1
(3.6)
The second-order condition is satisfied if the cost function is sufficiently convex. In
particular, it needs to satisfy
c′′(a1) ≥ ∂
2V (a1, u¯)
∂a21
, ∀ a1 ∈ R+ (3.7)
3.3.2 First-period effort and re-election threshold
I now turn to characterising the re-election threshold. This threshold depends on the
player’s higher-order beliefs. That is, their beliefs about the other player’s strategies and
beliefs. To clarify how these restrictions affect equilibrium strategies, I consider two cases.
In the first case, the players agree to disagree. That is, the voter believes that the shock
εt follows a normal distribution with variance σ
2
V , but knows that the incumbent believes
the variance of that shock is σ2. In the second case, the voter is naive. He thinks that
the shock has variance σ2V and believes that the politician shares the same beliefs. The
politician is aware of the voter’s naivety: she knows the shock has variance σ2 and knows
that the voter believes that variance is σ2V . In each case, a different equilibrium concept is
required to ensure that beliefs hierarchy are consistent. Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(WPBE) is appropriate for the first case. This is the equilibrium concept used in most
models of accountability (e.g. Ashworth & Bueno De Mesquita 2014). In the second case,
I follow the rationalisable conjectural equilibrium (RCE) proposed by Esponda (2013).
I characterise the equilibrium strategies in both cases and then show how the first case
(agreeing to disagree) requires some unintuitive assumptions about the players’ beliefs. I
derive some conditions for existence and uniqueness for both cases.
Strategies when the voter and the incumbent agree to disagree
In a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium, players’ actions maximise their expected utility
given their beliefs, and beliefs are updated according to Bayes’s rule. In equilibrium,
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players should have correct beliefs about other player’s actions. Requiring players to
have correct beliefs about other player’s equilibrium actions leads to a straightforward
conclusion in this model: overconfidence has no effect on the incumbent’s choice of effort
or on the selection of politicians.
To see this, I derive the re-election threshold of the voter. First recall that the voter
re-elects the incumbent if, given the first period payoff she observes, she believes the
incumbent is more competent than a randomly selected challenger. Let Φ(x) denote
the CDF of the standard normal distribution, and φ(x) its density. Under assumption
4 ε1σV ∼ N(0, 1). In addition, let a˜1 denote the belief of the voter over the politician’s
equilibrium choice of effort, then the voter re-elects the incumbent if:
pφ
(
u1−f(a˜1,θH)
σV
)
pφ
(
u1−f(a˜1,θH)
σV
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
u1−f(a˜1,θL)
σV
) ≥ p (3.8)
The left-hand side of this inequality is increasing in u1 given that φ satisfies the MLRP.
The voter therefore re-elects the politician if and only if her first period payoff is higher
than the value of u1 for which inequality (3.8) holds with equality. Re-arranging, and
using the symmetry of the normal distribution, the threshold must solve:
u¯ =
f(a˜1, θH) + f(a˜1, θL)
2
(3.9)
The final step is to solve for the voter’s conjecture about the politician’s effort a˜1. If
the voter is aware that the incumbent has different beliefs regarding the distribution of
the random shock, then the voter’s conjecture will be based on the incumbent’s belief
about that distribution. Indeed, at the point of choosing her effort level, the politician
anticipates that she will be judged based on that conjecture and the realised shock. She
therefore chooses effort based on her beliefs about that shock. In turn, the voter expects
the politician to follow this decision process and her conjecture is therefore based on the
incumbent’s beliefs: her conjecture solves condition 3.6, which is based on the objective
distribution G.
Combining equations (3.6) and (3.9) gives the following characterisation of the players’
strategies
Proposition 15. The weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy profile satisfies
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• The incumbent’s action aPS solves
c′(aPS ) =
δ
σ
φ
(
f(aPS , θH)− f(aPS , θL)
2σ
)
×
[
p
∂f(a1, θH)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aPS
+ (1− p)∂f(a1, θL)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aPS
]
(3.10)
• The voter’s cutoff is given by u¯ = f(aPS ,θH)+f(aPS ,θL)2
This equilibrium exists given assumptions 3 and 5 and it is unique if the incumbent’s
objective function V (a1, u¯), evaluated at the equilibrium threshold u¯ is strictly concave in
a1.
Note that this equilibrium only depends on the incumbent’s beliefs about the distri-
bution of the random shock, not on those of the voters: σV does not appear in equation
(3.10). Therefore, the resulting level of effort, quality of selection and voter welfare is
the same whether the voter is overconfident or not. Intuitively, the incumbent chooses
an action that is optimal given her (correct) prior beliefs about the random utility shock
ε. Given this behaviour, the voter’s best response is to choose the re-election threshold
defined by (3.9).
This result requires some demanding assumptions on the higher-order beliefs of the
players. Despite the fact that the voter cannot observe the actions of the politician, and
that the feedback that the voter receives does not allow her to verify that her conjecture
about the politician’s action is correct, the voter’s actions (the re-election threshold) is
based on the correct equilibrium play of the politician. In addition, the voter has to believe
that either the politician is not rational or to agree to disagree with her: believe that the
politician has a different prior, but continue to believe her prior is correct. Assuming
that players agree to disagree makes some demanding assumptions given the focus on
overconfidence. It requires the voter’s second-order belief over the incumbent’s prior beliefs
to be correct, while his own prior beliefs are incorrect.
Strategies when the voter is naive
Because this model explores the effect of voters’ systematic mistakes, a more intuitive
approach is to assume that the voter is unaware that the politician has a different prior
belief. This requires some different restrictions on higher-order beliefs in order to main-
tain the assumption of common belief of rationality. In particular, the requirement that
players have correct beliefs over the equilibrium strategy of the other players needs to
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be relaxed. To explore this question, I use the framework of rationalisable conjectural
equilibria developed by Esponda (2013).
In particular, I look instead for equilibria in which players do not have correct beliefs
over the equilibrium strategies of the other players.4 Following Esponda (2013), a strategy
profile is a rationalisable conjectural equilibrium if there exists a belief space B such that
players maximise their expected utility, given their beliefs, and these beliefs are consistent
given a partition, and such that there is common knowledge of rationality and consistency.
To find the set of such equilibria, I first define the exogenous feedback partition that
each player is facing, based on the timing and information structure of the model described
in section 3.2. I then find the set of strategy profiles that satisfy rationality and consistency,
and finally, I refine this set of equilibria by imposing restrictions on higher-order beliefs,
in particular, common knowledge of rationality and consistency.
Given that the voter only observes her utility at the end of the first period, and
at the end of the second period, I restrict the support of the beliefs over the epistemic
state that generates the incumbent’s actions and the distribution of the utility shock ε
to be consistent with the observed utility. Since both the incumbent’s action and the
random shock have support over the entire real line, this restriction is not very stringent:
any observed utility is consistent with some combination of incumbent effort and some
realisation of the random shock. In addition, I make the natural restriction that the
voter should know her own action (or her choice of re-election threshold). I also maintain
the assumption that the voter knows the correct distribution of the politician’s type. I
restrict the incumbent to know with certainty the ‘correct’ (objective) distribution of both
the random shock, and of her own type. The incumbent also observes her own actions,
and observes whether or not she is re-elected. This assumption does not place strong
restrictions on the beliefs of the incumbent, since re-election could be consistent with an
infinity of combinations of re-election thresholds and realisation of the random shock.
I restrict the voter to believe that the incumbent has the same beliefs as the voter
over the equilibrium strategies, and the fundamentals of the game. This captures the idea
that the voter is naive: she is not aware that she is mistaken over the distribution of the
random shock, and therefore believes that the incumbent is facing the same fundamental
game as she is.
4But in which players have common belief of rationality (they believe that other players are maximising
their own payoffs, given the beliefs that they think other players have) and have a hierarchy of beliefs
consistent with the feedback they can obtain from their payoffs or other signals about other players’
strategy.
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Given these beliefs, the voter believes that the incumbent solves the following problem:
max
a1
δ
[
1− pGV
(
u¯− f(a1, θH)
)
− (1− p)GV
(
u¯− (f(a1, θL)
)]
− c(a1) (3.11)
For a given threshold u¯.
Let VV (a1, u¯) = δ [1− pGV (u¯− f(a1, θH))− (1− p)GV (u¯− (f(a1, θL))]. If the voter
believes that the random shock ε is distributed as ε ∼ N(0, σ2V ), then the voter believes
that the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy aV solves
c′(aV ) =
∂VV (a1, u¯)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aV
(3.12)
This equilibrium choice of effort aV , determines the re-election threshold
u¯V =
f(aV , θH) + f(a
V , θL)
2
.
Finally, as the voter believes that the distribution of ε is GV , and the voter believes that
the incumbent will have correct beliefs about the equilibrium threshold, the voter believes
that the incumbent’s equilibrium strategy solves
c′(aV ) = δ
1
σV
φ
(
f(aV , θH)− f(aV , θL)
2σV
)
×
[
p
∂f(a1, θH)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aV
+ (1− p)∂f(a1, θL)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aV
]
(3.13)
This equation has the same form as equation (3.10), except for the different standard
deviation σV used. Therefore, the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a
V are
the same as those for aPS , replacing σ by σV .
Therefore, in an RCE, the equilibrium choice of threshold of the voter is u¯V =
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 , and the equilibrium beliefs of the voter over the incumbent’s action
are aV that solves equation (3.13).
Recall that the incumbent is aware of the voter’s mistakes, and is aware that the voter
is unaware that the incumbent has different beliefs. Therefore, the incumbent correctly
believes that the voter uses a threshold u¯V = f(a
V ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 , where a
V is defined by
equation (3.13), as above.
The equilibrium strategy of the incumbent is then determined by her maximisation
problem given a re-election threshold based on the voter’s incorrect conjectured equilib-
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rium. The incumbent’s first period a1 = a
I solves
c′(aI) = pδ
1
σ
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(aI , θH)
σ
)
∂f(a1, θH)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aI
+ (1− p)δ 1
σ
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(aI , θL)
σ
)
∂f(a1, θL)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aI
(3.14)
I summarise these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 16. If the voter is overconfident and naive, and if the incumbent is aware
of the voter’s overconfidence, then the following strategy profile and beliefs constitute a
rationalisable conjectural equilibrium
1. The incumbent chooses an effort level aI such that aI solves equation (3.14).
2. The voter chooses a re-election threshold u¯V = f(a
V ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 , such that a
V solves
equation (3.13).
3. The incumbent believes that the voter uses a threshold u¯V , and the voter believes that
the incumbent chooses aV .
4. All higher-order beliefs of both players are correct.
The existence of this equilibrium is guaranteed by the same conditions as when the
voter is not overconfident. Indeed, the voter’s problem is the same in both cases, simply
with a different variance. As a result, aV exists if aPS exists. Given some value a
P
S ,
the strict convexity of c(·) and the properties of f(a, θ) also guarantee that there exists
an aI that solves equation (3.14). The uniqueness of the equilibrium requires a more
demanding condition however. While aV is unique if aPS is unique, the uniqueness of a
I is
not guaranteed by the strict concavity of the incumbent’s objective function when the re-
election threshold is based on the correct incumbent action. Instead, a sufficient condition
is that the following function is concave in a given u¯V = f(a
V ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 :
V RCE =
δ
σ
[
pΦ
(
u¯V − f(a, θH)
σ
)
+ (1− p)Φ
(
u¯V − f(a, θL)
σ
)]
Proposition 17. The equilibrium defined in proposition 16 always exists and is unique if
V RCE(a) is concave in a for any a > 0 and given u¯V = f(a
V ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 .
This condition is more demanding than necessary and the equilibrium could be unique
even if the condition is not satisfied. However, it is easy to verify for a given set of
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parameters, and I show that it is satisfied for a given functional form and given parameters
in the next section.
Assuming that the voter is naive therefore implies that the voter’s perception of the
incumbent’s first-period effort and the actual first-period effort differ in equilibrium. As
long as σV 6= σ, then aV 6= aI , and there is a possibility for the politician to take advan-
tage of the voter’s mis-perception. This creates a wedge between the equilibrium effort
perceived by an overconfident voter and the one perceived by a fully rational voter. In
turn, this leads to a different re-election rule, and therefore a different expected second-
period politician type in equilibrium, than if the voter suffered no overconfidence. Given
these equilibrium beliefs and strategies, the effect of overconfidence on voter welfare arises
through the difference between the voter’s expectation of the politician’s optimal action
and the politician’s actual optimal action (since the politician does not suffer from over-
confidence, and has correct beliefs over the mistakes of the voter).
I now turn to the consequences of the voter’s overconfidence and naivety on the incum-
bent’s effort, the voter’s capacity to select high quality politicians and the voter’s welfare
in a special case of the model.
3.4 Comparing the welfare of overconfident voters and of
voters with correct beliefs
In this section, I compare the equilibrium politician effort, politician selection and voter
welfare when the voter is overconfident and naive and when the voter is fully rational.
Because of the voter’s naivety, the politician is able to manipulate the voter’s beliefs in
the sense that she can choose a level of effort different than the one the voter conjectures,
and as a result induce different beliefs about her type. Despite this possibility, I show in
a simple case that the voter can be better off when overconfident.
To keep the comparisons tractable, I assume that the outcome function f(a, θ) is linear
and additively separable in effort and competence.
Assumption 6. The performance function is linear in effort and ability f(a, θ) = a+ θ.
In addition, I normalise θL = 0 and σ
2 = 1.
Comparing effort levels
I begin by comparing the equilibrium level of effort when the voter is overconfident and
naive to the level of effort when the voter is fully rational. As shown in Proposition 15,
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it is the naivety of the voter that allows the difference in effort level between the case of
an overconfident voter and that of a rational one. Therefore, the effort level exerted when
a voter is fully rational is the same as that exerted when the voter is overconfident but
aware of her disagreement with the politician. The equilibrium level of effort in the case
of a rational voter, denoted aR, is therefore the solution to the first-order condition of the
politician’s problem when the players agree to disagree, given in equation (3.10). That is,
aR = aPS , and given assumption 6 and the normalisation, a
R solves:
c′(aR) = δφ
(
θH
2
)
(3.15)
When the voter is overconfident, the voter’s belief about the politician’s effort, aV ,
solves equation (3.12) and the actual equilibrium strategy of the politician, aI solves
equation (3.14). That is, aV and aI solve
c′(aV ) =
δ
σV
φ
(
θH
2σV
)
(3.16)
c′(aI) = δ
[
pφ
(
2(aV − aI)− θH
2
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
2(aV − aI) + θH
2
)]
(3.17)
Given Proposition 17, aI is unique if δ
[
pφ
(
2(aV −a)−θH
2
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
2(aV −a)+θH
2
)]
is
decreasing in a for any a > 0. This function is increasing up to a threshold a¯ and decreasing
above a¯. Therefore, a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of aI is that a¯ ≤ 0.
Lemma 4. Under assumption 6,
1. aR exists and is unique.
2. aV exists and is unique.
3. aI exists, and is unique provided that a¯ ≤ 0, where a¯ solves
(1− p)
(
2aV + θH
2
− a¯
)
exp
(
2θH(a
V − a¯))+ p(2aV − θH
2
− a¯
)
= 0
Comparing aR to aI shows that the incumbent exerts more effort when facing over-
confident voters than perfectly rational voters, if she is sufficiently overconfident.
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Proposition 18. Suppose assumption 6 is satisfied and a¯ ≤ 0, then there exists a threshold
s∗(θH) such that the politician’s effort when the voter is overconfident, aI , is greater than
her effort when the voter is rational, aR, if and only if σV > s
∗(θH) (provided that σV is
such that a¯ ≤ 0).5 In addition, s∗(θH) ∈ [0, 1] if θH < 2 and s∗(θH) is increasing in θH .
To understand the relationship between the level of overconfidence and the ranking of
effort levels, first note that the politician’s equilibrium level of effort when the voter is
overconfident is always between the beliefs of the overconfident voter about the politician’s
effort aV and the equilibrium effort when the voter is rational aR. That is, either aR <
aI < aV or aV < aI < aR.
To illustrate the intuition behind this result, suppose for instance that aR < aV . The
first observation is that, since the marginal cost of effort is increasing in effort, the marginal
cost of effort when the voter is rational c′(aR) must be lower than the marginal cost of
effort perceived by an overconfident voter c′(aV ).
In addition, the marginal cost of effort when the voter is rational, c′(aR) must be
equal to the marginal benefit of effort of a politician facing an overconfident voter, if the
politician were to choose the level of effort expected by that overconfident voter. That is, if
a = aV , then the marginal benefit, B(a) = δ
[
pφ
(
2(aV −a)−θH
2
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
2(aV −a)+θH
2
)]
satisfies:
B(aV ) = δ
[
pφ
(
2(aV − aV )− θH
2
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
2(aV − aV ) + θH
2
)]
= φ
(
θH
2
)
= c′(aR) (3.18)
This is because both the politician and a rational voter use the correct variance σ2 = 1
when computing this marginal benefit, and aI = aV means that the marginal benefit is
evaluated as if the voter correctly anticipates the politician’s effort level, which is what a
rational voter would do.
Combining these two observations implies that the marginal benefit of effort if the
politician were to take the effort level expected by an overconfident voter B(aV ) must be
lower than the marginal cost at that effort level c′(aV ), since B(aV ) = c′(aR) < c′(aV ).
The politician would therefore prefer to reduce her effort level, and the equilibrium effort
level aI must be lower than aV .
Moreover, when a¯ ≤ 0, the marginal benefit of effort of a politician facing an overconfi-
dent voter B(a) is decreasing in a. This implies that the marginal benefit evaluated at the
5I show in Proposition 20 that the set of parameters such that both σV > s
∗(θH) and a¯ ≤ 0 hold
simultaneously is non-empty.
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rational voter’s expected level of effort aR must be higher than at the overconfident voter’s
expected level: B(aV ) < B(aR). As a result, the marginal benefit of effort of a politician
facing an overconfident voter, evaluated at the level of effort expected by a rational voter
B(aR) must be greater than the marginal cost at that level: B(aR) > B(aV ) = c′(aR). So
the politician would like to increase her effort at this level and we must have aI greater
than aR.
Taken together, these imply that if aR < aV , then aR < aI < aV . A similar intuition
implies that if aV < aR, then aV < aI < aR. As a result, the ranking of effort between a
situation where the voter is rational, and one in which the voter is overconfident is fully
determined by the ranking of the effort levels expected by a rational voter, aR, versus an
overconfident voter, aV .
Given this relationship, I now describe how the ordering of the effort levels expected
by a rational voter, aR, versus an overconfident voter, aV , depends on the level of over-
confidence.
Note that the marginal benefit of exerting more effort for the incumbent, from the point
of view of an overconfident voter is δσV φ
(
θH
2σV
)
. This marginal benefit is non-monotonic
in the perceived variance σ2V . If that variance is sufficiently low, then the marginal benefit
of effort is increasing in variance, since the more noise there is, the more the politician can
jam the signal using her effort. Intuitively, as the variance goes to zero, the voter would
be able to perfectly infer the type of the politician, if she had the correct effort conjecture.
The voter believes that she is making the correct conjecture, and therefore believes that
effort is lower when the variance is σ2V than when it is σ
2 = 1. As the perceived variance
increases, the perceived marginal benefit becomes higher and eventually, the overconfident
voter believes that the politician exerts more effort than the rational voter does: aV > aR.
When perceived variance is high, the marginal benefit of effort starts decreasing in effort
and the equilibrium effort perceived by an overconfident voter, aV , eventually tends to
that perceived by the rational voter, aR. This is illustrated in figure 3.1.
Therefore, if the perceived variance is sufficiently high, σV > s
∗(θH), an overconfident
voter overestimates the marginal benefit of exerting more effort, and therefore expects
the incumbent to exert more effort than a fully rational voter would, so aV > aR. As a
consequence, if the incumbent were to exert the same effort as she would when the voter
is rational, a = aR, the marginal benefit of effort would outweigh the marginal cost, and
the incumbent would be better-off increasing her effort. So we must have aI > aR in
equilibrium.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium effort when voter is rational aR and perceived effort when voter
is overconfident aV
When the difference in competence between different types of politicians increases (that
is θH increases), that threshold increases too. Intuitively, a higher level of competence of
the good type θH decreases the marginal benefit of effort perceived by both an overcon-
fident and a rational voter. This decrease is more important for the overconfident than
the rational voter, and the ordering of aR and aV can be reversed. To compensate, the
overconfident voter needs to be less overconfident to guarantee that effort is higher than
with a rational voter, so s∗(θH) needs to increase.
Finally, note that, conditional on a¯ ≤ 0, neither the prior beliefs on the politician’s
type p, nor the discount factor δ affects this ordering. When voters and politicians have
the same beliefs about the noise, the incumbent fully internalises the effect of a higher
probability of being a high-type, p on the voter’s decision. Therefore, in equilibrium, this
parameter does not affect the incumbent’s choice of effort. This implies that neither aR nor
aV are affected by p. Since only the ordering of these two variables matters to determine
whether effort is higher under overconfidence, p does not affect this result. Similarly, a
change in δ affects both aR and aV in the same way, so it does not change their ordering.
These parameter matters can affect whether a¯ ≤ 0, however. As the overconfident
voter does not fully internalise the effect of changes in these parameters, the marginal
benefit B(a) of the politician facing an overconfident voter depends on the prior p and the
discount rate δ. Recall that a¯ is the point above which the marginal benefit of effort of an
incumbent facing an overconfident voter is decreasing. A higher p means the voter is more
likely to face a competent politician, who is more likely to produce a high outcome, all else
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equal, and as a result benefits less from exerting higher effort. Therefore, a¯ is more likely
to be below 0 if p is high. By contrast, a higher δ raises the marginal benefit perceived
by another confident, and therefore the effort that voter expects the politician to exert
aV . In turn, this raises the threshold of re-election, and increases the marginal benefit of
higher effort. Therefore, a¯ is more likely to be below 0 if δ is low.
Politician selection
The selection of high type politicians is another concern of accountability. I evaluate the
capacity of the voter to select the right politician through the ex-ante expected utility of
the voter in the second period. Since the equilibrium action in the second period is a2 = 0
for both types of politicians, this is equivalent to the expected type of the second period
politician. For a given threshold u¯, this is given by
S(u¯) = EθI
[
P(u > u¯ | θI)θI + P(u < u¯ | θI)E[θC ]
]
= p(1− p)θH [P(u > u¯ | θH)− P(u > u¯ | θL)] + pθH
As a result, selection improves when the voter is overconfident if and only if
P(u > u¯V | θH)− P(u > u¯V | θL) > P(u > u¯R | θH)− P(u > u¯R | θL)
Where u¯V = aV + θH+θL2 and u¯
R = aR + θH+θL2 . Given assumptions 5 and 6, this reduces
to
Φ
(
2(aV − aI) + θH
2
)
− Φ
(
2(aV − aI)− θH
2
)
> Φ
(
θH
2
)
− Φ
(−θH
2
)
The next proposition establishes that this can never occur. An overconfident and naive
voter is always worse at selecting good politicians than a rational voter.
Proposition 19. If assumption 6 is satisfied, and equilibria with and without overcon-
fidence exist and are unique, then selection is always worse when the voter suffers from
overconfidence.
Because the voter misperceives the equilibrium effort of the politician, the overconfi-
dence of the voter introduces a wedge aV − aI between the threshold that the voter uses
and the threshold he should be using if he was rational. As the politician is aware of this
wedge, she can take advantage of it to increase her chances of re-election. This may lead
to higher or lower effort than the voter expects, as shown in Proposition 18. However, in
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both cases, it reduces the informativeness of the payoff u1 as a signal of the politician’s
competence. Intuitively, the voter misinterprets this wedge as some information about the
politician’s competence, when it is in fact independent of that competence.
When aV − aI > 0, the payoff shock ε has to be higher for both types to be re-elected,
which reduces the probability of re-election of both types, but more so for the competent
type θH than the incompetent type θL. When a
V −aI > 0, re-election is possible for a lower
ε for both types, but this increase in re-election probability is higher for the incompetent
type θL than the competent type θH . Therefore, in both cases the relative probability of
electing an incompetent type θL increases.
Voter’s welfare
Given Proposition 19, a necessary condition for the voter’s welfare to be higher under
overconfidence is that the politician’s effort is higher. Given Proposition 18, this requires
σV > s
∗(θ) if a¯ < 0. This is not sufficient, however, as the negative effect on selection could
outweigh the positive effect of effort. The following proposition therefore characterises a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the voter to be better-off with overconfidence
when a¯ ≤ 0.
Proposition 20. If a¯ ≤ 0 an overconfident voter can be better-off than a rational voter
only if σV > s
∗(θ) and θH < 2.
The necessary and sufficient condition cannot be expressed in a closed form and de-
scribing it therefore does not unambiguously reveal when it is or is not satisfied. It is
provided in full, as a system of equations and inequalities, in the appendix. A numerical
example shows that there are reasonable sets of values for which this condition is satisfied,
so that voter welfare can indeed sometimes be higher under overconfidence.
This happens when the voter is not too overconfident (σV > s
∗(θ)), and therefore
overestimates the politician’s marginal benefit of effort relative to a rational voter. In that
case, the politician prefers to exert more effort to increase her chances of re-election (aI >
aR). For the higher effort to compensate for the worse selection, the effect of overconfidence
on selection should be relatively small. Following the intuition of Proposition 19, this
happens when the overconfident voter’s perception of effort aV is not too far from the
actual effort of a politician facing an overconfident voter aI , that is aV − aI is relatively
small.6 That distance depends subtly on the level of overconfidence σV , due to the shape
of the normal distribution’s density function.
6Recall from Proposition 18 that if aI > aR, then we must have aV > aI , given a¯ ≤ 0.
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These results imply that the voter can be better-off when he is sufficiently overcon-
fident that the politician wants to take advantage of that overconfidence, so that aI is
different from aR, but not too overconfident that overconfidence causes a significant loss
of information, that is, aV cannot be too far from aI .
3.5 Discussion
Implications
The results from the previous sections reveal that voters can be better-off when they over-
estimate the precision of their information, and are unaware that politicians have different
beliefs. This has normative implications for the effect of educating voters on voter welfare,
and empirical implications for measuring the effect of information on accountability.
Since overconfidence can result from voters misunderstanding the correlation between
their information sources (Ortoleva & Snowberg 2015), making voters aware of these cor-
relations, or reducing the source of these correlations could reduce voters’ overconfidence
(Levy et al. 2018). This model suggests that such actions could be misguided and result in
lower voter welfare, if voters are not too overconfidence. More generally, policy attempting
to better inform voters should be decided based on the size of the bias that voters suffer
from, and on the voter’s perceptions of what politicians know.
A number of empirical studies look at the effect of improving voter’s information on
accountability (see Ashworth (2012) for a survey and Bhandari et al. (2018) for a list of
more recent studies). This can take the form of information on the incumbent’s policy
choices, which this model does not address or information about the economic environment
or the impact of policies. In this model, an increase in the second type of information
available to both politician and voters can be interpreted as a decrease in the actual
variance (σ) of the utility shock. An increase in information provided to voters only can be
interpreted as a decrease in the voter’s perceived variance (σV ), and therefore corresponds
to an increase in overconfidence. This paper shows that the increase in either of these
parameters can have ambiguous effects on the politician’s action and on the voter’s welfare.
They also crucially depend on the level of sophistication of the voter, such as whether he
thinks the politician shares the same beliefs. The existing literature on behavioural biases
and accountability (Ashworth & Bueno De Mesquita 2014, Ashworth et al. 2018) suggests
that evaluating whether democratic institutions are effective by assessing whether voters
are well informed is insufficient as voters face strategic politicians. They suggest that more
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parameters of the political environment need to be accounted for to properly assess the
relationship between these two variable. This paper complements this view by suggesting
that another relevant parameter is not just what voters know but how they perceive what
politicians know.
Comparison with existing behavioural models of political accountability
Ashworth & Bueno De Mesquita (2014) also find that under certain conditions, irrational
voters (voters who fail to filter) can incentivise the incumbent to exert higher first-period
effort. In particular, they show that, in a pandering model, a low probability of having
an extreme challenger (equivalent to a high p in this model), gives the incumbent more
incentives to moderate (here, exerts higher effort). As expected, this is the opposite of
what happens in this model, since the bias they consider (failure to filter irrelevant noise)
implies that voters have more noise, while overconfidence implies that voters think that
they have less noise in their signals.
The key difference between Ashworth & Bueno De Mesquita (2014)’s model and this
model, however, lies in the fact that their voters correctly predicts the equilibrium action
of the incumbent. This is because the voter’s payoff is genuinely affected by the shock
that is unobservable from the point of view of the voters (or that they choose to ignore),
but observable for the politician. In this sense, the incumbent has to adopt the erroneous
beliefs of the voter when choosing their effort. Overconfidence, by contrast, is a genuine
mistake, in the sense that the shock to the voter’s utility has a different distribution that
the voter thinks it has.
Because the beliefs of the voter and the incumbent over the utility of the voter do not
diverge in Ashworth & Bueno De Mesquita (2014), each player also has correct higher order
beliefs over the other player’s strategy. Therefore, no difference arises between the voter’s
beliefs about the politician’s equilibrium strategy, and the actual politician’s strategy.
One direct implication of this less demanding form of irrationality is that selection can
either improve or worsen with a voter who fails to filter, while it always decreases with
an overconfident voter. A second implication is that the relationship between irrationality
and welfare is more subtle when voters are overconfident, as the changes in welfare depend
not only on the direct effect of overconfidence on first-period effort, but also on the indirect
effect on the voter’s belief about this effort.
Lockwood (2017) looks at a model of pandering: the incumbent knows the state and
chooses his action in order to improve the voter’s perception of his type. The model
98
therefore differs from mine because of the possibility for the politician to signal his type
through his actions. By contrast, information about the politician’s competence is sym-
metric in my model. My model can therefore be interpreted as a model of pandering with
unobservable actions but observable payoffs, in which the politician is always dissonant:
she dislikes effort but increasing effort increases her chances of re-election.
Secondly, the bias studied is different. Lockwood (2017) looks at confirmation bias,
the possibility of mis-interpreting a bad signal as a good one. In that sense, confirmation
bias is similar to overconfidence: a voter with confirmation bias thinks that he got the
correct signal when it is actually incorrect, while an overconfident voter thinks he got
a precise signal when it is actually less precise. In both cases, the politician knows the
correct distribution of the signal that the voter is receiving, but the voter does not know
that this is the case. The main difference is therefore that overconfidence is not partisan,
in the sense that the misinterpretation of information is independent of the voter’s prior.
A second important difference is that, with overconfidence, the voter’s misinterpretation is
relevant for the inference she draws: the voter and the politician agree on what is observed
but disagree about how it was generated. This implies that overconfident voters have the
wrong beliefs about the politician’s strategy, even in equilibrium.
In the case of unobservable actions but observable payoffs, Lockwood (2017) finds that
the probability that the incumbent chooses the right action (in his case, that the dissonant
politician imitates the consonant one), is always decreasing in the strength of confirmation
bias. This helps selection, by making it easier for the voter to distinguish between a good
and a bad politician but this improved selection is not sufficient to overcome the worst
first-period action. As a result, a behavioural voter always fares worse than a fully rational
voter. I find the opposite: if overconfidence is not too extreme, the politician is more likely
to choose the right action, but selection is worse, and the overconfident voter is overall
better off.
The difference arises because in his model, more confirmation bias unequivocally de-
creases the marginal benefit of pandering (i.e. exerting more effort) for the dissonant type,
as it raises the chances of being re-elected when the incumbent does not pander to voters.
With overconfident voters instead, the marginal benefit of increasing effort can increase
because the strategy expected by the voter can differ from that actually played by the
politician, so additional effort creates a more positive surprise for the voter who expected
a relatively low effort level in equilibrium. Therefore, the opposite results arises because
of the equilibrium difference in the perception of the politician’s strategy. This highlights
99
the importance of looking at the role of bias on second-order beliefs as well as first-order
beliefs.
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Appendices
A Proofs of results and extensions in Chapter 1
A.1 Commitment to confidentiality or transparency
In this section, I show that the results are not driven by the policy maker’s ability to
commit ex-ante to the confidentiality of her information. A standard unraveling intuition
would suggest that if the information is verifiable, no disclosure of the policy maker’s infor-
mation would make the lobbyist believe that the policy maker observed a ‘bad’ realisation
(e.g. Grossman (1981)). However, this does not occur here. The reason is that no type
has incentives to deviate from keeping the realisation r confidential. A policy-maker who
observed r1 strictly gains from keeping her information confidential, as she obtains some
informational rent from inducing piG. A policy-maker who observed r0 is indifferent be-
tween keeping this information confidential and making it public as piG is the information
the lobbyist would choose if she knew the policy maker had observed r0.
Formally, I assume that the policy maker cannot lie about the information she obtained
but chooses whether to disclose it. Let rˆ ∈ {r,∅} the information she chooses to disclose
and consider the following modification to the timing of the game: after r ∈ {r0, r1}
is realised and observed by the policy maker only, the policy maker chooses whether to
disclose the realisation rˆ = r or to keep it confidential rˆ = ∅. The lobbyist then chooses
pi, conditional on the report rˆ.
The following result captures the intuition above. Recall from Proposition 4 that if
B is sufficiently high (B > B), the policy maker weakly prefers the results from her
investigation to be public.
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Proposition 21. In the modified game, if B < B, there is an equilibrium in which:
1. The equilibrium choice of p is as defined by Proposition 3
2. pi = piG
3. The policy maker does not disclose her information
If B > B, it is an equilibrium for the policy maker to choose the most informative p, dis-
close her information, and for the lobbyist to choose his optimal public persuasion strategy
as defined by Lemma 1.
Therefore, the results established in previous sections remain equilibria under this
alternative assumption.7 Allowing the policy maker to choose the confidentiality of her
signal after it is realised also gives rise to other equilibria. In the case where B < B,
it is also an equilibrium for both types to disclose their information, or for type r0 to
disclose and type r1 not to. Both of these equilibria can be supported by the lobbyist
having off-equilibrium beliefs putting probability 1 on the deviating type being r1.
8 When
B > B, there is an equilibrium in which type r0 discloses her type and type r1 does not.
This is equivalent to full disclosure in the sense that the act of not disclosing fully reveals
the type.
This points to an important difference between the mechanism described in this paper
and alternative explanations for confidentiality in government. It could be suggested that
information is often not disclosed because it makes a policy maker look bad. This is
not explicitly modeled here, but could be an alternative way to rationalise the examples
mentioned in the introduction. If this were the case, however, the policy maker would
be indifferent between disclosing bad information or not, as no disclosure would amount
to revealing her bad signal (bad being interpreted as r1, or information that suggests the
lobbyist is right). In this case, no disclosure would be observed in conjunction with (1)
the government fully using their expertise, and (2) the lobbyist providing the minimum
level of evidence. The present model suggests by contrast that the policy maker would
be indifferent between disclosing good information or not, and would strictly prefer not to
7Note that these equilibria survive standard refinements such as the intuition criterion (Cho & Kreps
(1987)). In the case where B < B, this is straightforward as deviating from the equilibrium strategy of
no disclosure requires full revelation of the signal. Therefore, the off-equilibrium beliefs of the lobbyist
following a deviation are uniquely defined. In the case where B > B, the reason is that type r0 would
never strictly gain by deviating for any beliefs of the lobbyist. Therefore observing no disclosure would
induce the lobbyist to believe that the policy maker observed r1 with probability 1. As a result, the policy
maker would not gain from deviating to no disclosure following r1.
8This equilibrium is dominated for the policy maker (by Proposition 3). Therefore selecting the policy
maker-preferred equilibrium would leave only the equilibrium where information is not disclosed.
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disclose bad information. No disclosure of information would be observed in conjunction
with high amount of evidence presented by lobbyists.
104
A.2 Availability of more complex preliminary investigations
In the analysis, I restrict the policy maker to a preliminary investigation producing at two
most two signals. Given that the policy maker’s expertise is limited, it is reasonable to
restrict attention to simple investigation that can produce only one of two conclusions,
such as a memo summarising the key pros and cons of a policy and offering one policy
recommendation.
In addition, when information is transparent, the policy maker cannot gain from a
preliminary investigation producing more than two possible realisations. Any other re-
alisation would induce a belief µr∗ in the interval [µ, µ¯]. If µr∗ <
1
2 , then the lobbyist
would respond with a persuasion strategy pir∗ and on average, the policy maker would
not gain from that additional signal. 12 < µr∗ < µ¯, then the lobbyist would not provide
additional information, but the policy maker would sometimes end up with a belief that
leads to unnecessarily high level of uncertainty (as she could have received µ¯ instead).
Finally if µr∗ = µ¯, then it is without loss to focus on a binary investigation as r∗ and r1
are interchangeable.
However, the policy maker could potentially gain when information is confidential.
Recall that the policy maker gains most when the lobbyist targets her most sceptical type
r0. In addition, she gains more when her sceptical belief µ
r0 is lower, as the lobbyist needs
to provide more evidence. However, if that belief is too low (µr0 < m∗(µr1), the policy
maker is relatively more likely to be sympathetic (observe r1) and the lobbyist prefers to
target a sympathetic policy maker (r1).
By introducing a third signal realisation r∗, the policy maker could design a preliminary
investigation such that:
1. r∗ is relatively unlikely, so that the lobbyist does not want to target r∗
2. The presence of r∗ reduces the probability of r1 relatively more than the probability
of r0
As a result, the new incentive constraint of the lobbyist to target the sceptical type (r0)
is now looser. This implies that the policy maker can now choose an investigation that
induces a lower µr0 while still satisfying the new incentive constraint. This new investi-
gation can therefore make the policy maker better off, by forcing the lobbyist to produce
even more evidence.
Proposition 22. When B < B < B, there exists a preliminary investigation p with three
possible realisations {r0, r∗, r1} which yields a higher expected utility to the policy maker
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than the optimal investigation defined in Proposition 3.
There are two points to note regarding this alternative investigation. First, it can
only improve the policy maker’s expected utility when the incentive constraint is bind-
ing. In all other cases, choosing the most informative preliminary investigation is better
than any other investigation, and that most informative investigation has only two signal
realisations. Second, the alternative investigation also involves some distortions. In the
absence of lobbyist, the policy maker would have optimally chosen the most informative
preliminary investigation with only two realisations, so choosing an investigation with
three signals involves some loss of informativeness.
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A.3 Proofs of Propositions in the text
Proof of Lemma 1. This results follows directly from the characterisation of the optimal
information structure from Kamenica & Gentzkow (2011). In particular, if µr is above 12 ,
any persuasion strategy such that µrs0 ≥ 12 gives the lobbyist the same expected utility of
1. If µr is below 12 , the optimal persuasion strategy induces beliefs on the concave closure
of V (µ).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let U˜(µr) the indirect expected utility of the policy maker
given an interim belief µr and the lobbyist’s best-response to that public belief (as de-
scribed in Lemma 1):
U˜ (µr) =

P pir(s0|r) + P pir(s1|r)
(
1
2
)
if µr < 12
µr if µr ≥ 12
=

1− µr if µr < 12
µr if µr ≥ 12
This indirect expected utility is weakly convex. Indeed,
If µr0, µr1 < µ¯ < 1
2
, or 1
2
<µ < µr0, µr1 for any feasible µr0 , µr1 , then the indirect
expected utility is linear and the policy maker is indifferent between any preliminary
investigations as her expected utility is either
UP (µr0 , µr1) =
∑
r∈{r0,r1}
P(µr)U˜ (µr) =
∑
r∈{r0,r1}
P(µr) (1− µr) = 1− µ0
or
UP (µr0 , µr1) =
∑
r∈{r0,r1}
P(µr)U˜ (µr) =
∑
r∈{r0,r1}
P(µr)µr = µ0
and therefore does not depend on the choice of preliminary investigation.
If µ < 1
2
<µ¯, then her indirect expected utility is a continuous piecewise function of
two linear functions. I show that this function is convex. That is, ∀ µL, µH ∈ [0, 1] and
for any λ ∈ [0, 1], we have:
λU˜(µL) + (1− λ)U˜(µH) ≥ U˜ (λµL + (1− λ)µH)
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Indeed,
1. If µL < µH ≤ 12 , then for both µ ∈ {µL, µH}, U˜(µ) = 1 − µ which is linear and
therefore convex.
2. If 12 ≤ µL < µH , then for both µ ∈ {µL, µH}, U˜(µ) = µ which is linear and therefore
convex.
3. If µL <
1
2 < µH , and λµL + (1− λ)µH < 12 then:
λU˜(µL) + (1− λ)U˜(µH) = λ (1− µL) + (1− λ)µH
≥ λ (1− µL) + (1− λ) 1
2
= λ (1− µL) + (1− λ)
[
1
2
− 1
2
+
1
2
]
= 1−
[
λµL + (1− λ) 1
2
]
≥ 1− [λµL + (1− λ)µH ] = U˜ (λµL + (1− λ)µH)
Where the first and second inequality follow from the fact that µH >
1
2 . Similarly,
if λµL + (1 − λ)µH < 12 , then λU˜(µL) + (1 − λ)U˜(µH) ≥ λµL + (1 − λ)µH =
U˜ (λµL + (1− λ)µH) where the inequality follows from 1− µL > 12 .
As a result, we can apply directly results from Kamenica & Gentzkow (2011) to con-
clude that a preliminary investigation inducing the most extreme beliefs is optimal, and
it is therefore an equilibrium for the policy maker to make full use of her expertise when
her information is publicly available.
Proof of Lemma 2. There are two cases to consider depending on the interim beliefs of
the policy maker:
1. Lobbyist needs to persuade both types:
Suppose that µr0 < µr1 < 12 . Following the intuition from Lemma 1, to minimise
the probability of s0, the lobbyist’s strategy induces µ
r
s0 = 0 for any r. Similarly,
to maximise the probability of s1, the lobbyist’s strategy induces either µ
r0
s1 =
1
2 or
µr1s1 =
1
2 . These observations completely determine the two persuasion strategies piG
and piT characterised in definitions 1 and 2.
When he chooses piG, the lobbyist’s expected utility is simply PpiG(s1) as the realisa-
tion s1 persuades both types in this case. When he chooses piT , his expected utility
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is P(r1)PpiT (s1|r1) as he only persuades type r1 following realisation s1. The lobbyist
therefore chooses signal piG if and only if:
P piG(s1) ≥ P(r1)PpiT (s1|r1) (19)
Let µrs(pi) the posterior induced by s ∈ {s0, s1} from signal pi ∈ {piG, piT }, starting
from interim µr ∈ {µr0 , µr1}, and µs(pi) the posterior belief induced by s ∈ {s0, s1}
from signal pi ∈ {piG, piT }, starting from the prior µ0.
Using the Bayes plausibility constraint, inequality (19) becomes
µ0 − µs0(piG)
µs1(piG)− µs0(piG)
≥
(
µ0 − µr0
µr1 − µr0
)(
µr1 − µr1s0(piT )
µr1s1(piT )− µr1s0(piT )
)
⇔ µ0(1− µ
r0) + (1− µ0)µr0
2(1− µr0) ≥
µr1(µ0 − µr0)
(µr1 − µr0)
⇔ − (2(µr1 − µ0) + 1)(µr0)2 + (3µr1 − µ0)µr0 − µ0µr1 ≥ 0 (20)
This defines a set of pairs of beliefs (µr0 , µr1) such that the lobbyist prefers piG to
piT . Let, G = {(µr0 , µr1) | µr0 ≥ m∗(µr1)} denote this set. The boundary of the set
G is therefore given by a root of the equation:
H(µr0) = −(2(µr1 − µ0) + 1)(µr0)2 + (3µr1 − µ0)µr0 − µ0µr1 = 0 (21)
H(x) is a quadratic function of x with two roots: x and x¯. Its first derivative is
first positive up to some x∗ ∈ [x, x¯], then negative. Therefore, the function H(x) is
negative on x ∈ [0, x], positive on [x, x¯], and negative on [x¯, 1].
Define:
a(µr1 , µ0) = −(2(µr1 − µ0) + 1)
b(µr1 , µ0) = 3µ
r1 − µ0
c(µr1 , µ0) = −µ0µr1
Notice that fixing µ0 and µ
r1 , the function H(x) defined above is a quadratic function
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of x with two roots:
x =
−b(µr1 , µ0) +
√
(b(µr1 , µ0))2 − 4a(µr1 , µ0)c(µr1 , µ0)
2a(µr1 , µ0)
x¯ =
−b(µr1 , µ0)−
√
(b(µr1 , µ0))2 − 4a(µr1 , µ0)c(µr1 , µ0)
2a(µr1 , µ0)
Its first derivative H ′(µ) = b(µr1 , µ0) + 2a(µr1 , µ0)x is positive for x ∈
[
0, −b(µ
r1 ,µ0)
2a(µr1 ,µ0)
]
since a(µr1 , µ0) < 0 and it is negative on
[−b(µr1 ,µ0)
2a(µr1 ,µ0)
, 1
]
. Therefore, the function
H(x) is negative on x ∈ [0, x], positive on [x, x¯], and negative on [x¯, 1].
Let, m∗(µr1) the lowest root of equation (21),
m∗(µr1) =
3µr1 − µ0 −
[
(µr1 − µ0)(9µr1 − 8µ0µr1 − µ0
] 1
2
4(µr1 − µ0) + 2
Then we have that the lobbyist prefers piG only if µ
r0 ≥ m∗(µr1).
Finally, note that for any µ0 ∈ [0, 1] and µr1 ∈ [µ0, 1]:
m∗(µr1) =
−b(µr1 , µ0) +
√
(b(µr1 , µ0))2 − 4a(µr1 , µ0)c(µr1 , µ0)
2a(µr1 , µ0)
≤ µ0
Indeed, re-arranging gives:
−b(µr1 , µ0) +
√
(b(µr1 , µ0))2 − 4a(µr1 , µ0)c(µr1 , µ0)
2a(µr1 , µ0)
≤ µ0
⇔
√
(b(µr1 , µ0))2 − 4a(µr1 , µ0)c(µr1 , µ0) ≥ 2µ0a(µr1 , µ0) + b(µr1 , µ0)
⇔ b(µr1 , µ0))2 − 4a(µr1 , µ0)c(µr1 , µ0)
≥ 4µ20a(µr1 , µ0)2 + 4µ0a(µr1 , µ0)b(µr1 , µ0) + b(µr1 , µ0)2
⇔ 0 ≥ 4a(µr1 , µ0)
[
a(µr1 , µ0)µ
2
0 + b(µ
r1 , µ0)µ0 + c(µ
r1 , µ0)
]
⇔ 0 ≤ a(µr1 , µ0)µ20 + b(µr1 , µ0)µ0 + c(µr1 , µ0)
Substituting the values of a(µr1 , µ0), b(µ
r1 , µ0) and c(µ
r1 , µ0), we find that this holds
if
0 ≤ − [(2(µr1 − µ0) + 1)]µ20 + [3µr1 − µ0]µ0 − µ0µr1
⇔ 0 ≤ 2µ0(1− µ0)(µr1 − µ0)
which is true as µr1 ≥ µ0.
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In addition, 0 ≤ m∗(µr1). Indeed as a(µr1 , µ0) ≤ 0,
−b(µr1 , µ0) +
√
(b(µr1 , µ0))2 − 4a(µr1 , µ0)c(µr1 , µ0)
2a(µr1 , µ0)
≥ 0
⇔
√
(b(µr1 , µ0))2 − 4a(µr1 , µ0)c(µr1 , µ0) ≤ b(µr1 , µ0)
⇔ − 4a(µr1 , µ0)c(µr1 , µ0) ≤ 0
⇔ a(µr1 , µ0)c(µr1 , µ0) ≥ 0
which is true as c(µr1 , µ0) ≤ 0.
Similarly, we can show that x¯ ≥ µ0, so that condition (20) is satisfied for all µr0 ∈
[m∗(µr1), µ0]. As a result, we get that for any µr0 ∈ [0, µ0], H(µr0) is positive if and
only if µr0 ≥ x, so the lobbyist prefers piG only if µr0 ≥ m∗(µr1).
Finally note that the left-hand side of condition (20) is increasing in µr0 while the
right-hand side is decreasing in µr0 . As µr1 increases, the right-hand side shifts
down. As a result, the value of µr0 , m∗, that makes the two sides equal is decreasing
in µr1 . This proves that m∗(µr1) is decreasing in µr1 .
Indeed,
∂
∂µr0
[
µ0(1− µr0) + (1− µ0)µr0
2(1− µr0)
]
=
(1− µ0)
2(1− µr0)2 > 0
∂
∂µr0
[
µr1(µ0 − µr0)
(µr1 − µr0)
]
= −µ
r1(µr1 − µ0)
(µr1 − µr0)2 < 0
∂
∂µr1
[
µr1(µ0 − µr0)
(µr1 − µr0)
]
= −µ
r0(µ0 − µr0)
(µr1 − µr0)2 < 0
2. Lobbyist only needs to persuade lower type:
Suppose now that µr0 < 12 < µ
r1 . The lobbyist’s strategy should induce µr0s1 =
1
2 . If
it induces a belief below 12 then the lobbyist’s payoff is weakly below that of providing
no information and he would prefer an uninformative strategy. If it is strictly above
1
2 , then the lobbyist could increase the probability of s1 by reducing that posterior
belief without reducing his payoff. Therefore the trade-off for the lobbyist is now
between a strategy such that a realisation s0 persuades no type (i.e. µ
r1
s0 <
1
2) and
one that still persuades the high type (i.e µr1s0 =
1
2). This can be achieved with the
conditional distributions piG and piT characterised in definitions 1 and 2.
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The lobbyist now chooses piG if and only if:
P piG(s1) ≥ P piT (s1) + P(r1)PpiT (s0|r1)
⇔ µ0 − µs0(piG)
µs1(piG)− µs0(piG)
≥
(
µ0 − µs0(piT )
µs1(piT )− µs0(piT )
)
+
(
µ0 − µr0
µr1 − µr0
)(
µr1s1(piT )− µr1
µr1s1(piT )− µr1s0(piT )
)
⇔ (1− µ
r1)(1− 2µr0) [−(2(µr1 − µ0) + 1)(µr0)2 + (3µr1 − µ0)µr0 − µ0µr1]
(1− µr0)(µr1 − µr0)2 ≥ 0
This holds if and only if the following inequality is satisfied:
−(2(µr1 − µ0) + 1)(µr0)2 + (3µr1 − µ0)µr0 − µ0µr1 ≥ 0
The left-hand side of this inequality is H(µr0) as defined in equation (21) in the
previous part of the proof. The rest of the proof therefore follows the same logic as
in the previous case.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove this result, I first show that the policy maker’s ex-
pected utility is always strictly higher when the lobbyist chooses piG than when her infor-
mation is public for a given pair of interim beliefs (µr0 , µr1) (‘if’ statement). I then show
that the policy maker’s expected utility is the same when the lobbyist chooses piT as when
her information is public (‘only if’ statement).
1. If the incentive constraint is satisfied confidentiality is strictly preferred:
If the interim beliefs induced by the policy maker’s preliminary investigation are
(µr0 , µr1) ∈ G, then the lobbyist chooses a general persuasion strategy piG, which
yields the following expected utility for the policy maker
UG (µr0 , µr1) = P(r0)
[
P piG(s0|r0) + P piG(s1|r0)
1
2
]
+ P(r1)
[
P piG(s0|r1) + P piG(s1|r1)µr1s1
]
= (1− µ0)(1− 2µ
r0)
(1− µr0) + µ0
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The policy maker’s expected utility under transparency is:
UP (µr0 , µr1) =

P(s0) · 1 + P(s1) ·
(
1
2
)
if µr1 < 12
P(r0)
[
P pir0 (s0|r0) · 1 + P pir0 (s1|r0) ·
(
1
2
)]
+ P(r1)µr1 if µr1 > 12
=

1− µ0 if µr1 < 12(
µr1−µ0
µr1−µr0
)
(1− 2µr0) + µ0 if µr1 > 12
(22)
Therefore, piG always makes the policy maker better-off as
UG(µr0 , µr1) = (1− µ0)(1− 2µ
r0)
(1− µr0) + µ0 > 1− µ0 = U
P (µr0 , µr1) if µr1 <
1
2
UG(µr0 , µr1) = (1− µ0)(1− 2µ
r0)
(1− µr0) + µ0
>
(
µr1 − µ0
µr1 − µr0
)
(1− 2µr0) + µ0
= UP (µr0 , µr1) if µr1 >
1
2
2. If the incentive constraint is not satisfied, confidentiality is not strictly
preferred:
If (µr0 , µr1) /∈ G then the lobbyist chooses a targeted strategy which yields the
following expected utility for the policy maker
UT (µr0 , µr1) =

P(r0)
[
P piT (s0|r0) + P piT (s1|r0)(1− µr0s1)
]
+P(r1)
[
P piT (s0|r1) + P piT (s1|r1)
(
1
2
)]
if µr1 < 12
P(r0)
[
P piT (s0|r0)(1− µr0s0) + P piT (s1|r0)
(
1
2
)]
+P(r1)
[
P piT (s0|r1)
(
1
2
)
+ P piT (s1|r1)µr1s1
]
if µr1 < 12
=

1− µ0 if µr1 < 12(
µr1−µ0
µr1−µr0
)
(1− 2µr0) + µ0 if µr1 > 12
(23)
Therefore, for any (µr0 , µr1)
UP (µr0 , µr1) = UT (µr0 , µr1)
Proof of Proposition 3. As before, I divide the proof into two.
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1. Lobbyist needs to persuade both types: Suppose that for any feasible pair of
beliefs, µr0 < µr1 < 12 .
Claim 1: When µ¯ < 12 , the policy maker is always better-off when the lobbyist
chooses piG than piT .
Proof: Recall that in this case, the policy maker’s expected utility under trans-
parency, given in equation (22), is UP (µr0 , µr1) = 1 − µ0, which is independent of
(µr0 , µr1) and always worse than piG. Therefore,
UG (µr0 , µr1) > UP (µr0 , µr1) = UP (µ0, µ0)
Recall that UP and UT yield the same expected utility, independently of (µr0 , µr1).
Therefore,
UT (µr0 , µr1) = 1− µ0 = UP (µr0 , µr1) = UP (µ0, µ0)
Therefore, ∀ µr0 , µr1 , µr′0 , µr′1 :
UG (µr0 , µr1) > UP (µ0, µ0) = U
T
(
µr
′
0 , µr
′
1
)
So the policy maker always prefers to induce the lobbyist to target both of her types
(choose piG) than to target only her sympathetic type (piT ).
Claim 2: Given that the lobbyist chooses piG, the policy maker prefers a prelimi-
nary investigation inducing the lowest possible sceptical belief µr0 , and is indifferent
between any sympathetic belief µr1 induced by her investigation.
Proof: The function UG (µr0 , µr1) = (1− µ0) 1−2µr0(1−µr0 ) + µ0 is independent of µr1 and
decreasing in µr0 :
∂UG (µr0 , µr1)
∂µr0
= − (1− µ0)
(1− µr0)2 ≤ 0
Therefore, the policy maker always prefers her preliminary investigation to induce
the lowest possible µr0 subject to the incentive constraint being satisfied.
Combining claims 1 and 2 implies that the policy maker’s choice of preliminary
investigation is fully determined by whether the incentive constraint is binding or
not. If it is not, then she chooses the most informative preliminary investigation.
If it is, then she chooses the preliminary investigation that induces the lowest µr0
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subject to the incentive constraint.
Let B solve µ = m∗(µ¯), that is:
µ0
µ0 +B(1− µ0) = m
∗
(
Bµ0
Bµ0 + (1− µ0)
)
This threshold is given by B = 1 +
√
2, and the incentive constraint for the lobbyist
to choose piG binds if and only if B ≥ B.
Therefore,
(a) When B < B, the incentive constraint does not bind (m∗(µ¯) < µ) and the
optimal preliminary investigation induces µr0 = µ. Since UG (µr0 , µr1) is in-
dependent of µr1 the policy maker is indifferent between any values of µr1 , so
any (µr0 , µr1) ∈ {µ} × [(m∗)−1(µ), µ¯] can be in the support of an equilibrium
preliminary investigation. Therefore, when B < B, it is an equilibrium
for the policy maker to choose the most informative preliminary in-
vestigation.
(b) When B > B, the constraint binds (m∗(µ¯) > µ) and the optimal preliminary
investigation induces µr0 = m∗(µr1). Since m∗(µr1) is decreasing in µr1 and
UG (µr0 , µr1) is independent of µr1 , it is optimal to induce µr1 = µ¯. Therefore,
when B ≥ B, the only equilibrium is for the policy maker to choose
a preliminary investigation that induces µr0 = m∗(µ¯) and µr1 = µ¯.
2. Lobbyist only needs to persuade lower type:
Suppose now that beliefs such that µr0 < 12 < µ
r1 are feasible. Note that UG (µr0 , µr1)
is unchanged in this case. I show that the policy maker now sometimes prefer to
induce piT .
Claim 3: If the lobbyist were to choose piT , the policy maker would choose the most
informative investigation p¯.
Proof: Recall that the policy maker’s indirect utility as a function of (µr0 , µr1) in
this case is:
UT (µr0 , µr1) =
(µr1 − µ0)(1− µr0) + (µ0 − µr0)µr1
µr1 − µr0 (24)
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Therefore, UT (µr0 , µr1) is increasing in µr1 and decreasing in µr0 :
∂UT (µr0 , µr1)
∂µr0
= −(2µ
r1 − 1)(µr1 − µ0)
(µr1 − µr0)2 ≤ 0
∂UT (µr0 , µr1)
∂µr1
=
(1− 2µr0)(µ0 − µr0)
(µr1 − µr0)2 ≥ 0
As a result, the optimal preliminary investigation given piT induces interim beliefs
(µ, µ¯).
Claim 4: If B < B, the policy maker strictly prefers the most informative prelimi-
nary investigation.
Proof: As shown above, if B < B, the policy maker induces the lobbyist to choose
piG over piT even when using the most informative investigation. From the proof of
Proposition 2, we know that UG (µr0 , µr1) > UT (µr0 , µr1). Therefore UG
(
µ, µ¯
)
>
UT
(
µ, µ¯
)
. From claim 3, we know that UT
(
µ, µ¯
) ≥ UT (µr0 , µr1) for any feasible
(µr0 , µr1).
Therefore,
UG
(
µ, µ¯
)
> UT
(
µ, µ
) ≥ UT (µr0 , µr1)
Finally, from claim 2, we have UG
(
µ, µ¯
) ≥ UG (µr0 , µr1). Therefore if the incentive
constraint does not bind (B < B), the policy maker prefers the most informative
preliminary information p¯.
Claim 5: If B > B, there exists B > B such that the policy maker prefers a
preliminary investigation such that µr0 = m∗(µ¯) and to induce the lobbyist to choose
piG if B ≤ B, and prefers a preliminary investigation such that µr0 = µ and to induce
the lobbyist to choose piT if B ≥ B.
Proof: First recall that if B > B, the incentive constraint binds so given claim
2, the optimal preliminary investigation that induces piG generates interim beliefs
µr0 = m∗(µ¯) and µr1 = µ¯. Given claim 3, if the policy maker’s investigation induces
piT , then it is optimal to generate interim beliefs µ
r0 = µ and µr1 = µ¯. To show the
existence and uniqueness of B, I proceed in three steps.
Step 1: At B = B, m∗(µ¯) = µ so UG (m∗(µ¯), µ¯) = UG
(
µ, µ¯
)
> UT
(
µ, µ¯
)
by claim
4.
Step 2: UG(m∗(µ¯), µ)−UT (µ, µ¯) is strictly decreasing in B for B > B. Indeed, we
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can write
UG
(
m∗(µ¯), µ
)− UT (µ, µ¯) = 1
B + 1
− 2B
3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1µ0
And taking derivatives with respect to B proves the result:
∂
[
UG
(
m∗(µ¯), µ
)− UT (µ, µ¯)]
∂B
= − 1
(B + 1)2
− µ0 −10B + 2− 2
√
9B2 − 10B + 1
(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1)2√9B2 − 10B + 1
Therefore, as −10B+2−2√9B2 − 10B + 1 < 0, UG(m∗(µ¯), µ)−UT (µ, µ¯) is strictly
decreasing if and only if:
µ0 <
(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1)2√9B2 − 10B + 1
(B + 1)2(−2 + 10B + 2√9B2 − 10B + 1) (25)
Second, the right-hand side of (25), (3B+
√
9B2−10B+1−1)2√9B2−10B+1
(B+1)2(−2+10B+2√9B2−10B+1) is increasing in
B:
∂
∂B
[
(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1)2√9B2 − 10B + 1
(B + 1)2(−2 + 10B + 2√9B2 − 10B + 1)
]
=
=
1
(B + 1)3(5B − 1 +√9B2 − 10B + 1)2√9B2 − 10B + 1
× 2(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1)
× (165B3 − 207B2 + 63B − 5 + (57B2 − 38B + 5)
√
9B2 − 10B + 1)
This is positive if and only if:
165B3 − 207B2 + 63B − 5 + (57B2 − 38B + 5)
√
9B2 − 10B + 1 ≥ 0
This always holds for B > 1 as 57B2−38B+5 > 0 if and only if B > 13 + 2
√
19
57 ≈ 0.49,
while 165B3− 207B2 + 63B− 5 has three real roots all smaller than 1 and is greater
than 0 for B greater than 1.
Finally, if the right-hand side of (25) is increasing in B, and at B = 1 +
√
2 we have
(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1)2√9B2 − 10B + 1
(B + 1)2(−2 + 10B + 2√9B2 − 10B + 1) =
(3 + 2
√
2)2(4 +
√
2)
(2 +
√
2)2(4 + 3
√
2)
> 1 > µ0
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Then for any B > B = 1 +
√
2, UG(m∗(µ¯), µ)− UT (µ, µ¯) is decreasing in B.
Step 3: As B → +∞, UG(m∗(µ¯), µ) < UT (µ, µ¯).
We know that limB→+∞(µ, µ¯) = (0, 1), and limB→+∞m∗(µ¯) = m∗(1) = µ01−2µ0 and
since UG(µr0 , µr1) is continuous in µr0 , we have:
lim
B→+∞
UG(m∗(µ¯), µ¯) = lim
B→+∞
(1− µ0) 1− 2m
∗(µ¯)
(1−m∗(µ¯)) + µ0 = 1−
µ0
3
In addition, limB→+∞ UT (µ, µ¯) = (1− µ0) + µ0 = 1. Therefore, we have:
lim
B→+∞
UT (µ, µ¯) = 1 > 1− µ0
3
= lim
B→+∞
UG(m∗(µ¯), µ¯)
Therefore, limB→+∞ UT (µ, µ¯) > limB→+∞ UG(m∗(µ¯), µ¯) and the policy maker even-
tually prefers to give up on trying to induce piG.
Combining steps 1, 2 and 3 and the intermediate value theorem implies that there
exists a unique B > B that satisfies claim 5.
Claims 1 to 5 then imply that the policy maker makes full use of her expertise if either
B < B or B > B and otherwise distorts her investigation such that µr0 = m∗(µ¯).
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove Proposition 4, I first derive the equilibrium value of
confidentiality for all possible values of B and µ0 and then take derivatives with respect
to B and µ0 for each possible case.
Let BH the value of B such that, given some prior µ0 <
1
2 , µ¯ =
1
2 . Similarly, let
mH the value of µ0 such that, given some expertise B, µ¯ =
1
2 . It is easy to verify that
BH(µ0) =
1−µ0
µ0
and mH(B) =
1
B+1 .
Let UP (µ, µ¯) = 1−µ0 and UP (µ, µ¯) =
(
µ¯−µ0
µ¯−µ
) (
1− 2µ)+µ0 the possible forms of the
policy maker’s equilibrium expected utility under transparency, as per equation (22).
The value of confidentiality is then
W (B,µ0) =

UG(µ, µ¯)− UP (µ, µ¯) if B < min{B,BH}
UG(µ, µ¯)− UP (µ, µ¯) if B ∈ (BH , B)
UG(m∗(µ¯), µ¯)− UP (µ, µ¯) if B ∈ (B,BH)
UG(m∗(µ¯), µ¯)− UP (µ, µ¯) if B > max{B,BH}
For each case, we can simplify the expressions and take partial derivatives.
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1. Case 1: If B < min{B,BH},
W1(B,µ0) =
[
(1− µ0)1−2µ1−µ + µ0
]
− [1− µ0] = µ0(B−1)B .
Therefore, ∂W1(B,µ0)∂B =
µ0
B2
> 0 and ∂W1(B,µ0)∂µ0 =
(B−1)
B > 0.
2. Case 2: If B ∈ (BH , B),
W2(B,µ0) =
[
(1− µ0)1−2µ1−µ + µ0
]
−
[
(µ¯−µ0)
µ¯−µ (1− 2µ) + µ0
]
= (1−µ0)B−µ0B(B+1)
(a) For B: ∂W2(B,µ0)∂B =
µ0(2B+1)−B2(1−µ0)
(B(B+1))2
≤ 0 if B ≥ µ0+
√
µ0
(1−µ0) . This follows from
the fact that µ0(2B+1)−B
2(1−µ0)
(B(B+1))2
≤ 0 if and only if µ0(2B+ 1)−B2(1− µ0) > 0.
The left-hand side is a quadratic equation in B with a negative coefficient on
the squared term and with positive root B∗ = µ0+
√
µ0
(1−µ0) . Note that B
∗ can be
less than 1 for µ0 sufficiently low in which case the value of confidentiality is
always decreasing in this range.
(b) For µ0,
∂W2(B,µ0)
∂µ0
= − 1B < 0.
3. Case 3: If B ∈ (B,BH),
W3(B,µ0) =
[
(1− µ0)(1− 2m∗(µ¯))
(1−m∗(µ¯)) + µ0
]
− [1− µ0]
=
µ0
(
4µ0B − 3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 4µ0 + 3
)
µ0
√
9B2 − 10B + 1 + 2 + 3(B − 1)µ0
(a) For B: ∂W3(B,µ0)∂B = −(1−µ0) 1(1−m∗(µ¯))2 ∂m
∗(µ¯)
∂µ¯
∂µ¯
∂B > 0 as
∂m∗(µ¯)
∂µ¯ < 0 and
∂µ¯
∂B > 0.
(b) For µ0: note that we can simplify W3(B,µ0) to express it as a linear function
of µ0:
W3(B,µ0) =
(
B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1
3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1
)
µ0
Therefore,
∂W3(B,µ0)
∂µ0
=
B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1
3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1
Which is greater than zero as B > 1, 3B > 1 and
√
9B2 − 10B + 1 > 0.
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4. Case 4: If B > max{B,BH},
W4(B,µ0) =
(1− µ0)(1− 2m∗(µ¯))
(1−m∗(µ¯)) −
B(1− µ0)− µ0(1− q)
q(B + 1)
=
1
(B + 1)(3Bµ0 +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1µ0 − 3µ0 + 2)
×
[
(B + 2− µ0(B + 1))µ0
√
9B2 − 10B + 1 + 2 + (B2 − 1)µ20
+ (−3B2 +B − 2)µ0)
]
Note first that W4(B,µ0) can be re-written as a linear function of µ0:
W4(B,µ0) =
1
B + 1
−
(
2B
3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1
)
µ0
(a) For B: note then that the derivative with respect to B is:
∂W4(B,µ0)
∂B
= − 1
(B + 1)2
+
10B − 2 + 2√9B2 − 10B + 1
(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1)2√9B2 − 10B + 1µ0
Since 10B − 2 + 2√9B2 − 10B + 1 > 0, this is negative if and only if:
µ0 <
(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1)2√9B2 − 10B + 1
(B + 1)2(10B − 2 + 2√9B2 − 10B + 1) (26)
Note that this is the same condition as (25).
(b) For µ0: we simply need to note that
10B−2+2√9B2−10B+1
(3B+
√
9B2−10B+1−1)2√9B2−10B+1 > 0 since
10B > 10 > 2 and all other terms are squared or square roots and therefore
positive, so that
∂W4(B,µ0)
∂µ0
= − 10B − 2 + 2
√
9B2 − 10B + 1
(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1)2√9B2 − 10B + 1 < 0
As a result, we can conclude that
1. When B < min{B,BH}, W (B,µ0) increases in B.
2. When B ∈ (BH , B, ), W (B,µ0) increases in B if B ≤ µ0+
√
µ0
(1−µ0) and decreases other-
wise.
3. When B ∈ (B,BH), W (B,µ0) increases in B.
4. When B > max{B,BH}, W (B,µ0) decreases in B.
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And that W (B,µ0) increases in µ0 if µ0 < mH , but decreases in µ0 if µ0 > mH .
Finally, when B > B, the value of confidential information is 0 as the policy maker
prefers to let the lobbyist choose piT and make full use of her expertise, which yields the
same expected utility as transparency.
Proof of Proposition 5. Note that the set of equilibria under public information is the
same as that characterised by Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 since when the design of the
preliminary investigation is public, the policy maker can commit to it. Therefore, the
equilibrium expected utility from a public preliminary investigation is given by equation
(22).
Under confidential information, there can be multiple equilibria. For any equilibrium
preliminary investigation p, the lobbyist’s best response is determined by Lemma 2.
However, the policy maker’s best response is different than in the commitment case
since deviating to a different p no longer affects the strategy chosen by the lobbyist, as
that deviation is not observable. I prove the proposition using the following two lemmas.
Lemma 5. In any equilibrium in which piG is played, we must have µ
r0 = µ. Such an
equilibrium exists if and only if B ≤ B.
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps.
Claim 1: If an equilibrium exists where piG is played, then µ
r0 = µ.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that there was an equilibrium with µr0 > µ and a
corresponding piG. Then the policy maker’s expected utility from choosing a p
′ inducing
beliefs (µr
′
0 , µr1) such that µr
′
0 ≤ µr0 is:
UG(µr
′
0 , µr1) = P piG(s0) +
(
µr1 − µ0
µr1 − µr′0
)[
µr
′
0 + (1− µr′0) µ
r0
(1− µr0)
]
×
(
1− µ
r′0(1− µr0)
µr
′
0(1− µr0) + (1− µr′0)µr0
)
+
(
µ0 − µr′0
µr1 − µr′0
)[
µr1 + (1− µr1) µ
r0
(1− µr0)
]
×
(
µr1(1− µr0)
µr1(1− µr0) + (1− µr1)µr0
)
A deviation to µr
′
0 ≤ µr0 does not affect the strategy of the lobbyist, but changes (1)
the relative likelihood of the two types of the policy maker and (2) the expected payoff
conditional on r0 and s1, which now becomes 1 − µr
′
0
s1 instead of
1
2 . The derivative of
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this expected utility function with respect to µr
′
0 is negative, and therefore, it is always
profitable to deviate to some µr
′
0 < µr0 .
Indeed,
∂UG(µr
′
0 , µr1)
∂µr
′
0
= −(µ
r1 − µr0)(µr1 − µ0)
(1− µr0)(µr1 − µr′0)2 ≤ 0
Claim 2: If the policy maker chooses a preliminary investigation p that induces interim
beliefs (µ, µr1) and a corresponding persuasion strategy piG, the policy maker has no
incentives to deviate to p′ such that µr′0 ≥ µ.
Proof: Such a deviation gives expected utility UG(µr
′
0 , µr1) = P piG(s0)+µ0. Deviating
to µr
′
0 ≥ µ changes the expected payoff conditional on r0 and s1, which now becomes
µ
r′0
s1 ≥ 12 instead of 12 . Because the indirect expected utility is linear in this region, the
deviation payoff is independent of µr
′
0 and there can be no gain.
Claim 3: If the policy maker chooses a preliminary investigation p that induces interim
beliefs (µ, µr1) and a corresponding persuasion strategy piG, the policy maker has no
incentives to deviate to p′ such that µr′1 6= µr1 .
Proof: Such a deviation gives an expected payoff of UG(µr0 , µr
′
1) = P piG(s0) + µ0.
Deviating to µr
′
1 6= µr1 changes the expected payoff conditional on r1 and s1, which now
becomes µ
r′1
s1 6= µr1s1 ≥ 12 , but such that µ
r′1
s1 ≥ 12 . Because the indirect expected utility is
linear in this region, the deviation payoff is independent of µr1 and there can be no gain.
Combining claims 2 and 3 implies that, given some lobbyist strategy piG corresponding
to some beliefs (µr0 , µr1) = (µ, µr1), the policy maker does not deviate to any other
information structure. Given Lemma 2, if (µ, µr1) ∈ G, that is, if B ≤ B (and µr1 not too
small), the lobbyist does want to play piG so this is an equilibrium. This proves the ‘if ’
part of the existence statement.
Finally, given Lemma 2, if B > B, then (µ, µr1) /∈ G for any µr1 ∈ [µ0, µ¯], so claim 1
implies that the policy maker always deviates from an investigation inducing (µr0 , µr1) ∈ G
to some µr
′
0 < µr0 . Therefore if B > B there does not exist an equilibrium in which piG is
played. This proves the ‘only if ’ part of the existence statement.
Lemma 6. If B > B, then an equilibrium always exists, the lobbyists plays strategy piT
and the policy maker’s payoff is the same as if information was public.
Proof. If B > B, then Lemma 5 implies that the only possible equilibrium involves the
lobbyist choosing piT . I show that there is indeed a choice of p from which the policy
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maker does not deviate.
Claim 1: If µ¯ ≤ 12 (B ≤ BH) the policy maker does not deviate from any preliminary
investigation inducing µr1 = µ¯, and any µr0 such that (µr0 , µ¯) /∈ G.
Proof: The policy maker’s expected utility in equilibrium is UT (µr0 , µr1) as defined
in equation (23). Deviating to µr
′
1 < µ¯ gives expected utility of UT (µr0 , µr
′
1) = P piT (s0) +
(1−µ0)µ¯
1−µ¯ . This is independent of µ
r′1 , so the policy maker would not deviate.
Secondly, deviating to µr
′
0 6= µr0 gives expected utility of UT (µr′0 , µ¯) = P piT (s0) +
(1−µ0)µ¯
1−µ¯ . This is independent of µ
r′0 , so the policy maker would not deviate.
Claim 2: If µ¯ > 12 (B > BH) a preliminary investigation inducing µ
r0 = µ and µr1 = µ¯
and a persuasion strategy piT is the only equilibrium strategy profile.
Proof: The policy maker’s expected utility in equilibrium is UT (µ, µ¯) as defined in
equation (23).
Deviating to an investigation that induces a pair of interim beliefs (µr
′
0 , µr
′
1) such that
µr
′
0 ≥ µ and µr′1 ≤ µ¯ gives:
UT (µr
′
0 , µr
′
1) =
µ¯(1 + µ0 − 2µ)− µ0(1− µ)
µ¯− µ
Which is the same as when µr
′
0 = µ and µr
′
1 = µ¯, so the policy maker does not deviate to
any µr
′
0 > µ and µr
′
1 < µ¯ .
Finally, we can show that this is the only equilibrium. Suppose there was an equilib-
rium such that interim beliefs were (µr0 , µr1) such that µr0 ≥ µ and µr1 ≤ µ¯ with at least
one inequality strict. By evaluating the derivative of each payoff function when deviating,
we can show that:
1. If µr0 > µ, the policy maker would always deviate to inducing µr
′
0 < µr0 .
2. If µr1 < µ¯, the policy maker would always deviate to inducing µr
′
1 > µr1 .
Therefore, claim 1 implies that there exists an equilibrium in which piT is played when
µ¯ < 12 and claim 2 implies that there exists a unique equilibrium in which piT is played
when µ¯ > 12 , and that this equilibrium involves µ
r0 = µ and µr1 = µ¯.
Finally, since the policy maker’s expected utility is the same under confidentiality with
piT and transparency (Proposition 2), the two regimes yield the same utility whenever
B > B.
Lemmas 5 and 6 imply
1. If B < B, then p¯ and piG is an equilibrium strategy profile.
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2. If B < B, then p¯ and piG is no longer an equilibrium strategy profile, so any equi-
librium under confidential information induces piT which gives the same expected
utility to the policy maker as transparency.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 6. The influence function depends on whether B > B and µ¯ < 12 .
Substituting beliefs using the Bayes plausibility constraints in expression (1.4) and re-
arranging gives
F (B,µ0) =

(B+1)µ0
B if B < min{B,BH}
µ0 + (1− µ0) m
∗(µ¯)
(1−m∗(µ¯)) if B ∈ (B,BH)
(3µ0−1)B+µ0
B(B+1) if B ∈ (BH , B)
µ0 + (1− µ0) m
∗(µ¯)
(1−m∗(µ¯)) −
µ0−µ
µ¯−µ if max{B,BH} < B < B
2µ0
B+1 if B < B
For each case, I take the partial derivatives with respect to B and µ0.
1. Case 1: If if B < min{B,BH}, ∂F (B,µ0)∂B = − µ0B2 < 0 and ∂F (B,µ0)∂µ0 = B+1B > 0.
2. Case 2: We know that m∗(µ¯) is decreasing in B (as m∗(µr1) is decreasing in µr1 and
µ¯ is increasing in B). In addition, we know that m1−m is increasing in m. Therefore,
F2(B,µ0) = µ0 + (1− µ0) m
∗(µ¯)
(1−m∗(µ¯)) is decreasing in B.
Secondly, I show that (1− µ0) m
∗(µ¯)
(1−m∗(µ¯)) is increasing in µ0. Note that F2(B,µ0) can
be re-written as a linear function of µ0:
µ0 + (1− µ0) m
∗(µ¯)
(1−m∗(µ¯)) =
=
µ0
(
2µ0(B − 1) + µ0
√
9B2 − 10B + 1 + 3B + 1−√9B2 − 10B + 1
)
µ0
√
9B2 − 10B + 1 + 3(B − 1)µ0 + 2
=
(
5B − 1 +√9B2 − 10B + 1
3B − 1 +√9B2 − 10B + 1
)
µ0
Since 5B−1+
√
9B2−10B+1
3B−1+√9B2−10B+1 > 0, F2(B,µ0) is an increasing function of µ0.
3. Case 3: Since F3(B,µ0) =
(3µ0−1)B+µ0
B(B+1) ,
∂F3(B,µ0)
∂B =
(1−3µ0)B2−2µ0B−µ0
B2(B+1)2
. This is
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decreasing if and only if:
(1− 3µ0)B2 − 2µ0B − µ0 ≤ 0 ⇔ 1− 3µ0
µ0
≤ 2B + 1
B2
⇔ 1− 3µ0
µ0
+ 1 ≤ 2B + 1
B2
+ 1
⇔ 1− µ0
µ0
≤
(
B + 1
B
)2
+ 1
In addition, since in case 3, BH < B < B, and since
B+1
B is decreasing in B,(
B+1
B
)2
<
(
B+1
B
)2
, and as B = 1 +
√
2 <
(
2+
√
2
1+
√
2
)2
+ 1 =
(
B+1
B
)2
+ 1, we have:
(1− µ0)
µ0
= BH < B <
(
B + 1
B
)2
+ 1 <
(
B + 1
B
)2
+ 1
And therefore F3(B,µ0) is decreasing in B.
Secondly, note that ∂F3(B,µ0)∂µ0 =
3B+1
B(B+1) > 0, so F3(B,µ0) is increasing in µ0.
4. Case 4:
(a) For B: Recall that F4(B,µ0) = µ0 + (1− µ0) m
∗(µ¯)
(1−m∗(µ¯)) −
µ0−µ
µ¯−µ . The derivative
with respect to B is therefore:
∂F4(B,µ0)
∂B
=
∂(1− µ0) m
∗(µ¯)
(1−m∗(µ¯))
∂B
− 2µ0 − 1
(B + 1)2
It is possible for F4(B,µ0) to be increasing or decreasing in B when µ0 <
1
2 .
Indeed, it is increasing if:
1− 2µ0
(B + 1)2
> −
∂(1− µ0) m∗(µ¯)(1−m∗(µ¯))
∂B

This can be re-written as:
1− 2µ0
(B + 1)2
>
(
10B − 2 + 2√9B2 − 10B + 1√
9B2 − 10B + 1(3B +√9B2 − 10B + 1)2
)
µ0
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So F4(B,µ0) is increasing if and only if:
1
(B + 1)2
>
(
2
(B + 1)2
+
10B − 2 + 2√9B2 − 10B + 1√
9B2 − 10B + 1(3B +√9B2 − 10B + 1)2
)
µ0
⇔
[√
9B2 − 10B + 1(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1)2
]
×
[
2
√
9B2 − 10B + 1(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1)2
+ (B + 1)2(10B − 2 + 2
√
9B2 − 10B + 1)
]−1
> µ0
The left-hand side is clearly less than 12 , so there can be µ0 ∈
(
1
B+1 ,
1
2
)
such
that the inequality is not satisfied and F4(B,µ0) is decreasing in B. However,
the left-hand side is greater than 0 and can be greater than mH =
1
B+1 for
B large enough (e.g. at B = 2 the left-hand side is ≈ 0.39 > 13). Therefore,
it is possible to find µ0 and B such that µ¯ >
1
2 and B > B and such that
∂F4(B,µ0)
∂B > 0.
(b) For µ0: Note that F4(B,µ0) can be re-written as a linear function of µ0:
F4(B,µ0) =
1
(B + 1)((3B − 1)µ0 + µ0
√
9B2 − 10B + 1 + 2)
×
[
((B + 3)µ0 −B − 2)µ0
√
9B2 − 10B + 1
− 2 + (−B2 + 6B − 5)µ20 + (3B2 −B + 6)µ0
]
= − 1
B + 1
+
(
2B2 + 8B + 2
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 2
(B + 1)(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1)
)
µ0
It is easy to see that the slope is positive as 8B − 2 > 0 and 3B − 1 > 0:
2B2 + 8B + 2
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 2
(B + 1)(3B +
√
9B2 − 10B + 1− 1) > 0
So that F4(B,µ0) is increasing in µ0 everywhere.
5. Case 5: If B < B, ∂F (B,µ0)∂B = − 2µ0(B+1)2 < 0 and ∂F (B,µ0)∂µ0 = 2B+1 > 0.
6. Finally, the influence function has a discontinuity at µ0 = mH where influence drops,
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so influence is non-monotonic in alignment. Indeed, when B < B,
lim
µ0→m−H
F (B,mH) > lim
µ0→m+H
F (B,mH)
as
lim
µ0→m−H
F (B,mH) =
(B + 1)mH
B
··= F1(B,mH)
and
lim
µ0→m+H
F (B,mH) =
(3mH − 1)B +mH
B(B + 1)
··= F3(B,mH)
and as
F1(B,mH)− F3(B,mH) = (B + 1)mH
B
− (3mH − 1)B +mH
B(B + 1)
=
2B
B + 1
> 0
Similarly, when B > B, we can show that
lim
µ0→m−H
F (B,mH) > lim
µ0→m+H
F (B,mH)
Since
F2(B,mH)− F4(B,mH) =
(
mH + (1−mH) m
∗(µ¯)
(1−m∗(µ¯))
)
−
(
mH + (1−mH) m
∗(µ¯)
(1−m∗(µ¯)) −
mH − µ
µ¯− µ
)
=
2B
(B + 1)2
> 0
For the statements on welfare, I simply note that on
[
B,B
]
, or on
[
BH , B
]
, the policy
maker’s utility is either UG(µ, µ¯) or UG(m∗(µ¯), µ¯). Both functions are increasing in B and
decreasing in µ0 (this follows from the proof of Proposition 4).
Proof of Proposition 21. 1. Consider first the case where B < B, and consider the
following equilibrium: the policy maker chooses p to induce beliefs (µ, µ¯) if B < B
and (m∗(µ¯), µ¯) if B > B, the policy maker reports rˆ = ∅ following both r0 and r1
and the lobbyist chooses piG. The only relevant deviations to consider are for the
policy maker to disclose rˆ = r instead of rˆ = ∅. In that case, the lobbyist learns the
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policy maker’s type and chooses piG if rˆ = r0 and piT if rˆ = r1. The expected utility
of type r0 is therefore the same whether she deviates or not so she has no incentives
to deviate. The expected utility of type r1 is lower if she deviates so she has strict
incentives not to deviate.
2. Consider now the case where B > B, and consider the following equilibrium: the
policy maker chooses p to induce beliefs (µ, µ¯) and reports rˆ = r following both r0
and r1 and the lobbyist chooses piG following rˆ = r0 and piT following rˆ = r1. Let
ρ = P(r = r1|rˆ = ∅) the off-equilibrium beliefs of the lobbyist following no disclosure.
If ρ is such that the incentive constraint is not satisfied: P piG(s1) < ρP piT (s1|r1),
then the lobbyist chooses piT following no disclosure. This gives type r1 the same
utility as under full disclosure so she has no incentives to deviate, and gives type r0
a lower utility than under full disclosure.
Proof of Proposition 22. To prove the statement, I provide a numerical example of an
investigation with three signal realisations that increases the expected utility of the policy
maker.
Consider first the optimal investigation when µ0 = 0.2 and B = 3. Since B = 1 +
√
2,
we have B > B. Given µ0 = 0.2, we have B ' 13.50, so B < B. Therefore, by Proposition
3, the optimal investigation induces beliefs µr0 = m∗(µ¯) ' 0.0898, and µr1 = µ¯ ' 0.4286.
This yields an expected utility to the policy maker of:
UG(m∗(µ¯), µ¯) = (1− µ0)(1− 2m
∗(µ¯))
(1−m∗(µ¯)) + µ0 ' 0.9211
Consider now a preliminary investigation p with three realisations {r0, r∗, r1} such
that:
p(r0|0) = 0.765
p(r0|1) = 0.300
p(r∗|0) = 0.035
p(r∗|1) = 0.100
This investigation induces three possible posterior beliefs: µ < µr0 ' 0.0893 < m∗(µ¯),
µr1 = µ¯, and µ < µr∗ = 0.4167 < µ¯.
The lobbyist prefers to target the sceptical type and get expected utility Ppir0 (s1) =
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0.278 than to target the sympathetic type and get Ppir1 (s1)P(r1|s1) = 0.240 < 0.278 or
the middle type and get Ppir∗ (s1)[P(r1|s1) + P(r∗|s1) = 0.274 < 0.278.
The policy maker’s expected utility is UG3 (µ
r0 , µr∗ , µr1) ' 0.9216 > UG(m∗(µ¯), µ¯) '
0.9211, and she therefore gains from the investigation with 3 realisations.
B Proofs of results in Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 7. On the equilibrium path, interim beliefs should belong to the
set {µθL , µ0, µθR} as only pure strategies are allowed. Off-equilibrium, the modified intu-
itive criterion refinement also rules out beliefs outside the set {µθL , µ0, µθR} since either
only one of two types would like to deviate, in which case the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
following this deviation should put weight on this type only, or neither / both types want
to deviate in which case the out-of-equilibrium should equal the prior.
Equilibrium of the competitive game In the proposed pooling equilibrium, the equi-
librium interim belief of the receiver is µ0, and the equilibrium experiment induces pos-
terior beliefs (µs)(s∈pic). The senders expected utilities are Eµθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
for
Sender I of type θ and Eµ0
[
VN ((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
for Sender N.
Conditions 2.2 requires the uninformed sender to prefer the equilibrium distribution τ c
to any deviation, given that a deviation by this sender cannot change the out-of-equilibrium
beliefs of the receiver.
2.3 requires that both types of the informed sender prefer the equilibrium distribution
τ c to any deviation, given any out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ˜(pi′) that satisfy condition 2.4.
2.4 defines the set of beliefs that satisfy the intuitive criterion. The intuitive criterion
requires that following a deviation pi′, the receiver only puts weight on types of the sender
who would prefer that deviation to the equilibrium outcome, given some interim beliefs
of the receiver (the deviation is not ‘equilibrium-dominated’).
In particular, if the out-of-equilibrium belief µ˜(pi′) corresponds to a type θ, then that
type θ must get a higher payoff from pi′ than from pic, given some interim beliefs of the
receiver. This is ensured by the first part of condition 2.4:
∃ µ s.t. E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic);µ)
]
> E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
In addition, since the modification of the intuitive criterion used here imposes that the
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receiver should have belief µ0 whenever both types potentially find the deviation profitable
(possibly under different interim beliefs of the receiver), then the receiver can have out-of-
equilibrium belief µθ only if type θ
′ never finds that deviation profitable. This is ensured
by the second part of condition 2.4:
∀ µ, E µθ′
[
VI((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic);µ)
]
< E µθ′
[
VI((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
Finally, if either both types would find that deviation profitable given some interim
beliefs of the receiver, or if neither types do, then the intuitive criterion does not restrict
the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the receiver in any way. The modified intuitive criterion
used here restricts the receiver to have beliefs equal to the prior: µ˜(pi′) = µ0. This is the
case when either of the last two parts of condition 2.4 are satisfied:
∀ µθ, ∀ µ, E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic);µ)
]
< E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
]
Or, ∃ µ(θ), s.t. E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic);µ(θ))
]
> E µθ
[
VI((µs)(s∈pic);µ0)
] ∀µθ
Equilibrium of the collusive game In the proposed pooling equilibrium, the equilib-
rium interim belief of the receiver is µ0, and the equilibrium experiment induces posterior
beliefs (µs)(s∈pim). The merged senders’ expected utility is Eµθ
[
Vm((µs)(s∈pim);µ0)
]
when
the coalition’s type is θ.
Condition 2.5 ensures that the coalition would not deviate to an experiment pi′ if that
deviation induces out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ˜(pi′).
Condition 2.6 defines the set of beliefs that satisfy the modified intuitive criterion
following a deviation to experiment pi′ following the same logic as condition 2.4.
No less informative equilibria in collusion Conditions 2.7 ensures that at least one
type of the coalition would deviate from any experiment that generates a less informative
distribution of posterior beliefs, for any out-of-equilibrium belief of the receiver that satisfy
the modified intuitive criterion. If this condition was not satisfied, then a less informative
distribution of posterior beliefs could be sustained as an equilibrium of the collusive game.
This could be achieved by imposing some out-of-equilibrium beliefs in the set of possible
ones that make the deviation unattractive to that type of the sender.
Condition 2.8 defines the set of out-of-equilibrium beliefs that could be used to rule
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out such deviations.
Proof of Lemma 3. I first define the experiments pim and pic leading to the desired
distribution of posterior beliefs. Recall that an experiment pi consists of a finite partition
of {L,R} × [0, 1], such that pi ⊂ S where S is the set of non-empty Lebesgue measurable
subsets of {L,R} × [0, 1], and that there is a random variable X independent of ω and
uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and an S-valued random variable equal to s when (ω, x) ∈ s,
for ω ∈ {L,R} and x, a realisation of X.
Therefore, as P(s|ω) = λ({x|(ω, x) ∈ s}) (where λ(.) is the Lebesgue measure), we can
construct pim as:
pim = {s1, s2} where s1 =
(
L,
[
0,
µ2 − µ0
µ2(1− µ0)
])
∪ (R, ∅)
and s2 =
(
L,
[
µ2 − µ0
µ2(1− µ0) , 1
])
∪ (R, [0, 1])
Similarly, we can construct pic as:
pic = {s1, s2} where s1 =
(
L,
[
0,
(1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
])
∪
(
R,
[
0,
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
])
and s2 =
(
L,
[
(1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1) , 1
])
∪
(
R,
[
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1) , 1
])
As a result, pic ∨ pic has realisations {z1, z12, z21, z2} where z1 = s1 ∩ s1, z12 = s1 ∩ s2,
z21 = s2 ∩ s1, and z2 = s1 ∩ s1. Since z12 = s1 ∩ s2 = ∅ and z21 = s2 ∩ s1 = ∅, however,
and since z1 = s1 ∩ s1 = s1 and z2 = s2 ∩ s2 = s2 the support of pic ∨ pic is {s1, s2}.
I now proceed to show why the two conditions are necessary:
1. If pic is an equilibrium of the competitive game, then w1i < w
1
j for any i, j such that
i > j.
Suppose not, then for some i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, w1i > w1j and i > j. If wI3 > wI1 or
wI3 > w
I
2, then type θR of Sender I would prefer to deviate to a fully disclosing
experiment and get wI3 instead of the combination of w
I
1 and w
I
2 obtained when
both senders play pic. Therefore, wI3 > w
I
2, so given assumption 1, it must be that
wI2 > w
I
1.
2. If pim is an equilibrium of the collusive game, then max{wc3, wc1} < wc2.
Suppose not, then wc3 > τ
m
1 w
c
1 + τ
m
2 w
c
2 and type θR of the coalition could deviate to
a fully disclosing experiment and get wc3.
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Proof of Proposition 8. I first show that the conditions in 8 guarantee the existence of
a competitive equilibrium inducing a distribution of posteriors τ c, then that they guarantee
the existence of a collusive equilibrium inducing a distribution of posteriors τm, and finally
that there is no equilibrium in collusion inducing a less informative distribution than τ c.
Equilibrium in competition
I show that the conditions in Proposition 8 are sufficient for each condition in Propo-
sition 7 to be satisfied, given these possible deviations.
1. Uninformed sender:
Claim 1: Condition 2.12 ⇒ condition 1(a) in Proposition 8.
Proof: Following Kamenica & Gentzkow (2011), we know that the optimal distribu-
tion of posterior beliefs should yield a payoff on the concave closure of the sender’s
utility. Given the shape of the sender’s utility function, the concave closure below
µ2 is given by either the line joining points (0, 0) and (µ1, w
N
1 ) or the line joining
(0, 0) and (µ2, w
N
2 ). Above µ2, it is given by w
N
3 .
Thus, if wN2 <
wN3
µ2
µ1, it is given by
V˜ (µ) =

wN3
µ2
µ if µ ≤ µ2
wN3 if µ > µ2
And if wN2 >
wN3
µ2
µ1, it is given by
V˜ (µ) =

wN2
µ1
µ if µ ≤ µ1(
µ2wN2 −µ1wN3
µ2−µ1
)
+
(
wN3 −wN2
µ2−µ1
)
µ if µ ≤ µ1
wN3 if µ > µ2
Therefore, condition 2.12: µ1µ2 ≤
wN2
wN3
implies that the concave closure is given by the
second expression, and given the prior µ0 ∈ [µ1, µ2], the optimal experiment induces
beliefs µ1 and µ2. That is,
E µ0 [VN (µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µ0 [VN ((µs)(s∈pi′∨pic);µ0)]
Therefore, condition 1(a) of proposition 7 is satisfied given condition 2.12.
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2. Informed sender:
Lemma 7. Conditions 2.12 and 2.13 ⇒ condition 1(b) in Proposition 8.
Proof. Claim 1: If condition 2.13 is satisfied, then Sender I of type θL does not
deviate from pic if that deviation induces out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ0.
Proof: I first show that condition 2.13 implies that type θL of Sender I prefers to
induce (µ1, µ2) than (µ1, 1).
E µθL [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] =
[
(1− µθL)
(
(1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθL
(
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wI1
+
[
(1− µθL)
(
1− (1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθL
(
1− µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wI2
≥
[
(1− µθL) + µθL
µ1(1− µ0)
µ0(1− µ1)
]
wI1
+
(
1−
[
(1− µθL) + µθL
µ1(1− µ0)
µ0(1− µ1)
])
0
=
[
(1− µθL) + µθL
µ1(1− µ0)
µ0(1− µ1)
]
wI1
= E µθL [VI(µ1, 1;µ0)]
Re-arranging, we therefore, get
E µθL [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθL [VI(µ1, 1;µ0)]
⇔ (1− µ2)(µ0(1− µ1)− µθL(µ0 − µ1))
(1− µ1)(µ0(1− µ2) + µθL(µ2 − µ0))
≤ w
I
2
wI1
Next, note that E µθL [VI(µ1, 1;µ0)] ≥ E µθL [VI(m1,m2;µ0)] for any m1 ∈ [0, µ1]
and m2 ∈ (µ2, 1] as inducing any belief m1 ∈ [0, µ1) or m2 ∈ (µ2, 1] reduces the
probability of receiving wI1.
So if E µθL [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθL [VI(µ1, 1;µ0)], then
E µθL [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθL [VI(m1,m2;µ0)]
for any m1 ∈ [0, µ1] and m2 ∈ [µ2, 1].
Similarly E µθL [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθL [VI(m1,m2;µ0)] for any m1 ∈ [0, µ1] and m2 ∈
[µ0, µ2] as inducing these beliefs reduces the probability of receiving w
I
1.
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Finally, E µθL [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθL [VI(m1,m2;µ0)] for any m1 ∈ (µ1, µ0] and m2 ∈
[µ0, 1] as this would only yields a mixture of w
N
1 and 0 rather than a mixture of w
I
1
and wN1 , and since w
I
1 > w
N
1 > 0.
Claim 2: If µ11−µ1
1−µ2
µ2
≤ wI2
wI1
, then Sender I of type θR does not deviate from pi
c if
that deviation induces out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ0.
Proof: I first show that µ11−µ1
1−µ2
µ2
≤ wI2
wI1
implies that type θR of Sender I prefers to
induce (µ1, µ2) than (µ1, 1).
E µθR [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] =
[
(1− µθR)
(
(1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθR
(
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wI1
+
[
(1− µθR)
(
1− (1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθR
(
1− µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wI2
=
(
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)
wI1 +
(
1− µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)
wI2
≥ µ1(1− µ0)
µ0(1− µ1)w
I
1 +
(
1− µ1(1− µ0)
µ0(1− µ1)
)
0
=
µ1(1− µ0)
µ0(1− µ1)w
I
1
= E µθR [VI(µ1, 1;µ0)]
Re-arranging, we therefore, get
E µθR [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθR [VI(µ1, 1;µ0)]⇔
µ1
1− µ1
1− µ2
µ2
≤ w
I
2
wI1
Next, note that E µθR [VI(µ1, 1;µ0)] ≥ E µθR [VI(m1,m2;µ0)] for any m1 ∈ [0, µ1]
and m2 ∈ (µ2, 1] as inducing any belief m1 ∈ [0, µ1) or m2 ∈ (µ2, 1] reduces the
probability of receiving wI1.
So if E µθR [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθR [VI(µ1, 1;µ0)], then
E µθR [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθR [VI(m1,m2;µ0)]
for any m1 ∈ [0, µ1] and m2 ∈ [µ2, 1].
Similarly E µθR [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθR [VI(m1,m2;µ0)] for any m1 ∈ [0, µ1] and m2 ∈
[µ0, µ2] as inducing these beliefs reduces the probability of receiving w
I
1.
Finally, E µθR [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθR [VI(m1,m2;µ0)] for any m1 ∈ (µ1, µ0] and m2 ∈
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[µ0, 1] as this would only yields a mixture of w
N
1 and 0 rather than a mixture of w
I
1
and wN1 , and since w
I
1 > w
N
1 > 0.
Claim 3: Condition 2.13 ⇒ Sender I of type θR does not deviate from pic if that
deviation induces out-of-equilibrium beliefs µ0.
Proof: I show that condition 2.13 ⇒ µ11−µ1
1−µ2
µ2
≤ wI2
wI1
.
(1− µ2)(µ0(1− µ1)− µθL(µ0 − µ1))
(1− µ1)(µ0(1− µ2) + µθL(µ2 − µ0))
≥ µ1
1− µ1
1− µ2
µ2
⇔ µ2(µ0(1− µ1)− µθL(µ0 − µ1)) ≥ µ1(µ0(1− µ2) + µθL(µ2 − µ0))
⇔ µ2 ≥ µ1
Therefore, condition 2.13⇒ wI2
wI1
≥ (1−µ2)(µ0(1−µ1)−µθL (µ0−µ1))(1−µ1)(µ0(1−µ2)+µθL (µ2−µ0)) ≥
µ1
1−µ1
1−µ2
µ2
, and using
claim 2, Sender I of type θR does not deviate from pi
c if that deviation induces out-
of-equilibrium beliefs µ0.
Claim 4: No sender wants to deviate to an experiment if that experiment induces
out-of-equilibrium beliefs µθR .
Proof: When the receiver’s out-of-equilibrium belief following some deviation is
µθR , then the receiver’s only possible posterior belief is µ = 1. Therefore, Sender I’s
expected utility is wI3 and since w
I
3 < w
I
2 < w
I
1, then any deviation is equilibrium
dominated for both types of Sender I if it induces out-of-equilibrium beliefs µθR .
Claim 5: Condition 2.13⇒ if a feasible deviation were to induce out-of-equilibrium
belief µθL , type θL would not want to deviate to it.
Proof: I begin to prove this claim with a lemma defining the set of beliefs that are
feasible, given that a deviation induces belief µθL and given that Sender N is playing
pic. I then prove a second lemma that shows that among any feasible deviation is
weakly dominated by either one of two feasible deviations which I define. Finally,
I show that Condition 2.13 ensures that type θL deviates to neither of these two
deviations.
Lemma 8. If the receiver’s belief following a deviation from (pic, pic) is θL, then it
must induce some belief µ ∈ [0,m(µ1, µ0, µθL)]∪[m(µ2, µ0, µθL), 1] with some positive
probability.
Proof of Lemma 8. By definition of the function m(µ, µr, µi), the pair of beliefs
induced by pic when the receiver’s interim belief is µθL is (m(µ1, µ0, µθL),m(µ2, µ0, µθL)).
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Consider a deviation from Sender N to pi′. Suppose, by contradiction, that all beliefs
induced by the joint experiment pi′ ∨ pic are in the interval
(m(µ1, µ0, µθL),m(µ2, µ0, µθL))
Then 〈pi′∨pic〉 is more integral-precise than 〈pic〉 (intuitively, a distribution of poste-
rior beliefs is more integral-precise if the posteriors in its support are less spread-out,
see Ganuza & Penalva (2010) for the full definition). In addition, Ganuza & Penalva
(2010) (Theorem 2) show that a distribution of posterior is more integral-precise
than another if and only if it is Blackwell less informative. Therefore, if all beliefs
induced by pi′ ∨ pic are in (m(µ1, µ0, µθL),m(µ2, µ0, µθL)), then 〈pic〉 must be strictly
Blackwell more informative than 〈pi′ ∨ pic〉.
However, this contradicts the result that 〈pi′ ∨ pic〉 % 〈pic〉 as pi′ ∨ pic is a refinement
of pic (Gentzkow & Kamenica (2017a), Lemma 3). Therefore, any deviation to an
experiment pi′ must induce some belief µ ∈ [0,m(µ1, µ0, µθL)] ∪ [m(µ2, µ0, µθL), 1]
with some positive probability.
Lemma 9. The most profitable feasible deviation given that Sender N plays pic and
given out-of-equilibrium belief θL induces either
(m(µ1, µ0, µθL), µ2) or (m(µ1, µ0, µθL), 1)
Proof of Lemma 9. This result follows a standard concavification argument. First,
note that any distribution over posterior induced by some deviation that puts weight
on more than 3 distinct beliefs can be replicated by a payoff-equivalent distribution
that puts weight on at most 3 distinct beliefs. To do this, we can take any subset
of beliefs in the support that results in the same payoff w and replace it by a single
belief equal to the average of these beliefs. That is, for any µ′ ∈ supp(〈pi′∨pic〉) such
that vI(µ
′) = w1i , replace µ
′ by µ˜ =
∑
{µ s.t. vI(µ)=w1i } P(µ)µ.
If any deviation induces beliefs that are not on the concave closure of VI(µ) restricted
to the set of feasible beliefs, then there is an alternative deviation that yields a higher
payoff. Therefore, the best deviation induces at most two beliefs.
Finally, among the distribution of beliefs inducing two posterior beliefs, the best
possible deviation must induce the feasible belief closest to the prior when the re-
ceiver updates downwards, that is µ = m(µ1, µ0, µθL), and the belief furthest from
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the prior inducing either a payoff of wI2 or 0, depending on the value of w
I
1 and w
I
2.
That is, either µ = µ2 or µ = 1.
Since both µ2 > m(µ2, µ0, µθL) and 1 > m(µ2, µ0, µθL) (as µθL < µ0), then both
deviations are feasible.
The next step is to show that condition 2.13 implies
EµθL [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ EµθL [VI(m(µ1, µ0, µθL), µ2;µθL)]
This holds since:
E µθL [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] =
[
(1− µθL)
(
(1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθL
(
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wI1
+
[
(1− µθL)
(
1− (1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθL
(
1− µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wI2
≥
[
(1− µθL)
(
(1−m(µ1, µ0, µθL))(µ2 − µθL)
(1− µθL)(µ2 −m(µ1, µ0, µθL))
)
+ µθL
(
m(µ1, µ0, µθL)(µ2 − µθL)
µθL)(µ2 −m(µ1, µ0, µθL))
)]
×
(
m(µ1, µ0, µθL)
µ1
)
wI1
+
(
1−
[
(1− µθL)
(
(1−m(µ1, µ0, µθL))(µ2 − µθL)
(1− µθL)(µ2 −m(µ1, µ0, µθL))
)
+ µθL
(
m(µ1, µ0, µθL)(µ2 − µθL)
µθL(µ2 −m(µ1, µ0, µθL))
)])
wI2
= E µθL [VI(m(µ1, µ0, µθL), µ2;µθL)]
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This holds if and only if
wI1
[
(µ2 − µ0) (µ0(1− µθL)(1− µ1) + (1− µ0)µθLµ1)
µ0(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
−
(
µ2 − µθL
µ2 −m(µ1, µ0, µθL)
)(
m(µ1, µ0, µθL)
µ1
)]
≥ wI2
[
(µ2 − µ0) (µ0(1− µθL)(1− µ1) + (1− µ0)µθLµ1)
µ0(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1) −
(
µ2 − µθL
µ2 −m(µ1, µ0, µθL)
)]
Re-arranging and substituting for m(µ1, µ0, µθL) shows that this is equivalent to:
G1(µ0, µ1, µ2, µθL)µ1(µ2 −m(µ1, µ0, µθL))−m(µ1, µ0, µθL)(µ2 − µθL)(µ2 − µ1)µ0(1− µ0)
G1(µ0, µ1, µ2, µθL)µ1(µ2 −m(µ1, µ0, µθL))− µ1(µ2 − µθL)(µ2 − µ1)µ0(1− µ0)
≤ w
I
2
wI1
Where
G1(µ0, µ1, µ2, µθL) = (µ2 − µ0)(µ0(1− µ1)(1− µθL) + (1− µ0)µθLµ1)
Finally, it is easy to verify that
G1(µ0, µ1, µ2, µθL)µ1(µ2 −m(µ1, µ0, µθL))−m(µ1, µ0, µθL)(µ2 − µθL)(µ2 − µ1)µ0(1− µ0)
G1(µ0, µ1, µ2, µθL)µ1(µ2 −m(µ1, µ0, µθL))− µ1(µ2 − µθL)(µ2 − µ1)µ0(1− µ0)
≤ (1− µ2)(µ0(1− µ1)− µθL(µ0 − µ1))
(1− µ1)(µ0(1− µ2) + µθL(µ2 − µ0))
Where the right-hand side of this inequality is the left-hand side of condition 2.13.
So if 2.13 is satisfied, then this condition is satisfied.
Finally, I show that condition 2.13 also implies that
EµθL [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] ≥ EµθL [VI(m(µ1, µ0, µθL), 1;µθL)]
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This holds since:
E µθL [VI(µ1, µ2;µ0)] =
[
(1− µθL)
(
(1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθL
(
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wI1
+
[
(1− µθL)
(
1− (1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθL
(
1− µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wI2
≥
[
(1− µθL) + µθL
m(µ1, µ0, µθL)(1− µθL)
µθL(1−m(µ1, µ0, µθL))
]
×
(
m(µ1, µ0, µθL)
µ1
)
wI1
+
(
1−
[
(1− µθL) + µθL
m(µ1, µ0, µθL)(1− µθL)
µθL(1−m(µ1, µ0, µθL))
])
0
= E µθL [VI(m(µ1, µ0, µθL), 1;µθL)]
Note that, since
m(µ1,µ0,µθL )
µ1
< 1, this holds whenever the following holds:
[
(1− µθL)
(
(1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθL
(
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wI1
+
[
(1− µθL)
(
1− (1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθL
(
1− µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wI2
≥
[
(1− µθL) + µθL
m(µ1, µ0, µθL)(1− µθL)
µθL(1−m(µ1, µ0, µθL))
]
wI1
+
(
1−
[
(1− µθL) + µθL
m(µ1, µ0, µθL)(1− µθL)
µθL(1−m(µ1, µ0, µθL))
])
0
Which holds if and only if
wI2
[
(µ0 − µ1)(µθL(µ2 − µ0) + µ0(1− µ2)
µ0(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
]
≥ wI1
[
(µ0 − µ1)(µθL(µ2 − µ0) + µ0(1− µ2)
µ0(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1) −
(
1− µθL
1−m(µ1, µ0, µθL)
)]
Re-arranging and substituting for m(µ1, µ0, µθL) shows that this is equivalent to:
wI2
wI1
≥ (1− µ2)(µ0(1− µ1)− µθL(µ0 − µ1))
(1− µ1)(µ0(1− µ2) + µθL(µ2 − µ0))
Which is condition 2.13.
Equilibrium in collusion
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Since any deviations induces out-of-equilibrium belief µθL , the set of feasible beliefs
that can be induced by these deviations is [0, µθL ] ∪ [µθL , 1].
Following a standard concavification argument, the best possible deviations given this
set induce either (m1, µ1) or (m1, µ2) for some m1 ∈ [0, µθL ].
I show that if condition 2.14 is satisfied, then type θL of the coalition does not want
to deviate to induce any of these pairs of beliefs.
If condition 2.14 is satisfied, then EµθL [Vm(0, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθL [Vm(m1, µ2;µθL)] for any
m1 ∈ [0, µθL ]. This holds since:
E µθL [Vm(0, µ2;µ0)] =
(
(1− µθL)(µ2 − µ0)
µ2(1− µ0)
)
0
+
(
µθLµ2(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µ2)(1− µθL)
µ2(1− µ0)
)
wc(µ2)
≥
(
µ2 − µθL
µ2 −m1
)(
wI1
µ1
m1
)
+
(
µθL −m1
µ2 −m1
)
wc(µ2)
= E µθL [Vm(m1, µ2;µθL)]
Which holds if and only if
[
(µθLµ2(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µ2)(1− µθL)) (µ2 −m1)− (µθL −m1)µ2(1− µ0)
µ2(1− µ0)
]
wc(µ2)
≥
(
m1(µ2 − µθL)
µ1
)
wI1
Note that
(µθLµ2(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µ2)(1− µθL)) (µ2 −m1)− (µθL −m1)µ2(1− µ0)
= µ2 (µθLµ2(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µ2)(1− µθL)− µθL(1− µ0))
+m1 [µ2(1− µ0)− (µθLµ2(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µ2)(1− µθL))]
= µ2(1− µ2)(µ0 − µθL) +m1(1− µθL)(µ2 − µ0)
Which is positive for any m1 ∈ [0, µθL ]. Therefore, the condition for no deviation becomes
wc(µ2)
wN1
≥ m1µ2(1− µ0)(µ2 − µθL)
µ1 [µ2(1− µ2)(µ0 − µθL) +m1(1− µθL)(µ2 − µ0)]
The right-hand side is increasing in m1, so for this to be satisfied for any m1 ∈ [0, µθL ],
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we need it to be satisfied at m1 = µθL , that is:
wc(µ2)
wN1
≥ µθLµ2(1− µ0)(µ2 − µθL)
µ1 [µ2(1− µ2)(µ0 − µθL) + µθL(1− µθL)(µ2 − µ0)]
=
µθLµ2(1− µ0)(µ2 − µθL)
µ1(µ2 − µθL) [µ2µθL(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µθL)(1− µ2)]
=
µθLµ2(1− µ0)
µ1 [µ2µθL(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µθL)(1− µ2)]
Finally, if 2.14 is satisfied, then since wc(µ1) > w
I
1,
wc(µ2)
wI1
≥ w
c(µ2)
wc(µ1)
≥ µθLµ2(1− µ0)
µ1(µθLµ2(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µθL)(1− µ2))
I now show that if condition 2.14 is satisfied, then
EµθL [Vm(0, µ2;µ0)] ≥ E µθL [Vm(m1, µ1;µθL)]
for any m1 ∈ [0, µθL ]. This holds since:
E µθL [Vm(0, µ2;µ0)] =
(
(1− µθL)(µ2 − µ0)
µ2(1− µ0)
)
0
+
(
µθLµ2(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µ2)(1− µθL)
µ2(1− µ0)
)
wc(µ2)
≥
(
µ1 − µθL
µ1 −m1
)(
wI1
µ1
m1
)
+
(
µθL −m1
µ1 −m1
)
wc(µ1)
= E µθL [Vm(m1, µ1;µθL)]
This holds if and only if
(
µθLµ2(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µ2)(1− µθL)
µ2(1− µ0)
)
wc(µ2)
≥
(
µ1 − µθL
µ1 −m1
)(
m1
µ1
wI1
)
+
(
µθL −m1
µ1 −m1
)
wc(µ1)
Note that
(
µ1−µθL
µ1−m1
)(
m1
µ1
)
is increasing in m1 and that
µθL−m1
µ1−m1 is decreasing in m1. In
addition, recall that wc(µ1) > w
I
1. Therefore, the right-hand side of the inequality is
decreasing in m1. So for it to be true for any m1 ∈ [0, µθL ], we need to be true at m1 = 0,
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that is
(
µθLµ2(1− µ0) + µ0(1− µ2)(1− µθL)
µ2(1− µ0)
)
wc(µ2) ≥
(
µθL
µ1
)
wc(µ1)
Which is equivalent to condition 2.14.
No less informative equilibrium in collusion
I show that, when condition 2.15 is satisfied, there is no equilibrium in collusion that
induces a less informative distribution of beliefs than the competitive equilibrium τ c. I
proceed in three steps.
Claim 1: Condition 2.15 ensures that type θR would always prefer to deviate to a
fully revealing experiment if both types of the coalition were to pool on an experiment
inducing beliefs (µ1, µ2). As a result, a distribution over these two posteriors cannot be
an equilibrium outcome of the collusive game.
Proof: Type θR obtains expected utility w
c
3 with probability 1 with a fully revealing
experiment. With an experiment inducing beliefs (µ1, µ2) given interim receiver belief µ0,
type θR gets expected utility:
E µθR [Vc(µ1, µ2;µ0)] =
[
(1− µθR)
(
(1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθR
(
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wc(µ1)
+
[
(1− µθR)
(
1− (1− µ1)(µ2 − µ0)
(1− µ0)(µ2 − µ1)
)
+ µθR
(
1− µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)]
wc(µ2)
=
(
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)
wc(µ1) +
(
1− µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1)
)
wc(µ2)
< wc3 = E µθR [VI(0, 1;µ)]
Re-arranging, we therefore, get
E µθR [Vc(µ1, µ2;µ0)] < E µθR [Vc(0, 1;µ)]⇔
µ1(µ2 − µ0)
µ0(µ2 − µ1) >
wc(µ2)− wc3
wc(µ2)− wc(µ1)
Which is condition 2.15.
Claim 2: There cannot be any less informative pooling equilibrium in collusion.
Proof: Any such equilibrium would need to induce some beliefs m ∈ [µ1, µ2] (see
Lemma 8). But in this case, the coalition could deviate to an experiment pi′ that induces
beliefs (0, µ1) given out-of-equilibrium belief µ0, instead of m and keeps the distribution
over other beliefs the same.
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Note that since the deviation pi′ needs to induce beliefs (0, µ1) given out-of-equilibrium
belief µ0, pi
′ could induce a different pair of posterior beliefs for different out-of-equilibrium
interim beliefs. However, note that, if deviation pi′ induces out-of-equilibrium belief µθR
both types of the coalition would prefer to deviate to that experiment, as it gives a higher
payoff than the payoff from any distribution with belief µs ∈ [µ1, µ2] in its support,
given condition 2.14. Therefore, there always exists some belief such that this deviation
dominates the equilibrium for both types, so the modified intuitive criterion requires that
the receiver’s out-of-equilibrium following that deviation be µ0, which means that deviating
to pi′ does indeed induce beliefs (0, µ1).
Finally, if that deviation induces out-of-equilibrium belief µ0, it gives a higher payoff
by a concavification argument and condition 2.14.
As a result, there is always a profitable deviation from any pooling equilibrium inducing
beliefs µs ∈ [µ1, µ2].
Claim 3: There is no separating equilibrium that reveals less information than the
competitive equilibrium.
Proof: Let S = {µs} the support of the distribution over posterior beliefs induced
by some separating equilibrium. Then this support S must include the set of beliefs
{µs0(θL), µs1(θL), 1}, where µs0(θL), µs1(θL) are two beliefs such that µs0(θL) < µθL <
µs1(θL) < 1.
Therefore, a separating equilibrium creates a more spread-out distribution over poste-
rior beliefs than pic and is therefore more informative, given Lemma 8.
Proof of Proposition 9. The proof is constructive and provides an example of payoffs
that satisfy all the conditions given in proposition 8 given the private information structure.
I show that the example provided in Section 2.4.2 is a collusion-preferred pair of equilibria.
Suppose that the payoffs take the values given in (2.16) and the information structure
takes the form of (2.17), then
1. Condition 2.12 is satisfied as µ1µ2 = 0.43 ≤ 12 =
wN2
wN3
2. Condition 2.13 is satisfied as
(1−µ2)(µ0(1−µ1)−µθL (µ0−µ1))
(1−µ1)(µ0(1−µ2)+µθL (µ2−µ0))
= 0.832 ≤ 0.833 = wI2
wI1
3. Condition 2.14 is satisfied as
µθLµ2(1−µ0)
µ1(µθLµ2(1−µ0)+µ0(1−µθL )(1−µ2))
= 0.69 ≤ 1.73 = wc(µ2)wc(µ1)
4. Condition 2.15 is satisfied as µ1(µ2−µ0)µ0(µ2−µ1) = 0.3 > 0.26 =
wc(µ2)−wc3
wc(µ2)−wc(µ1)
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Proof of Proposition 10. This proposition follows directly from Gentzkow & Kamenica
(2017b) since the environment is Blackwell-connected here.
In particular, if neither sender has information, then the senders’ interim beliefs are
equal to the prior and condition 2.3 reduces to:
Eµ0 [VI(µ1, µ2, µ0)] > Eµ0 [VI(m1,m2, µ0)] for all (m1,m2) ∈ [0, µ1)× (µ2, 1]
In addition, payoffs need to satisfy condition 2.2:
Eµ0 [VN (µ1, µ2, µ0)] > Eµ0 [VN (m1,m2, µ0)]
for all (m1,m2) ∈ [0, µ1)× (µ2, 1], for collusion to be more informative than competition.
Taking a convex combination of the two inequalities with weight α ∈ [0, 1] given that
(m1,m2) = (0, µ2) gives:
Eµ0 [αVI(µ1, µ2, µ0) + (1− α)VN (µ1, µ2, µ0)] > Eµ0 [αVI(0, µ2, µ0) + (1− α)VN (0, µ2, µ0)]
⇔ Eµ0 [Vm(µ1, µ2, µ0)] > Eµ0 [Vm(0, µ2, µ0)]
Which contradicts condition 2.5 (with µθ = µ0). Therefore, conditions 2.2, 2.3, and
2.5 can never be satisfied at the same time when µθL = µθR = µ0.
Proof of Proposition 11. To prove that the least informative collusive equilibrium is
not strictly more informative than the least-collusive competitive equilibrium when senders
have full information, I show that the only (and therefore least informative) competitive
equilibrium is fully revealing.
First note that if any of the senders play a separating strategy, then the receiver fully
learns the state in equilibrium regardless of the experiment chosen, so we can restrict
attention to pooling equilibria.
Suppose by contradiction that the two types of the two senders pool on an experiment
that induces posterior beliefs such that at least one of these beliefs m satisfies 0 < m < 1.
If µ1 < m < 1, type θL of Sender I can deviate to a fully revealing experiment. This
increases Sender I’s expected utility to wI1 with probability 1, which is greater than the
utility from any other experiment that induces some belief m satisfying µ1 < m < 1.
In particular, since type θR of Sender I would never deviate to such a experiment, the
out-of-equilibrium put only weight on θL, so we do not need to consider how the receiver
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would update a degenerate belief that contradicts the fully revealing experiment.
Similarly, if 0 < m ≤ µ1, type θR of Sender N would prefer to deviate to a fully
revealing experiment since this gives expected utility wN3 with probability 1, which is
greater than the utility from any other experiment that induces some belief m satisfying
µ1 < m < 1.
Hence the unique competitive equilibrium must be fully revealing, and the least infor-
mative collusive equilibrium cannot possibly be strictly more informative.
Proof of Proposition 12. If the conditions in proposition 8 are satisfied, then the least
informative equilibrium in collusion is more informative than the least-information equi-
librium in competition.
Therefore, if the receiver’s welfare is increasing in the amount of information available,
then the receiver is better-off under collusion than competition, when focusing on the least
informative equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 13. Since the uninformed sender can unilaterally deviate to an
experiment inducing τm in competition without changing the interim beliefs of the receiver,
then distribution τm must make the uninformed sender worse-off. Otherwise, he would
deviate to it in competition, which contradicts that τ c is an equilibrium in competition.
Therefore, the uninformed sender must be (ex-ante) worse-off in collusion.
The equilibrium distribution in collusion induces posterior beliefs (0, µ2). Therefore,
type θR of the informed sender expects to get w
I
2 with probability 1 in collusion, instead
of some mixture of wI1 and w
N
1 in competition. Therefore, the payoff in collusion is higher
than in competition as wI1 > w
N
1 . Therefore, type θR of the informed sender must be
(ex-ante) worse-off in collusion.
Finally, suppose by contradiction that type θL of Sender I is worse-off under com-
petition than under collusion. Then this type could deviate to the more informative
distribution τm in competition. However, condition 2.13 in 8 implies that this deviation
is not profitable for any out-of -equilibrium belief of the receiver. Therefore, type θL of
Sender I is also worse-off in collusion than in competition.
Since both types of Sender I are worse-off, then Sender I must be worse-off ex-ante
too.
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C Proofs of results in Chapter 3
Proof of proposition 14. For the first and second part of the proposition (a2 = 0 in
any equilibrium, and the voter believes a2 = 0 with probability 1): for any type of the
politician, and for any realisation of the random shock to utility, the politician’s second-
period payoff is strictly decreasing in effort. Since the politician cannot credibly commit
to a second-period action in the first period, the unique optimal strategy is to exert zero
effort. Common knowledge of rationality implies that the only possible belief for the voter
is that the politician will exert zero effort with probability 1.
For the third part, given the optimal choice of effort of the politician in the second
period, the voter’s choice of r(u1) at the end of the first period maximises
r(u1)E[u2(0, θI)|u1] + (1− r(u1))E[u2(0, θC)]
The voter will therefore re-elect the incumbent if and only if (assuming re-election
when indifferent):
E[u2(0, θI)|u1] ≥ E[u2(0, θC)]
Given u2 = f(a2, θ) + ε2, θL, θH > 0, and
∂f(at,θ)
∂θ ≥ 0, this is equivalent to
E[θI |u1] ≥ E[θC ]
Finally, given the prior belief over the type of a politician in the pool of challenger,
P(θ = θH) = p, the voter re-elects the incumbent if and only if
P(θI = θH |u1) ≥ p (27)
The voter updates her beliefs using Bayes’ rule, given her beliefs over the choice of
effort of the politician in the first period. Let a˜1 denote the (degenerate) belief of the
voter over the politician’s choice of effort. The voter’s naivete only affects her beliefs
about the noise ε and about the politician’s own beliefs about that noise. Therefore, the
voter correctly believes that the politician has got no private information on her type and
the left-hand side of equation (27) is then equal to
P(θI = θH |u1, a˜1) = P(u1|θI = θH , a˜1)P(θI = θH)P(u1|θI = θH , a˜1)P(θI = θH) + P(u1|θI = θL, a˜1)P(θI = θL)
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Which given the density of the voter’s prior over εt, gV , is:
P(θI = θH |u1a˜1) = pgV (u1 − f(a˜1, θH))
pgV (u1 − f(a˜1, θH)) + (1− p)gV (u1 − f(a˜1, θL))
Therefore, the condition on u1 for the incumbent to be re-elected is
pgV (u1 − f(a˜1, θH)
pgV (u1 − f(a˜1, θH)) + (1− p)gV (u1 − f(a˜1, θL)) ≥ p
Or equivalently,
gV (u1 − f(a˜1, θH))
gV (u1 − f(a˜1, θL)) ≥ 1 (28)
Since the voter’s prior distribution GV over the random shock ε satisfies the monotone
likelihood ratio property (MLRP) (by the normality assumption), the left-hand side of
inequality (28) is increasing in u1. This implies that the voter re-elects the politician if
and only if her first period payoffs are higher than a threshold. Let u¯ denote this threshold.
In particular, this threshold should solve gV (u¯−f(a˜1,θH))gV (u¯−f(a˜1,θL)) = 1, or equivalently
gV (u¯− f(a˜1, θH)) = gV (u¯− f(a˜1, θL))
This concludes the proof of the third statement and of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 15. First consider the politician’s problem given some arbi-
trary threshold u¯. The effort choice is determined by the first-order condition 3.6. I
express this condition in terms of the model parameters below, let a∗1 the optimal effort
given an arbitrary threshold u¯:
c′(a∗1) = pδg
(
u¯− f(a∗1, θH)
)∂f(a1, θH)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=a∗1
+ (1− p)δg
(
u¯− f(a∗1, θL)
)∂f(a1, θL)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=a∗1
(29)
The first-order condition identifies the optimal effort if the second-order condition is
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satisfied. Expanding condition 3.7 gives:
c′′(a∗1) ≥ pδ
[
g (u¯− f(a∗1, θH))
∂2f(a1, θH)
∂a21
∣∣∣
a1=a∗1
− g′ (u¯− f(a∗1, θH))
(
∂f(a1, θH)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=a∗1
)2 ]
+ (1− p)δ
[
g (u¯− f(a∗1, θL))
∂2f(a1, θL)
∂a21
∣∣∣
a1=a∗1
− g′ (u¯− f(a∗1, θL))
(
∂f(a1, θL)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=a∗1
)2 ]
(30)
Voter’s choice of threshold: given that the voter has correct beliefs over the politi-
cian’s beliefs about the distribution of ε1, and given that the politician’s choice of effort
is based on her own belief about that distribution and her belief about the voter’s equi-
librium threshold, the voter uses the solution to the first-order condition 29 to determine
the threshold. This is because the voter’s belief about the variance σ2V does not affect her
choice of threshold. Therefore, the threshold is obtained by substituting a∗1 into equation
(3.9):
u¯ =
f(a∗1, θH) + f(a∗1, θL)
2
Substituting this voter’s re-election threshold and using assumption 4, we find that the
equilibrium effort aSP must satisfy:
c′(aPS ) =
δ
σ
φ
(
f(aPS , θH)− f(aPS , θL)
2σ
)
×
[
p
∂f(a1, θH)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aPS
+ (1− p)∂f(a1, θL)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aPS
]
(31)
And that it is a maximum if:
c′′(aPS ) ≥
δ
σ
[
1
2σ
φ′
(
f(aPS , θH)− f(aPS , θL)
2σ
)(
∂f(aPS , θH)
∂a1
− ∂f(a
P
S , θL)
∂a1
)
×
(
p
∂f(aPS , θH)
∂a1
+ (1− p)∂f(a
P
S , θL)
∂a1
)
+ φ
(
f(aPS , θH)− f(aPS , θL)
2σ
)[
p
∂2f(aPS , θH)
∂a21
+ (1− p)∂
2f(aPS , θL)
∂a21
]]
This proves the first and second statement of the proposition.
To prove existence, note that the left-hand side of equation (31) is strictly increasing
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in a and is equal to 0 at a = 0 and goes to infinity as a tends to infinity, given the properties
of c in assumption 5. The right-hand side of (31), denoted B(a) satisfies
lim
a→0
B(a) > 0
Since lima→0 δσφ
(
f(a,θH)−f(a,θL)
2σ
)
is strictly positive given
∣∣ lima→0 f(a, θ)∣∣ < +∞, and
lima→0
[
p∂f(a,θH)∂a + (1− p)∂f(a,θL)∂a
]
> 0 since lima→0
∂f(a,θ)
∂a > 0, given assumption 3.
In addition, B(a) satisfies,
lim
a→+∞B(a) < +∞
Since lima→+∞ δσφ
(
f(a,θH)−f(a,θL)
2σ
)
is finite given σ > 0, and since
lim
a→+∞
[
p
∂f(a, θH)
∂a
+ (1− p)∂f(a, θL)
∂a
]
< +∞
given lima→0
∂f(a,θ)
∂a < +∞ as stated in assumption 3.
Therefore, we have that
c′(0) = 0 < lim
a→0
B(a) and lim
a→+∞B(a) < lima→+∞ c
′(a) = +∞
So by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a∗ ∈ (0,+∞) such that the left-hand
side of equation (31) equals the right-hand side if a = a∗. The strategy profile (a, u¯) =(
a∗, f(a
∗,θH)+f(a∗,θL)
2
)
is then an equilibrium.
For uniqueness, a sufficient condition is that the function
T (a) ··= δ
[
1− pΦ
(
f(a, θL)− f(a, θH)
2σ
)
− (1− p)Φ (f(a, θH)− (f(a, θL))
]
− c(a)
is strictly concave. In that case, T ′(a) < 0 for any a, so given the existence result above,
T (a) = 0 for a unique value of a, and u¯ is then also uniquely determined. Note that the
concavity of T (a) also implies that the second-order condition is satisfied.
Proof of proposition 16. The proof of the first three statements in the proposition is
given in the text. For the last statement, note that since the voter believes the incumbent
chooses effort aV , and the incumbent is aware of the voter’s bias and naivety, then the
incumbent also believes that the voter believes she chooses effort aV . Similarly, since the
incumbent believes the voter will re-elect if and only if her payoff is above the threshold u¯V
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, then the voter believes that the incumbent believes the voter uses this threshold. There-
fore, both player’s beliefs over the other player’s beliefs over the equilibrium strategies are
correct, and as a result any higher-order beliefs must be correct too.
Proof of proposition 17. The existence and uniqueness of a RCE requires that both
the incumbent’s action aI and the voter’s beliefs over the incumbent’s action aV exist and
are unique.
The voter’s belief about the incumbent’s action aV solves:
c′(aV ) = δ
1
σV
φ
(
f(aV , θH)− f(aV , θL)
2σV
)[
p
∂f(a1, θH)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aV
+ (1− p)∂f(a1, θL)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aV
]
(32)
This is the same equation as equation (31) and therefore the same arguments as in the
proof of Proposition 15 ensure the existence and the uniqueness of aV .
Given a unique aV , the incumbent’s equilibrium action is defined by equation (3.14)
reproduced below:
c′(aI) = pδ
1
σ
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(aI , θH)
σ
)
∂f(a1, θH)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aI
+ (1− p)δ 1
σ
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(aI , θL)
σ
)
∂f(a1, θL)
∂a1
∣∣∣
a1=aI
The left-hand side is 0 at aI = 0 and tends to infinity as aI → +∞ given assumption
5. The right-hand side is strictly positive as aI → 0 since
1. φ
(
f(aV ,θH )+f(a
V ,θL)
2
−f(aI ,θ)
σ
)
> 0 for any aV , any θ ∈ {θL, θH}, and any aI as∣∣ lima→0 f(a, θ)∣∣ < +∞,
2. and lima→0
∂f(a,θ)
∂a > 0 given assumption 3.
Finally, the limit of the right-hand side is less than infinity as aI → +∞ since
lim
aI→+∞
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(aI , θH)
σ
)
< +∞
as σ > 0 and since lima→+∞
∂f(a,θ)
∂a < +∞ given assumption 3. Therefore, by the inter-
mediate value theorem there exists aI such that equation (3.14) is satisfied.
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A sufficient condition for uniqueness is that the derivative of
V RCE =
δ
σ
[
pΦ
(
u− f(a, θH)
σ
)
+ (1− p)Φ
(
u− f(a, θL)
σ
)]
is strictly negative for u = f(a
V ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 . Indeed,
c′(aI) = pδ
1
σ
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(aI , θH)
σ
)
∂f(a, θH)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=aI
+ (1− p)δ 1
σ
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(aI , θL)
σ
)
∂f(aI , θL)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=aI
Then for all a < aI ,
c′(a) < pδ
1
σ
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(a, θH)
σ
)
∂f(a, θH)
∂a
+ (1− p)δ 1
σ
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(a, θL)
σ
)
∂f(a, θL)
∂a
And for all a > aI ,
c′(a) > pδ
1
σ
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(a, θH)
σ
)
∂f(a, θH)
∂a
+ (1− p)δ 1
σ
φ
(
f(aV ,θH)+f(a
V ,θL)
2 − f(a, θL)
σ
)
∂f(a, θL)
∂a
So that the two sides only intersect once.
Proof of lemma 4. Recall that the different optimal levels of efforts solve the following
equations:
The voter’s belief about equilibrium effort solves
c′(aV ) =
δ
σV
φ
(
θH
2σV
)
The politician’s choice of effort in the absence of overconfident voter solves
c′(aR) = δφ
(
θH
2
)
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The politician’s choice of effort in the presence of overconfident voters solves
c′(aI) = δ
[
pφ
(
2(aV − aI)− θH
2
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
2(aV − aI) + θH
2
)]
Since assumption 6 implies that assumption 3 is satisfied, then given assumption 5 and
Propositions 15 and 17 we can conclude that aV and aR exist and are unique, and that
aI exists.
For the uniqueness of aI , I show that δ
[
pφ
(
2(aV −a)−θH
2
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
2(aV −a)+θH
2
)]
is
decreasing if and only if a > a¯ where a¯ solves
(1− p)
(
2aV + θH
2
− a¯
)
exp
(
2θH(a
V − a¯))+ p(2aV − θH
2
− a¯
)
= 0
Define the right-hand side of equation (3.14) under assumption 6 as
B(a) ≡ δ
[
pφ
(
2(aV − a)− θH
2
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
2(aV − a) + θH
2
)]
Then,
B′(a) ≤ 0
⇔ ∂
∂a
[
δ
[
pφ
(
2(aV − a)− θH
2
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
2(aV − a) + θH
2
)]]
≤ 0
⇔ p
(
2(aV − a)− θH
2
)
1√
2pi
exp
(
−(2(a
V − a)− θH)2
8
)
+ (1− p)
(
2(aV − a) + θH
2
)
1√
2pi
exp
(
−(2(a
V − a) + θH)2
8
)
≤ 0
⇔ p
(
2aV − θH
2
− a
)
+ (1− p)
exp
(
− (2(aV −a)+θH)28
)
exp
(
(2(aV −a)+θH)2
2
) ≤ 0
⇔ (1− p)
(
2aV + θH
2
− a
)
exp
(
2θH(a
V − a))+ p(2aV − θH
2
− a
)
≤ 0
In addition, B(a) only equals 0 once. Suppose that for some a, B(a) ≤ 0.
1. Then at least one of 2a
V +θH
2 − a ≤ 0 or 2a
V −θH
2 − a holds.
2. Since 2a
V −θH
2 <
2aV +θH
2 , then at least
2aV −θH
2 − a must hold.
3. If 2a
V +θH
2 − a ≤ 0, then for any a′ > a, 2a
V −θH
2 − a′ ≤ 0, 2a
V +θH
2 − a′ ≤ 0 and
therefore (1− p)
(
2aV +θH
2 − a′
)
exp
(
2θH(a
V − a′))+ p(2aV −θH2 − a) ≤ 0.
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4. If 2a
V +θH
2 − a ≥ 0, then
∂
∂a
(1− p)
(
2aV + θH
2
− a
)
exp
(
2θH(a
V − a))
= −(1− p) exp (2θH(aV − a))(1 + 2θH (2aV + θH
2
− a
))
< 0
So for any a′ > a such that a′ ≤ 2aV +θH2 − a, we also have B(a′) ≤ 0.
Finally, note that a = 0,
B(0) = δ
[
(1− p)
(
2aV + θH
2
− a
)
exp
(
2θH(a
V − a))+ p(2aV − θH
2
− a
)]
≥ 0
And as a→∞,
lim
a→∞B(a) = lima→∞ δ
[
(1− p)
(
2aV + θH
2
− a
)
exp
(
2θH(a
V − a))+ p(2aV − θH
2
− a
)]
≤ 0
Therefore, there exists a¯ such that
B(a) ≤ 0 ⇔ a ≥ a¯
Proof of Proposition 18. Given lemma 4, the proof of proposition 18 proceeds as fol-
lows. First, I show that aI is higher than aR if and only if aV > aR. Then I show that
aV > aR if and only if σV > s
∗(θ). Finally, I show that s∗(θ) ∈ [0, 1] and that s∗(θ) is
decreasing in θH .
Lemma 10. Suppose that assumptions 6 is satisfied, and a¯ ≤ 0, then aI > aR if and only
if aV > aR.
Proof of lemma 10. First note the following.
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At a = aV ,
B(aV ) = δ
[
pφ
(
2(aV − aV )− θH
2
)
+ (1− p)φ
(
2(aV − aV ) + θH
2
)]
= δφ
(
θH
2
)
= c′(aR)
Given that c′(a) is increasing in a and B(a) is decreasing in a (as a¯ ≤ 0), we have:
1. aV > aR ⇒ c′(aV ) > c′(aR)
2. aV > aR ⇒ B(aV ) < B(aR)
Thus,
aV > aR ⇒ c′(aV ) > c′(aR) = B(aV ) and c′(aR) = B(aV ) < B(aR)
Therefore, since B(a) and c′(a) are continuous, there exists a such that aR < a < aV and
c′(a) = B(a). Since aI solves c′(aI) = B(aI) and is unique, then
aV > aR ⇒ aR < aI < aV
Similarly, aV < aR ⇒ aV < aI < aR, which concludes the proof.
I then prove the following lemma:
Lemma 11. There exists a threshold s∗(θH) such that aV < aR if and only σ2V < s
∗(θH).
Proof of lemma 11. Given that c′(.) is increasing, aV < aR if and only if c′(aV ) <
c′(aR), and given equations (3.15) and (3.12) this holds if and only if δ
σV
φ
(
θH
2σV
)
<
δφ
(
θH
2
)
.
Or equivalently, if and only if
1
σV
<
exp
(
−12
(
θH
2
)2)
exp
(
−12
(
θH
2σV
)2)
⇔ 1
σV
< exp
(
1
2
[(
θH
2σV
)2
−
(
θH
2
)2])
⇔ − θ
2
H
8
< ln(σV )
(
σ2V
1− σ2V
)
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The right-hand side of this inequality is decreasing in σV , tends to − 12 as σV → 1 and to
0 as σV → 0, as shown below.
Claim 1: ln(σV )
(
σ2V
1−σ2V
)
is decreasing in σV .
Proof: First note that
∂
[
ln(x) x
2
1−x2
]
∂x
=
x
1− x2 + ln(x)
2x
(1− x2)2
And secondly, note that
x
1− x2 + ln(x)
2x
(1− x2)2 < 0⇔ 1 < −2 ln(x) + x
2
In addition, −2 ln(x) + x2 is decreasing in x if x ≤ 1 since ∂−2 ln(x)+x2∂x = − 2x + 2x and at
x = 1, −2 ln(x) + x2 = 1, so that −2 ln(x) + x2 ≥ 1 for any x ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore, ln(σV )
(
σ2V
1−σ2V
)
is decreasing in σV .
Claim 2: limσV→0 ln(σV )
(
σ2V
1−σ2V
)
= 0.
Proof: Using L’Hoˆpital’s rule
lim
σV→0
ln(σV )
(
σ2V
1− σ2V
)
= lim
σV→0
ln(σV )(
1−σ2V
σ2V
) = lim
σV→0
(
1
σV
)
(
− 2
σ3V
) = lim
σV→0
−σ
2
V
2
= 0
Claim 3: limσV→1 ln(σV )
(
σ2V
1−σ2V
)
= − 12 .
Proof: Using L’Hoˆpital’s rule
lim
σV→1
ln(σV )
(
σ2V
1− σ2V
)
= lim
σV→1
ln(σV )(
1−σ2V
σ2V
) = lim
σV→1
(
1
σV
)
(
− 2
σ3V
) = lim
σV→1
−σ
2
V
2
= − 1
2
As a result, combining claims 1, 2 and 3, we get that there exists a threshold s∗(θH)
such that − θ2H8 < ln(σV )
(
σ2V
1−σ2V
)
if and only if σV < s
∗(θH).
The first part of Proposition 18 then follows directly from lemmas 10 and 11.
I now show that s∗(θH) ∈ [0, 1] provided that θH < 2. By claims 2 and 3 and the
intermediate value theorem, the equation − θ2H8 = ln(σV )
(
σ2V
1−σ2V
)
has a unique solution in
[0, 1] if 12 < −
θ2H
8 < 0.
As θH > 0, then − θ
2
H
8 < 0 is always satisfied. In addition,
1
2 < −
θ2H
8 if and only if
θH < 2.
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Finally, as θH increases, − θ
2
H
8 decreases, so since ln(σV )
(
σ2V
1−σ2V
)
is decreasing, then
s∗(θH) is increasing in θH .
Proof of proposition 19. First note that the condition for selection under overconfi-
dence to be higher than for rational voters is derived as follows
S(u¯) = p [P(u > u¯ | θH)θH + P(u < u¯ | θH)(pθH + (1− p)θL)]
+ (1− p) [P(u > u¯ | θL)θL + P(u < u¯ | θL)(pθH + (1− p)θL)]
= p(1− p)(θH − θL) [P(u > u¯ | θH)− P(u > u¯ | θL)] + pθH + (1− p)θL
And in particular,
P(u > u¯V | θH)− P(u > u¯V | θL) > P(u > u¯R | θH)− P(u > u¯R | θL)
⇔
Φ
(
f(aV , θH) + f(a
V , θL)− 2f(aI , θL)
2σ
)
− Φ
(
f(aV , θH) + f(a
V , θL)− 2f(aI , θH)
2σ
)
> Φ
(
f(aR, θH)− f(aR, θL)
2σ
)
− Φ
(
f(aR, θL)− f(aR, θH)
2σ
)
Which under assumptions 5 and 6, and given θL = 0 and σ = 1 reduces to
Φ
(
2(aV − aI) + θH
2
)
− Φ
(
2(aV − aI)− θH
2
)
> Φ
(
θH
2
)
− Φ
(−θH
2
)
Let A = 2(aV − aI). Then,
Φ
(
θH + 2(a
V − aI)
2
)
− Φ
(−θH + 2(aV − aI)
2
)
=
∫ θH+A
−θH+A
φ
(x
2
)
dx
And
∫ θH+A
−θH+A
φ
(x
2
)
dx =
∫ θH
−θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx−
∫ −θH+A
−θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx+
∫ θH+A
θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx
If aV ≥ aI , then A ≥ 0, so
∫ θH
−θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx =
∫ θH+A
−θH+A
φ
(x
2
)
dx+
[∫ −θH+A
−θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx−
∫ θH+A
θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx
]
=
∫ θH+A
−θH+A
φ
(x
2
)
dx+
[∫ θH
θH−A
φ
(x
2
)
dx−
∫ θH+A
θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx
]
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Where the second line follows from the symmetry of the standard normal distribution
around 0. In addition, since θH > 0, we have∫ θH
θH−A
φ
(x
2
)
dx−
∫ θH+A
θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx ≥ 0
So that,
∫ θH
−θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx ≥
∫ θH+A
−θH+A
φ
(x
2
)
dx
That is,
Φ
(
θH
2
)
− Φ
(−θH
2
)
≥ Φ
(
2(aV − aI) + θH
2
)
− Φ
(
2(aV − aI)− θH
2
)
So selection is better without overconfidence.
Similarly, if A ≤ 0,
∫ θH
−θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx =
∫ θH+A
−θH+A
φ
(x
2
)
dx+
[∫ θH
θH+A
φ
(x
2
)
dx−
∫ θH−A
θH
φ
(x
2
)
dx
]
And
∫ θH
θH+A
φ
(
x
2
)
dx− ∫ θH−AθH φ (x2) dx ≥ 0, so that
Φ
(
θH
2
)
− Φ
(−θH
2
)
≥ Φ
(
2(aV − aI) + θH
2
)
− Φ
(
2(aV − aI)− θH
2
)
And selection is also better without overconfidence.
Proof of proposition 20. Proposition 20 follows directly from the following facts:
1. The voter’s expected utility is increasing in a1: follows from assumption 3.
2. First period effort is higher under overconfidence when a¯ ≤ 0 if σ < s∗(θH): follows
from Proposition 18.
3. The voter’s expected utility is increasing in the expected competence of the politician
in office in the second period: follows from assumption 3.
4. Second period expected competence is always worse under overconfidence: follows
from Proposition 19.
The condition below is necessary and sufficient for welfare to be higher under overcon-
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fidence:
aI − aR > p(1− p)δθH
[
2Φ
(
θH
2
)
− Φ
(
θH − 2(aV − aI)
2
)
− Φ
(
θH + 2(a
V − aI)
2
)]
(33)
Indeed, the voter’s expected utility when overconfident is:
UV = p
[
θH + a
I + δ
((
1− Φ
(
2(aV − aI)− θH
2
))
θH + Φ
(
2(aV − aI)− θH
2
)
pθH
)]
+ (1− p)
[
aI + δΦ
(
2(aV − aI) + θH
2
)
pθH
]
= pθH + a
I + pδθH
[
1− (1− p)
(
Φ
(
2(aV − aI)− θH
2
)
− Φ
(
2(aV − aI) + θH
2
))]
The voter’s expected utility when rational is:
UR = p
[
θH + a
R + δ
((
1− Φ
(−θH
2
))
θH + Φ
(−θH
2
)
pθH
)]
+ (1− p)
[
aR + δΦ
(
θH
2
)
pθH
]
= pθH + a
R + pδθH
[
p+ (1− p)2Φ
(
θH
2
)]
Comparing the two and re-arranging gives condition (33).
This condition is satisfied for instance with the cost function c(a) = a
2
2 and the follow-
ing parameters:
Parameter Value
δ 14
σ2V
1
4
θH 1
p 34
Since then aV =
( 12)
( 12)
φ
(
1
2( 12)
)
' 0.12, aR = (12)φ (12) ' 0.088, aI ' 0.089, so UV =
1.044 and UR = 0.997.
D Formal definition of the rationalisable conjectural equi-
librium
I follow the notation and structure used in Esponda (2013). Consider
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1. A state space Ω = {A, U¯ ,G,P}, where A = R2 is the action space of the incumbent,
U¯ ⊆ R is the action space of the voter (redefined in terms of the choice of a threshold
strategy), G is the set of possible probability measures over ε ∈ R, P the set of
probability measures over the set {θL, θH}.
2. A belief space B = 〈Ω, T, ξ, λV , λI〉, where Ω is the state space (set of strategy
profiles and fundamentals of the game) defined above, T is a set of epistemic states,
ξ : T → Ω is a mapping from epistemic states to states of nature, λV and λI are
probability measures over T , representing the players’ beliefs over epistemic states
(and thus over the state space).
3. Two feedback partitions PV for the voter and PI for the incumbent politician.
Following Esponda (2013), a strategy profile is a rationalisable conjectural equilibrium
if there exists a belief space B such that players maximise their expected utility, given
their beliefs (rationality), and these beliefs are consistent given a partition (consistency),
and such that there is common knowledge of rationality and consistency.
To find the set of such equilibria, I first define the exogenous feedback partition that
each player is facing, based on the timing and information structure of the model described
in section 3.2. I then find the set of strategy profiles that satisfy rationality and consistency,
and finally, I refine this set of equilibria by imposing restrictions on higher-order beliefs,
in particular, common knowledge of rationality and consistency.
Given that the voter only observes her utility at the end of the first period, and at
the end of the second period, I restrict the support of the beliefs over the epistemic state
that generates the incumbent’s actions and the distribution of the utility shock ε to be
consistent with the observed utility. Given that, both the incumbent’s action and the
random shock have support over the entire real line, this restriction is not very stringent:
any observed utility is consistent with some combination of incumbent effort and some
realisation of the random shock. In addition, I make the very natural restriction that the
voter should know her own action (choice of re-election threshold), and I assume that the
voter knows the correct distribution of the politician’s type for certain (in order to focus
on overconfidence over the random utility shock). Formally, ∀ ω ∈ Ω, let
PV (ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω | u¯(ω′) = u¯(ω), u1(ω′) ∈ suppω(Eθ[f(a1, θ) + ε]), p(ω′) = p(ω)} (34)
I restrict the incumbent to know with certainty the ‘correct’ (objective) distribution
of both the random shock, and of her own type. The incumbent also observes her own
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actions, and observes whether or not she is re-elected. In this case too, this assumption
does not place strong restrictions on the beliefs of the incumbent, since re-election could
be consistent with an infinity of combinations of re-election thresholds and realisation of
the random shock. Formally, ∀ ω ∈ Ω, let
PI(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω | (a1(ω′), a2(ω′)) = (a1(ω), a2(ω)), G(ω′) = G(ω), p(ω′) = p(ω)} (35)
Then a strategy profile (u¯V , (a
I
1, a
I
2)) is an RCE if there exists B = 〈Ω, T, ξ, λV , λI〉
such that
1. Voter’s rationality
u¯V ∈ arg max
u¯′∈U¯
∫
ξ(T )
uV (u¯
′, (a1(ω), a2(ω)), G(ω), p(ω))dδV (36)
Where δV is the marginal probability over strategies of the incumbent and funda-
mentals of the game (distribution of ε and of θ) induced by the belief λV in B.
2. Incumbent’s rationality
(aI1, a
I
2) ∈ arg max
(a1,a2)∈A
∫
ξ(T )
uI(u¯(ω), (a
I
1, a
I
2), G(ω), p(ω))dδI (37)
Where δI is the marginal probability over strategies of the voter and fundamentals
of the game (distribution of ε and of θ) induced by the belief λI in B.
3. Consistency of voter’s beliefs The voter must put a zero-probability weight on any
epistemic state that generates a state ω that does not belong to the same partition
as the state generated by the epistemic state believed by the voter.
λV (t)(ξ
−1(PV (ξ(t))) = 1 (38)
4. Consistency of incumbent’s beliefs Similarly for the incumbent, let
λI(t)(ξ
−1(PI(ξ(t))) = 1 (39)
5. Voter’s knowledge of incumbent’s rationality Let RBI ⊆ T the event ‘the incumbent
is rational ’ as defined in point 2. above. Then the voter’s second-order beliefs need
to satisfy, for each epistemic state t on which the voter puts positive probability
λV (t)[R
B
I ] = 1.
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6. Incumbent’s knowledge of voter’s rationality Similarly for the incumbent , let
λI(t)[R
B
V ] = 1.
7. Voter’s knowledge of incumbent’s consistency Let CBI ⊆ T the event ‘the incumbent
has consistent beliefs’ as defined in point 4. above. Then the voter’s second-order
beliefs need to satisfy, for each epistemic state t on which the voter puts positive
probability λV (t)[C
B
I ] = 1.
8. Incumbent’s knowledge of voter’s consistency Similarly for the incumbent, let
λI(t)[C
B
V ] = 1
9. In addition, the equilibrium needs to satisfy common knowledge of these last four
conditions, and of all higher-order beliefs about this common knowledge.
Without any restrictions on beliefs, the set of RCEs, as just defined, would be very
large. Indeed, there are infinitely many possible distributions of the random utility shock,
and infinitely many possible beliefs over these distributions, each of which is associated
with a different equilibrium action of the politician and equilibrium threshold of the voter.
Therefore, I focus on the case where the voter has degenerate beliefs over (the subset
of epistemic states which generates) a given distribution of the random shock, denoted
GV (ε) ∈ G, while the incumbent has degenerate beliefs over (the subset of epistemic
states which generates) the true (objective) distribution of the random shock, denoted
G(ε) ∈ G. I also focus on the case where both players have degenerate beliefs over the true
distribution of the politician’s type P(θ = θH) = p. I then use the requirement of common
knowledge of rationality to find the equilibrium beliefs, and equilibrium actions of both
players, such that these beliefs are consistent given the partitions defined in expressions
(34) and (35).
The RCE studied in Chapter 3 is consistent with this definition given the following
voter’s beliefs
λV (tV ) = 1 (40)
Where ξ(tV ) = ωV = (u˜, (a˜1, a˜2), GV , p), for some u˜ ∈ U¯ and (a˜1, a˜2) ∈ A, λV (tV )[RBI ] = 1,
λV (tV )[C
B
I ] = 1, λV (tV )[λI(tV ) = 1] = 1.
9
9The last condition restricts the second-order beliefs of the voter to be degenerate over the event that
the incumbent has the same first-order beliefs as the voter. In other words, I restrict the voter to believe
that the incumbent has the same beliefs as the voter over the equilibrium strategies, and the fundamentals
of the game.
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